Mandatory Retirement for Judges Improved Performance on U.S. State Supreme Courts

Elliott Ash, W. Bentley MacLeodSSRN 2020 · DOI

Introduction

In high-skill professions such as law, medicine, and academia, cognitive performance is often assumed to decline with age. However, these fields frequently lack performance-based compensation or straightforward paths for termination. In the United States judiciary, many judges enjoy life tenure or robust protections, raising concerns that age-related cognitive depreciation—sometimes referred to as "senility"—might compromise the quality of legal output.

Recent research investigates whether mandatory retirement (MR) policies effectively address this issue. By analyzing the staggered introduction of MR laws across U.S. state supreme courts, this study explores whether forcing older judges to step down improves court performance or prematurely removes valuable experience from the bench.

The Challenge of Judicial Aging

The core challenge lies in the nature of judicial work. Unlike manual labor, judicial output is intellectual and cumulative. While experience is a virtue, cognitive decline is a biological reality. Without mandatory retirement, courts may suffer from "graying" benches where older judges, despite their prestige, produce less influential work. The study asks: does MR solve this by refreshing the court, or does it hurt the system by losing the "wisdom" of senior jurists?

Methodology: A Natural Experiment

To answer these questions, researchers treated the introduction of mandatory retirement laws as a natural experiment. Using a Differences-in-Differences (DiD) framework and event-study regressions, they compared courts that enacted MR policies against a control group of states that maintained their existing rules.

Performance was measured using two primary proxies:

  1. Quantity: The volume of published opinions authored by a judge.
  2. Quality/Influence: The number of "forward citations"—how frequently future judges in other jurisdictions cite an opinion as persuasive or binding.

Data and Policy Landscape

The study utilized a massive longitudinal dataset spanning 1947 to 1994, incorporating over 1.1 million judicial opinions from Bloomberg Law and biographical data for 1,558 judges.

Table A shows the status quo of retirement rules in 1947, while Table B lists the states that enacted changes between 1948 and 1993.

As shown in the table above, the policy landscape was varied. In 1947, many states had no maximum age for judges, while others mandated retirement at 70, 72, or 75. Over the subsequent decades, numerous states transitioned from "No Max Age" to specific limits, providing the variation necessary for the DiD analysis.

Key Insights: The "Team Effect" of Aging

The research yielded several striking findings regarding how age affects judicial output:

  • The Performance Peak: Judicial influence (citations) typically peaks when a judge is in their late 40s and declines steadily thereafter. By age 70, judges are significantly less influential than they were earlier in their careers.
  • Beyond the Mechanical Effect: Replacing a 70-year-old judge with a 50-year-old naturally improves performance (the "mechanical effect"). However, the total improvement in court performance was three to six times larger than what age changes alone would predict.
  • The Team Effect: The presence of older, less productive judges appears to "slow down" younger colleagues. This may be due to "equal workload" norms, where younger judges limit their output to match their peers, or because younger judges must spend time assisting or correcting the work of aging colleagues.
  • Selective Attrition: Mandatory retirement does not always mean a total exit. High-performing retired judges often return as "senior judges" with partial caseloads, allowing the court to retain the "best" of the old guard while clearing the way for new talent.

Results and Implications

The implementation of mandatory retirement caused a 25–30% proportional increase in positive citations to court opinions. This boost was driven by both an increase in the number of opinions written and the legal influence of those documents. The reforms successfully lowered the average age of working judges by 3 to 4 years.

While these results are clear for the state judiciary, the authors note that they may not translate perfectly to other fields with different workload norms. Furthermore, while citations measure utility to future judges, they may not fully capture "wisdom" in a philosophical sense. Nevertheless, the study suggests that mandatory retirement can significantly enhance the productivity and influence of high-skill institutions by mitigating the negative externalities of cognitive decline.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@misc{ash2020mandatory,
  author = {Elliott Ash and W. Bentley MacLeod},
  title = {{Mandatory Retirement for Judges Improved Performance on U.S. State Supreme Courts}},
  year = {2020},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.4025688},
  howpublished = {SSRN},
}
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