Your Agent, Their Asset: A Real-World Safety Analysis of OpenClaw

Zijun Wang, Haoqin Tu, Letian Zhang, Hardy Chen, Juncheng Wu, Xiangyan Liu, Zhenlong Yuan, Tianyu Pang, Michael Qizhe Shieh, Fengze Liu, Zeyu Zheng, Huaxiu Yao, Yuyin Zhou, Cihang Xie

TL;DR

Personal AI agents are designed to "evolve" by updating their own memory and skills, but this very feature creates a massive security loophole called "state poisoning." By introducing the CIK (Capability, Identity, Knowledge) taxonomy, researchers demonstrated that attackers can hijack agents—even those powered by future models like GPT-5.4 and Claude 4.5—increasing attack success rates from 25% to over 70% in real-world scenarios.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

We are entering the era of the "Personal AI Agent"—systems like the paper’s target, OpenClaw, which have full access to your filesystem, Gmail, and Stripe accounts. To be useful, these agents must be "evolutionary": they learn your preferences, store memories, and gain new skills over time.

However, this evolution relies on persistent state files that survive across sessions. The authors identify a critical gap: while most AI safety research focuses on "one-shot" prompt injections in sandboxed environments, they ignore how an agent’s long-term "personality" and "knowledge" can be corrupted. If an attacker can trick an agent into writing a malicious "habit" into its memory, that agent becomes a permanent liability.

Methods

The researchers formalize the agent's attack surface using the CIK taxonomy:

  • Capability: The executable tools and scripts the agent can run.
  • Identity: The agent’s persona, core values, and trust anchors (e.g., "who is my owner?").
  • Knowledge: The agent’s long-term memory and factual database.

They employ a Two-Phase Attack Protocol:

  1. Injection: The attacker uses a normal interaction (like an email or a chat) to trick the agent into updating its persistent files with "poisoned" content.
  2. Trigger: In a later, separate session, a seemingly benign prompt activates the poison, causing the agent to perform a harmful action (like exfiltrating API keys or deleting the workspace).

Crucially, this evaluation was performed on a live system with real integrations, rather than a simulation.

Datasets

The authors introduced CIK-Bench, a benchmark consisting of:

  • 12 Impact Scenarios: Spanning Privacy Leakage (e.g., passport exfiltration) and Risky Irreversible Operations (e.g., unauthorized Stripe refunds).
  • 88 Test Cases per Model: Including 12 baselines and 76 injection variants.
  • Evaluation Models: The study used "frontier" models (dated early 2026 in the paper's context): Claude Sonnet 4.5, Claude Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and GPT-5.4.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The "Evolution-Safety" Tradeoff: This is the paper's most striking "aha moment." When the researchers implemented "File Protection" (requiring the agent to ask for permission before updating its memory), it blocked 97% of attacks. However, it also blocked 93% of legitimate updates. Essentially, you can have a safe agent or an evolving agent, but with current architectures, it is nearly impossible to have both.
  • Capability is the Most Dangerous Vector: Attacks on the "Capability" dimension (installing malicious code) often bypass the LLM’s reasoning loop entirely. If a script is designed to delete a folder in the background while the LLM thinks it's just checking the weather, the LLM's internal safety filters never even "see" the attack.
  • Vulnerability is Structural, Not Model-Specific: Even the most "robust" model (Claude Opus 4.6) saw its vulnerability triple once its state was poisoned. This suggests that simply making models "smarter" won't fix the problem; the issue lies in how agent architectures handle persistent data.

Key Results

  • Massive Success for Attackers: Poisoning just one CIK dimension skyrocketed the average Attack Success Rate (ASR) from a baseline of 24.6% to between 64% and 74%.
  • Knowledge Poisoning: This was the easiest to achieve, with agents accepting malicious memory updates 87.5% to 100% of the time.
  • Defense Failure: The authors tested "GuardianClaw" (a specialized security skill). While it helped reduce baseline risks, it still allowed a 63.8% success rate for Capability-targeted attacks because the malicious code executed outside the "checklist" reasoning.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Single Platform: The study focused exclusively on OpenClaw. While OpenClaw follows common agent design patterns, results might vary on different architectures.
  • Independent Dimensions: The researchers tested CIK dimensions in isolation. They note that "chaining" attacks (e.g., using poisoned Knowledge to reinforce a fake Identity) would likely be even more effective.
  • The Need for Architectural Safeguards: The authors conclude that prompt-based defenses are "band-aids." Future work must focus on low-level systems security, such as code signing for new skills, sandboxed execution for all tools, and mandatory human-in-the-loop approvals for sensitive file modifications.

Summary updated

Abstract

OpenClaw, the most widely deployed personal AI agent in early 2026, operates with full local system access and integrates with sensitive services such as Gmail, Stripe, and the filesystem. While these broad privileges enable high levels of automation and powerful personalization, they also expose a substantial attack surface that existing sandboxed evaluations fail to capture. To address this gap, we present the first real-world safety evaluation of OpenClaw and introduce the **CIK taxonomy**, which unifies an agent’s persistent state into three dimensions, i.e., **C**apability, **I**dentity, and **K**nowledge, for safety analysis. Our evaluations cover 12 attack scenarios on a live OpenClaw instance across four backbone models (Claude Sonnet 4.5, Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and GPT-5.4). The results show that poisoning any single CIK dimension increases the average attack success rate from 24.6% to 64-74%, with even the most robust model exhibiting more than a threefold increase over its baseline vulnerability. We further assess three CIK-aligned defense strategies alongside a file-protection mechanism; however, the strongest defense still yields a 63.8% success rate under Capability-targeted attacks, while file protection blocks 97% of malicious injections but also prevents legitimate updates. Taken together, these findings show that the vulnerabilities are inherent to the agent architecture, necessitating more systematic safeguards to secure personal AI agents. Our project page is https://ucsc-vlaa.github.io/CIK-Bench.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{wang2026your,
  author = {Zijun Wang and Haoqin Tu and Letian Zhang and Hardy Chen and Juncheng Wu and Xiangyan Liu and Zhenlong Yuan and Tianyu Pang and Michael Qizhe Shieh and Fengze Liu and Zeyu Zheng and Huaxiu Yao and Yuyin Zhou and Cihang Xie},
  title = {{Your Agent, Their Asset: A Real-World Safety Analysis of OpenClaw}},
  booktitle = {WAB @ COLM},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=2uCfsduqRt},
}
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