Reducing Partisanship in Judicial Elections Can Improve Judge Quality: Evidence from U.S. State Supreme Courts

Elliott Ash, W. Bentley MacLeod2016 · DOI

Abstract

Should technocratic public officials be selected through politics or by merit? This paper explores how selection procedures influence the quality of selected officials in the context of U.S. state supreme courts for the years 1947-1994. In a unique set of natural experiments, state governments enacted a variety of reforms making judicial elections less partisan and establishing merit-based procedures that delegate selection to experts. We compare post-reform judges to prereform judges in their work quality, measured by forward citations to their opinions. In this setting we can hold constant contemporaneous incentives and the portfolio of cases, allowing us to produce causal estimates under an identification assumption of parallel trends in quality by judge starting year. We find that judges selected by nonpartisan processes (nonpartisan elections or technocratic merit commissions) produce higher-quality work than judges selected by partisan elections. These results are consistent with a representative voter model in which better technocrats are selected when the process has less partisan bias or better information regarding candidate ability.

Introduction

In the United States, the selection of state supreme court judges is a patchwork of democratic and technocratic ideals. Some states use partisan elections, where judges run with party labels; others use nonpartisan elections; and many utilize "merit selection," where a commission of experts nominates candidates for gubernatorial confirmation. This diversity in selection methods highlights a core tension between democratic accountability and technical expertise. While proponents of elections argue they ensure judges remain accountable to the public, critics contend that political processes favor "politicians in robes" over legal scholars. This research investigates whether the selection method fundamentally alters the quality of the judges who end up on the bench, specifically asking if less political processes select more capable technocrats.

Methodology and Data

To identify the causal effect of selection methods, the study treats state-level reforms as a series of natural experiments. Between 1947 and 1994, numerous states transitioned between selection systems, providing a rich dataset for analysis. The authors employ a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) approach, comparing judges sitting on the same court at the same time who were selected under different regimes. This strategy controls for contemporaneous factors like workload and institutional incentives, isolating the "selection effect."

Timeline of Judicial Selection Reforms by State

The primary metric for quality is the rank percentile of forward citations per opinion. In the legal profession, citations serve as a functional form of peer review; a judge cites a previous opinion because it offers a clear, usable rule. Therefore, citation frequency is a robust proxy for the technical utility and reasoning of a judge's work. The study utilizes a massive longitudinal dataset including biographical data on 1,558 judges, over 400,000 majority opinions, and comprehensive citation metadata.

Results and Analysis

The findings suggest that removing partisan labels significantly improves judicial quality. Moving from partisan elections to merit selection increases a judge's work quality by 0.08 to 0.1 rank percentiles. On a typical nine-judge panel, this shift is equivalent to a judge moving up one full spot in the internal quality ranking. Quantitatively, partisan-selected judges receive 6% to 8% fewer citations per opinion than their merit-selected or nonpartisan-selected counterparts.

Interestingly, the transition from nonpartisan elections to merit selection showed no significant change in quality. This suggests that the primary gain comes from eliminating the partisan label, which reduces political noise and allows for better information regarding candidate ability to influence the selection. The data also indicates that judicial quality is remarkably stable over a career, suggesting that who gets the job (selection) is more impactful than how they are rewarded once in office (incentives).

Conclusion and Limitations

This research demonstrates that less partisan selection processes lead to higher-quality judicial output. However, the study acknowledges certain limitations. While citations are a standard metric, they do not capture every facet of "justice" or the broader social outcomes of rulings. Additionally, the dynamics observed in appellate courts may differ from those in trial courts. Finally, as judicial elections have become increasingly polarized since 1994, the partisan bias measured in this study may be even more pronounced in the modern era. Future work should continue to explore the interplay between selection methods and long-term judicial performance.

Summary updated

Abstract

Should technocratic public officials be selected through politics or by merit? This paper explores how selection procedures influence the quality of selected officials in the context of U.S. state supreme courts for the years 1947-1994. In a unique set of natural experiments, state governments enacted a variety of reforms making judicial elections less partisan and establishing merit-based procedures that delegate selection to experts. We compare post-reform judges to prereform judges in their work quality, measured by forward citations to their opinions. In this setting we can hold constant contemporaneous incentives and the portfolio of cases, allowing us to produce causal estimates under an identification assumption of parallel trends in quality by judge starting year. We find that judges selected by nonpartisan processes (nonpartisan elections or technocratic merit commissions) produce higher-quality work than judges selected by partisan elections. These results are consistent with a representative voter model in which better technocrats are selected when the process has less partisan bias or better information regarding candidate ability.
BibTeX
@misc{ash2016reducing,
  author = {Elliott Ash and W. Bentley MacLeod},
  title = {{Reducing Partisanship in Judicial Elections Can Improve Judge Quality: Evidence from U.S. State Supreme Courts}},
  year = {2016},
  doi = {10.3386/w22071},
}
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