Does Corruption Produce Unsafe Drivers?

Marianne Bertrand, Simeon Djankov, Rema Hanna, Sendhil Mullainathan

Abstract

This study follows 822 applicants through the process of obtaining a driver's license in New Delhi, India, to understand how bureaucracy responds to individual and social needs. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: a bonus group (offered a financial reward for obtaining a license quickly), a lesson group (offered free driving lessons), and a comparison group. To gauge actual driving skills, researchers performed a surprise independent driving test after participants obtained their licenses. The results reveal that the bureaucracy is highly responsive to individual needs—those in the bonus group obtained licenses 40% faster—but entirely insensitive to social needs like road safety. Despite superior skills, the lesson group was no more likely to obtain a license than the comparison group. Detailed surveys and an audit of private agents suggest that bureaucrats use "red tape" to extract bribes, allowing individuals to bypass exams and undermining the fundamental purpose of regulation.

Introduction

Economists have long debated whether corruption acts as "grease" or "sand" in the gears of development. The "grease the wheels" hypothesis suggests that bribes allow individuals to bypass inefficient bureaucracy, potentially increasing economic efficiency. Conversely, the "sand" view argues that corruption undermines essential regulations and encourages bureaucrats to create artificial hurdles to extract payments.

This paper tests these theories within the context of driver licensing in India. The core question is whether the corrupt system merely facilitates administrative shortcuts or if it fundamentally fails the public by allowing unqualified drivers onto the road.

Experimental Framework

The researchers conducted a field experiment with 822 license applicants in New Delhi, randomly assigning them to three experimental arms:

  1. Bonus Group: Offered a reward of approximately one-third of an average monthly salary for obtaining a license within 31 days. This tested the system's sensitivity to an applicant's "willingness to pay" for speed.
  2. Lesson Group: Offered free, high-quality driving lessons to test if the bureaucracy rewards actual technical skill.
  3. Comparison Group: A control group receiving no special incentives or training.

To measure true ability, the researchers administered a surprise independent road test to all participants after they obtained their licenses. This allowed for a direct comparison between the government's licensing decision and the applicant's actual driving competence. Additionally, an audit study was conducted with 224 private agents to determine the pricing and feasibility of bypassing various regulatory requirements.

The Failure of the Licensing System

The study's findings provide a stark indictment of the licensing process. The bureaucracy proved highly effective at rewarding those who wanted to move fast, but indifferent to those who could actually drive.

Speed vs. Safety

The Bonus group was highly successful in navigating the bureaucracy, obtaining licenses 40% faster and at a 28% higher rate than the control group. However, this speed came at the cost of safety: 69% of the Bonus group failed the surprise independent driving test. These individuals were licensed despite being dangerously unqualified.

The Skill Gap

Conversely, the Lesson group demonstrated significantly improved driving skills, with only 11% failing the surprise test. Despite this proficiency, they were no more likely to obtain a license than the comparison group. In fact, they were 29 percentage points less likely to get a license than the Bonus group. This suggests that the official licensing process is almost entirely "skill-blind."

Mechanisms of Corruption: Red Tape and Agents

The study identifies two primary mechanisms that sustain this corrupt equilibrium: endogenous red tape and the agent system.

Artificial Hurdles

Bureaucrats do not merely wait for bribes; they actively create obstacles. The researchers found that bureaucrats arbitrarily fail applicants on the official driving test—even those who are demonstrably good drivers—to nudge them toward hiring intermediaries. This "red tape" makes the official path so difficult that the corrupt path becomes the default.

The Role of Intermediaries

Corruption in New Delhi is mediated by professional "agents." These intermediaries handle the transaction, minimizing the risk of detection for the bureaucrat and reducing the "hassle" for the applicant. The audit study revealed that agents are highly effective at bypassing the rules: among those who used an agent, only 12% actually took the official driving test. In contrast, 94% of those who did not use an agent were forced to take the exam.

The Verifiability Constraint

Interestingly, the system is not lawless. Bureaucrats are strict about "verifiable" requirements, such as age or residency documents, which can be easily checked by supervisors. However, because a five-minute road test is difficult to verify after the fact, it is the first requirement to be discarded in exchange for a bribe.

Conclusion

The findings suggest that corruption in this context does more than just "grease the wheels"; it completely subverts the social goal of road safety. By creating a system where licenses are for sale and skill is irrelevant, the bureaucracy extracts significant rents—participants paid an average of Rs 1,127 for a license, more than double the official fee—while endangering the public.

Future policy interventions should focus on making the testing process more transparent and technologically verifiable. If the primary constraint on corruption is the ability of a supervisor to verify a bureaucrat's actions, then tools like automated testing tracks or dashcam recordings could be essential in restoring the integrity of the licensing process.

Summary updated

Abstract

We follow 822 applicants through the process of obtaining a driver's license in New Delhi, India.To understand how the bureaucracy responds to individual and social needs, participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: bonus, lesson, and comparison groups.Participants in the bonus group were offered a financial reward if they could obtain their license fast; participants in the lesson group were offered free driving lessons.To gauge driving skills, we performed a surprise driving test after participants had obtained their licenses.Several interesting facts regarding corruption emerge.First, the bureaucracy responds to individual needs.Those who want their license faster (e.g. the bonus group), get it 40% faster and at a 20% higher rate.Second, the bureaucracy is insensitive to social needs.The bonus group does not learn to drive safely in order to obtain their license: in fact, 69% of them were rated as "failures" on the independent driving test.Those in the lesson group, despite superior driving skills, are only slightly more likely to obtain a license than the comparison group and far less likely (by 29 percentage points) than the bonus group.Detailed surveys allow us to document the mechanisms of corruption.We find that bureaucrats arbitrarily fail drivers at a high rate during the driving exam, irrespective of their ability to drive.To overcome this, individuals pay informal "agents" to bribe the bureaucrat and avoid taking the exam altogether.An audit study of agents further highlights the insensitivity of agents' pricing to driving skills.Together, these results suggest that bureaucrats raise red tape to extract bribes and that this corruption undermines the very purpose of regulation.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{bertrand2006does,
  author = {Marianne Bertrand and Simeon Djankov and Rema Hanna and Sendhil Mullainathan},
  title = {{Does Corruption Produce Unsafe Drivers?}},
  booktitle = {Natural},
  year = {2006},
}

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