TL;DR
By analyzing 50 years of U.S. State Supreme Court data, this paper demonstrates that judges are primarily driven by intrinsic motivation rather than external incentives. When institutional changes grant judges more time or autonomy, they don't slack off; instead, they pivot from quantity to quality, producing more well-researched and influential legal opinions.
What Problem Does This Paper Address?
In the private sector, performance is often tied to "high-powered" incentives like bonuses or commissions. In the public sector, however, experts like judges usually receive "low-powered" incentives—fixed salaries regardless of output. This raises a fundamental question in labor economics: what actually drives performance in these roles?
The authors tackle the "professionalism" hypothesis: the idea that individuals in high-status public roles are intrinsically motivated to do a good job. Specifically, they investigate how changes in a judge’s work environment—such as caseload, term length, salary, and the electoral cycle—affect the trade-off between the quantity of decisions and the quality of legal reasoning.
Methods
The researchers employ a two-pronged approach:
- Theoretical Modeling: They extend a "legal-realist" model of judicial behavior using a Cobb-Douglas utility function. This model treats a judge’s time as a finite resource allocated between leisure, judging, and "outside activities" (like campaigning). It predicts that if judges are intrinsically motivated, reducing time pressure will lead them to invest more effort into high-quality, "important" cases.
- Empirical Analysis: To test the theory, they use a within-judge fixed-effects strategy. By looking at how the same judge’s behavior changes before and after a policy shift (like the creation of an intermediate court), they control for unobservable traits like individual ability or innate work ethic. They treat state-level legal reforms as "natural experiments" to identify causal effects.
Datasets
The authors assembled a massive, newly integrated panel dataset covering all 50 U.S. states from 1947 to 1994:
- Judicial Opinions: ~388,000 authored majority opinions scraped and parsed from Bloomberg Law.
- Performance Metrics: They quantified "quality" using opinion length, the number of citations to previous case law (research effort), and how often the opinion was cited by future judges (influence).
- Institutional Data: Information on the establishment of Intermediate Appellate Courts (IACs), salary scales from the National Center for State Courts, and biographical data on 1,636 judges.
Key Insights and Ideas
- The Discretion Multiplier: Intrinsic motivation isn't a constant; it's highly dependent on autonomy. The positive effects of higher salaries or reduced caseloads on quality were only significant in states where judges had full discretion over which cases to hear. Without control over their "portfolio," judges behave more like "unmotivated" agents.
- Elections as a Distraction, Not an Incentive: In contested election systems, judicial performance (both quality and quantity) actually drops during election years. This suggests that the time required for campaigning "crowds out" the time available for judging, rather than the threat of losing office acting as a "prodding" incentive for better work.
- Quality Over Quantity: When judges are given more time (e.g., through the introduction of a lower court to handle routine cases), they write fewer opinions overall but significantly increase the depth and research quality of the opinions they do write.
Key Results
- Caseload Reduction: The establishment of an Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) in full-discretion states led to a 10% increase in majority opinion length and a 14% increase in the number of citations to previous authorities.
- Salary Effects: A 1% increase in real salary was associated with a significant rise in future citations (influence) per opinion, but again, only in states with high judicial discretion.
- The Election Tax: In contested systems, judges write roughly 6.5% fewer majority opinions during an election year compared to their non-election years.
Limitations and Future Work
The authors acknowledge that while they control for "within-judge" changes, they cannot fully account for selection effects—how institutional rules might change who decides to become a judge in the first place.
Additionally, the paper notes that much of the "labor" in opinion writing is performed by law clerks. While they found that clerk-to-judge ratios remained relatively stable over the study period, future research could explore how the management of these "human inputs" changes under different incentive structures. Finally, the study's timeframe ends in 1994; the rise of the internet and automated legal research tools likely changed the "cost" of quality in ways that modern data could further illuminate.
Summary updated