The rise of digital marketplaces has forced a fundamental rethink of how goods are priced, sold, and distributed. Traditionally, retail operated on a wholesale or reselling model: manufacturers sold goods to retailers at a wholesale price, and retailers set the final price for consumers. Today, e-commerce platforms frequently offer an alternative: the agency selling model. In this format, the manufacturer retains pricing power, selling directly to consumers through the platform while paying the platform a percentage-based commission.
Choosing between these formats is not merely a tactical decision; it fundamentally alters the distribution of pricing power, profit margins, and operational risks across the supply chain.
The Mechanics of the Agency Advantage
To understand why agency selling has become so pervasive, we must look at how it alters pricing incentives. In a traditional reselling arrangement, supply chains suffer from double marginalization. The manufacturer adds a markup to its production cost when selling to the retailer, and the retailer adds another markup when selling to the consumer. This independent double-markup drives retail prices up and depresses total supply chain demand.
Agency selling bypasses this friction by consolidating pricing authority. Because the manufacturer sets the final retail price directly, it eliminates the retailer's independent markup. As demonstrated in Distribution Contract Analysis on e-Platform by Considering Channel Role and Good Complementarity, goods sold under wholesale contracts consistently exhibit higher optimal retail prices than those sold under agency contracts. Consequently, Zeling Xu et al. show that suppliers exhibit a robust, systemic preference for agency contracts when selling complementary goods on e-platforms, regardless of their relative market power.
This structural advantage extends to specialized markets, such as sustainable manufacturing. Qunli Wu et al. note that when managing green technology investments alongside market uncertainty, the choice of sales format dictates how pricing power and environmental risks are distributed (Online promotion format selection for a supply chain with environment responsibility in an uncertain market). Similarly, Xigang Yuan et al. find that a dual-channel model incorporating an agency route yields higher profitability for green manufacturers across varying market conditions (Logistics Service Selection Strategy of Green Manufacturers in Green Low-Carbon Supply Chain).
Aligning Incentives Under Information Asymmetry
Platforms and downstream retailers sit closest to the consumer, meaning they naturally possess superior demand forecasting data. In a traditional reselling model, a retailer has an incentive to hide this data to maintain bargaining leverage over the manufacturer's wholesale price.
Agency selling flips this incentive structure. Because the platform's revenue is tied directly to total sales volume via commissions, it benefits when the manufacturer prices products accurately according to market demand.
In Reselling or agency selling? Sales mode selection for a manufacturer in private label competition under information asymmetry, Anqi Li et al. model this dynamic in an environment where a manufacturer competes directly with a retailer's private label. The authors demonstrate that the agency selling model creates a unique strategic alignment: it incentivizes the retailer to share its private demand forecasts transparently. By retaining pricing control, the manufacturer can use this shared data to optimize its market engagement without fearing that the retailer will manipulate retail markups to favor its own private label, resulting in a win-win outcome for both entities.
The Logistics Interlock
A firm cannot select a sales format in a vacuum; the choice is deeply coupled with physical fulfillment infrastructure. Deciding who controls the transaction format often dictates—or is dictated by—who controls the logistics.
Firms generally navigate three logistics pathways: self-supported infrastructure, third-party logistics (3PL) providers, or platform-integrated fulfillment. Huiyan Li provides a foundational matrix for this choice, mapping an organization's internal management capabilities against the strategic importance of delivery to prevent operational inefficiencies (Research on Models and Modernization of Logistic System in E-commerce).
When a manufacturer leverages a platform's integrated logistics services alongside an agency channel, it introduces a complex trade-off. As Xigang Yuan et al. point out, platform-led logistics can rescue a manufacturer when independent 3PL options are subpar, yet it also exposes the manufacturer to platform exploitation (Logistics Service Selection Strategy of Green Manufacturers in Green Low-Carbon Supply Chain). If the platform capitalizes on its operational dominance, it can inflate fulfillment fees, driving up retail prices and eroding the manufacturer's margins.
This operational tension is highly visible in service-heavy sectors like food delivery. Luxin Li et al. evaluate how restaurants choose between self-delivery, platform delivery, or operating entirely on independent platforms (Study on the Selection of Takeaway Operating Modes from a Restaurant Perspective). The optimal operational mode is highly sensitive to platform commission rates and market size, forcing businesses to constantly balance the reach of a platform against the cost of its fees.
Furthermore, product characteristics can override platform efficiencies entirely. Jan Blechschmidt demonstrates that when goods require specialized handling—such as temperature regulation or hazardous material safety—the need for direct process control outweighs the scale economies of third-party or platform networks, shifting firms toward private fleets (Ein gemeinsames Verkehrsmittel- und Losgrößenwahlmodell basierend auf Copula-Funktionen).
Service Innovations and Channel Conflicts
Finally, format selection influences how firms deploy customer-facing innovations and manage multi-channel friction. When a firm controls the retail interface via agency or direct channels, it assumes full responsibility for the service experience.
This introduces new operational dilemmas, such as the choice between human and automated customer service. Leilei Zhao demonstrates that while AI-driven customer service reduces operational costs, its viability hinges on consumer sensitivity to service quality and the probability of problem resolution (Is Customer Service Innovation Always Preferable? The Impact of AI Technology on an Online Retailer’s Customer Service Decision).
Additionally, expanding into platform-mediated agency channels can trigger intense channel conflict with existing brick-and-mortar networks. As Chunguang Bai and Yongbo Xiao observe, while dual-channel distribution strategies that mix online and offline routes are frequently optimal for manufacturers, traditional retailers often find pure offline channels more profitable due to the aggressive pricing dynamics of online competition (Editorial Special Issue on Service Systems and Service Management).
Ultimately, the choice between agency selling and reselling is a lever for balancing margin control, information flow, and fulfillment costs. By understanding how these contracts eliminate double marginalization and unlock data sharing, enterprises can strategically align their sales formats with their broader operational capabilities.
Key Foundational Work
Research on Models and Modernization of Logistic System in E-commerce (2014) — contributed 3 concept elements to this direction.
Supply Chain Sourcing Under Asymmetric Information (2007) — contributed 1 concept elements to this direction.