Reselling or agency selling? Sales mode selection for a manufacturer in private label competition under information asymmetry

Min Yang, Anqi LiPLoS 2026 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper uses game theory to model how manufacturers choose between reselling and agency selling when competing with retailers' private labels, especially when retailers have better market information. The key takeaway is that manufacturers generally benefit from retailers sharing information, and a "win-win" scenario is most likely under the agency selling model, particularly when retailers have accurate demand forecasts.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

In today's retail landscape, retailers are increasingly leveraging big data to understand consumer demand, which gives them an edge in developing and marketing their own private label products. This creates a competitive challenge for manufacturers, who often lack direct access to this end-market information. This information asymmetry forces manufacturers to make critical decisions about their sales strategies, specifically whether to sell through retailers via a "reselling" model (where the manufacturer sells to the retailer at wholesale) or an "agency selling" model (where the manufacturer sells directly to consumers, with the retailer earning a commission). The paper investigates how a retailer's decision to share its superior demand information influences the manufacturer's choice of sales mode, and under what conditions both parties can achieve mutually beneficial outcomes.

Methods

The authors employ a dynamic game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic interactions between a manufacturer and a retailer. They use backward induction to determine the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies for both parties. The model considers a supply chain where the manufacturer offers its products through either reselling or agency selling, and the retailer competes by also selling its own private label products. A key aspect of the model is the retailer's decision to share or withhold its demand forecast information, which is influenced by factors like forecast accuracy, product substitution rates, and commission/revenue-sharing rates. The paper also introduces an Information Compensation Mechanism (ICM) to incentivize information sharing.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The study relies on a theoretical model and numerical simulations rather than empirical data.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Information is Power (and Profit): Manufacturers consistently benefit from retailers sharing demand information, regardless of the sales mode. This is because better information allows manufacturers to make more informed decisions, leading to higher revenues.
  • Agency Selling for Win-Win: The agency selling model, combined with information sharing, offers the most promising path to a "win-win" outcome for both the manufacturer and the retailer.
  • Retailer's Forecast Accuracy is Key: As a retailer's demand forecasting accuracy improves, it encourages a shift from the reselling to the agency selling mode for the manufacturer.
  • No First-Mover Advantage (Usually): Lower retailer forecast accuracy or smaller demand variance generally negates any significant first-mover advantage for either party.
  • ICM for Cooperation: An Information Compensation Mechanism (ICM) is proposed to align incentives and encourage information sharing, especially in the reselling mode where retailers might otherwise be reluctant to share.

Key Results

The paper presents detailed analyses of four scenarios: reselling with and without information sharing, and agency selling with and without information sharing. It identifies numerous thresholds for commission rates, product substitution rates, and information forecast accuracy that dictate the optimal strategies for both the manufacturer and the retailer. For instance, in the reselling mode, the retailer generally chooses not to share information, exacerbating double marginalization. In contrast, under agency selling, the retailer's decision to share depends on a complex interplay of factors, including the commission rate and product substitution. The study also shows that when the retailer's private label has a higher market share, the threshold for information sharing becomes more favorable for the manufacturer to adopt the agency selling mode.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge that their model assumes private labels already exist and does not deeply explore the interaction of the manufacturer's sales mode choice with the retailer's decision to introduce private labels. Future work could investigate scenarios where manufacturers establish direct sales channels to compete with retail channels, and explore more complex real-world situations involving C2M (Customer-to-Manufacturer) reverse customization. The study also assumes a simplified market structure and does not delve into the impact of factors like brand loyalty or marketing efforts beyond what's implicitly captured by substitution rates.

Summary updated

Abstract

Big data systems enhance retailers' predictive capabilities, providing them with a significant advantage in understanding end-market demand, increasing the competitiveness of retailers' private labels, and significantly impacting manufacturers' sales strategies. This paper applies dynamic game-theoretic models to explore the interaction between the retailer's information-sharing strategies and the manufacturer's sales mode selections when the retailer introduces a private label. Through backward induction, the equilibrium strategies of both parties can be derived. The results show that the manufacturer consistently benefits from information-sharing under both sales modes, potentially achieving a win-win outcome under the agency selling mode. Improving the retailer's information forecast accuracy encourages a shift from reselling to agency selling mode. The retailer's lower information forecast accuracy or the smaller demand variance offers no first-mover advantage to either the manufacturer or the retailer. Additionally, an Information Compensation Mechanism (ICM) for revenue-sharing is proposed, and contract conditions across different sales modes are discussed.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{yang2026reselling,
  author = {Min Yang and Anqi Li and Yang Yang},
  title = {{Reselling or agency selling? Sales mode selection for a manufacturer in private label competition under information asymmetry}},
  booktitle = {PLoS},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0341467},
}
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