Intrinsic Motivation in Public Service: Theory and Evidence from State Supreme Courts

Elliott Ash, W. Bentley MacLeod

Abstract

This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the intrinsic preferences of state appellate court judges. Using a panel dataset of published decisions from 1,636 state supreme court judges across all 50 U.S. states (1947–1994), we estimate the effects of changing employment conditions on judicial performance. Our results suggest that judges are intrinsically motivated to provide high-quality decisions, prioritizing quality over quantity at the margin. When time pressure is reduced—specifically through the creation of intermediate appellate courts—judges produce more well-researched and influential opinions. Conversely, election cycles appear to distract from judicial work rather than incentivize performance. These effects are most pronounced when judges possess the discretion to select their own case portfolios.

Introduction

In traditional labor economics, performance is typically driven by "high-powered" incentives such as bonuses or commissions. However, many critical public sector roles, including the judiciary, operate under "low-powered" incentives where salaries are fixed and output is difficult to monitor. This raises a fundamental question: what drives performance in these high-status public roles? This study investigates the "professionalism" hypothesis, which posits that individuals in these positions are driven by intrinsic motivation to perform high-quality work.

Theoretical Framework

We extend a "legal-realist" model of judicial behavior using a Cobb-Douglas utility function. In this model, a judge’s time is a finite resource allocated between leisure, judging, and outside activities (such as political campaigning). If judges are intrinsically motivated by the quality of their legal reasoning, the model predicts that reducing time pressure will lead them to invest more effort into high-quality, "important" cases rather than simply increasing the volume of their output.

Methodology and Data

To test this theory, we employ a within-judge fixed-effects strategy. By observing how the same judge’s behavior changes following institutional policy shifts, we control for unobservable traits like innate ability or work ethic. We treat state-level legal reforms, such as the establishment of Intermediate Appellate Courts (IACs), as natural experiments to identify causal effects.

The analysis is based on a massive panel dataset covering 1947 to 1994:

  • Judicial Opinions: Approximately 388,000 authored majority opinions.
  • Performance Metrics: Quality is quantified through opinion length, the number of citations to previous case law (indicating research effort), and the frequency with which an opinion is cited by future judges (indicating influence).
  • Institutional Context: Data on salary scales, biographical information for 1,636 judges, and the timing of IAC establishments.

Key Findings

The Quality-Quantity Trade-off

Our findings indicate that when judges are given more time, they do not "slack off." Instead, they pivot toward quality. The introduction of an IAC—which handles routine cases and reduces the supreme court's caseload—allows judges to focus on more complex matters. In states where judges have full discretion over their case portfolio, the establishment of an IAC led to a 10% increase in majority opinion length and a 14% increase in citations to previous legal authorities.

The Role of Discretion

Intrinsic motivation is not a static trait; it is highly dependent on autonomy. The positive effects of reduced caseloads or increased salaries on quality were only statistically significant in states where judges had the discretion to choose which cases to hear. Without control over their "portfolio," judges behave more like unmotivated agents, suggesting that autonomy is a prerequisite for the expression of professional intrinsic motivation.

Elections as a Distraction

Contrary to the idea that elections serve as a performance-enhancing incentive, our data shows that judicial performance—both in terms of quality and quantity—drops during election years. In contested election systems, judges write roughly 6.5% fewer majority opinions during an election year. This suggests that the time required for campaigning "crowds out" judicial work, rather than the threat of removal acting as a "prodding" incentive for better performance.

Salary and Influence

While salaries are "low-powered" in terms of immediate output, they do correlate with long-term influence. A 1% increase in real salary was associated with a significant rise in future citations per opinion, but again, this effect was only observed in high-discretion environments.

Conclusion and Implications

This research demonstrates that state supreme court judges are primarily driven by intrinsic professional standards. When institutional structures grant judges more time and autonomy, they invest that surplus into the quality and depth of their legal reasoning. These findings have significant implications for the design of public institutions: to maximize the quality of public service, policy should focus on reducing distractions (like political campaigning) and increasing professional autonomy, rather than relying on traditional extrinsic incentives.

Summary updated

Abstract

This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the intrinsic preferences of state appellate court judges. We construct a panel data set using published decisions from state supreme court cases merged with institutional and biographical information on all (1,636) state supreme court judges for the 50 states of the United States from 1947 to 1994. We estimate the effects of changes in judge employment conditions on a number of measures of judicial performance. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that judges are intrinsically motivated to provide high-quality decisions, and that at the margin they prefer quality over quantity. When judges face less time pressure, they write more well-researched opinions that are cited more often by later judges. When judges are up for election then performance falls, suggesting that election politics take time away from judging work -rather than providing an incentive for good performance. These effects are strongest when judges have more discretion to select their case portfolio, consistent with psychological theories that posit a negative effect of contingency on motivation (e.g.
BibTeX
@article{ash2015intrinsic,
  author = {Elliott Ash and W. Bentley MacLeod},
  title = {{Intrinsic Motivation in Public Service: Theory and Evidence from State Supreme Courts}},
  journal = {The Journal of Law and Economics},
  year = {2015},
  doi = {10.1086/684293},
}
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