Distribution Contract Analysis on e-Platform by Considering Channel Role and Good Complementarity

Jie Wei, Jinghui Lu, Weiyu Chen, Zeling XuJ. Theor. Appl. Electron. Commer. Res 2021 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper analyzes how suppliers choose between agency and wholesale contracts when selling complementary goods on an e-platform, considering their differing roles in the supply chain. The key finding is that regardless of channel roles or contract specifics, suppliers generally prefer agency contracts, and this preference is robust across various market conditions.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The rise of e-platforms has created new distribution channels for suppliers. When suppliers offer complementary goods (like a phone and its case) on the same e-platform, they face a crucial decision: which distribution contract to use. E-retailers typically offer two main options: an agency contract, where the supplier sets the price and pays a referral fee to the e-retailer, or a wholesale contract, where the e-retailer buys goods in bulk and sets its own retail price. This decision becomes complex when suppliers have different levels of market power (channel roles – e.g., a dominant brand vs. a smaller one) and when their products are complementary. Existing research has largely overlooked how these factors interact to influence contract choice and subsequent pricing and profit outcomes for all parties involved. This paper aims to fill that gap by analyzing this complex interplay.

Methods

The authors employ a game-theoretic approach to model the supply chain. They consider a system with one e-retailer (acting as the supply chain leader) and two suppliers selling complementary goods. Crucially, they assume the suppliers have different channel roles, with one designated as the "channel leader" and the other as the "channel follower." This is modeled using a Stackelberg game framework.

Four distinct game models are developed to cover all combinations of contract choices:

  1. WWS1: Both suppliers use a Wholesale contract.
  2. WAS1: Supplier 1 (leader) uses Wholesale, Supplier 2 (follower) uses Agency.
  3. AWS1: Supplier 1 (leader) uses Agency, Supplier 2 (follower) uses Wholesale.
  4. AAS1: Both suppliers use an Agency contract.

The analysis involves deriving equilibrium solutions for prices and profits for each scenario. To gain deeper insights into the impact of various factors, the authors also conduct numerical simulations, varying parameters such as the e-retailer's referral fees, the degree of complementarity between goods, and the potential demand for each good.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The study relies on theoretical modeling and numerical simulations rather than empirical data from specific datasets.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Universal Preference for Agency Contracts: The most striking finding is that, irrespective of their channel role, the e-retailer's referral fees, or the specific complementarity and demand levels of the goods, one supplier's choice of contract consistently leads the other supplier to prefer an agency contract. This suggests a strong inherent advantage of agency contracts for suppliers in this complementary goods scenario.
  • Channel Role Impact: While channel roles (leader vs. follower) influence pricing and profit levels, they don't alter the fundamental preference for agency contracts. The leader might command higher prices, but the profit advantage often leans towards the agency contract regardless of who holds the leadership position.
  • Complementarity Matters for Pricing, Not Contract Choice: The degree of complementarity between goods significantly impacts optimal retail prices. However, this impact is secondary to the core preference for agency contracts when it comes to the distribution strategy itself.
  • E-Retailer's Profitability: The e-retailer generally profits more when both suppliers use wholesale contracts, especially when referral fees are low. However, the impact of supplier contract choices on the e-retailer's profit can be nuanced and depends on the specific contract combinations and market conditions.

Key Results

  • Supplier Contract Choice: The study consistently shows that when two suppliers sell complementary goods on an e-platform, the supplier not making the decision (the "other supplier") will always prefer an agency contract. This holds true across all analyzed scenarios, including different channel roles, referral fees, and product characteristics.
  • Pricing Dynamics: When suppliers use different contracts, the optimal retail price for a good sold under a wholesale contract tends to be higher than for a good sold under an agency contract.
  • Profitability: The agency contract generally leads to higher profits for suppliers compared to the wholesale contract, a finding that is robust across various parameters.
  • Impact of Complementarity: When goods have different levels of complementarity, low-complementarity goods can command higher optimal retail prices if the difference in complementarity is significant. Suppliers producing these lower-complementarity goods tend to earn more profits, regardless of their contract or channel role.
  • Impact of Potential Demand: For complementary goods with different potential demands, the high-demand good generally achieves a higher optimal retail price and leads to higher profits for its supplier, irrespective of the distribution contract or channel role.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge several limitations:

  • Linear and Deterministic Demand: The study assumes linear and deterministic demand functions. Future research could explore how results change with nonlinear or stochastic demand functions, which are more realistic in e-commerce.
  • Single E-Retailer and Same Echelon: The model focuses on one e-retailer and different channel roles between suppliers at the same echelon. Investigating scenarios with multiple e-retailers or different channel roles among e-retailers could offer broader insights.
  • Information Completeness: The assumption of complete information among all supply chain members is a simplification. Future work could incorporate information asymmetry and the role of big data in influencing decisions.

The paper suggests that exploring these areas would be valuable for a more comprehensive understanding of e-commerce supply chain dynamics.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@article{wei2021distribution,
  author = {Jie Wei and Jinghui Lu and Weiyu Chen and Zeling Xu},
  title = {{Distribution Contract Analysis on e-Platform by Considering Channel Role and Good Complementarity}},
  journal = {J. Theor. Appl. Electron. Commer. Res.},
  year = {2021},
  doi = {10.3390/jtaer16030028},
}
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