A Tax-Subsidy Scheme for Efficient Investment in Renewable Generation Capacity

Mohammad Reza Karimi Gharigh, Lamia Varawala, Mohammad Reza Hesamzadeh, György Dán

TL;DR

This paper proposes a novel tax-subsidy scheme to address two critical challenges in electricity markets: accurately pricing pollution externalities and incentivizing efficient investment in renewable energy capacity. By implementing a Pigouvian tax on pollution and a consumer-surplus-based subsidy for renewable investments, the scheme aims to align producer behavior with social welfare maximization, ultimately leading to a more sustainable and efficient energy system.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The global energy sector faces a dual challenge: transitioning to renewable energy sources while ensuring market efficiency and sustainability. Current electricity markets, often operating on a merit-order dispatch system, fail to account for the negative externalities of pollution, such as carbon emissions. This leads to underpricing of polluting energy sources and an inaccurate reflection of true costs.

Furthermore, renewable energy sources, while having low operational costs, require significant upfront investment. This can disincentivize producers, leading to strategic decisions that may not align with maximizing overall social welfare. Specifically, low operational costs can drive down market prices, reducing producer profits and potentially leading to capacity withholding or strategic investment choices that don't optimize for the grid's long-term needs. This paper tackles these issues by proposing a market mechanism that internalizes pollution costs and encourages optimal renewable capacity investment.

Methods

The authors propose a two-pronged approach:

  1. Pigouvian Tax for Pollution Externalities: A tax is introduced to internalize the cost of pollution generated by electricity production. This tax is designed to be a Pigouvian tax, meaning it's set equal to the marginal external cost of pollution. This aims to correct the market's failure to account for these negative externalities, leading to more accurate electricity prices and encouraging cleaner generation.
  2. Consumer-Surplus-Based Subsidy for Renewable Investment: To address the disincentive for investing in renewable capacity, a subsidy is proposed. This subsidy is set equal to a producer's marginal contribution to consumer surplus. The idea is that by increasing consumer surplus, producers are incentivized to invest in socially optimal generation capacity, as their profits are less directly tied to volatile market prices and more to the overall welfare generated.

The paper formulates these concepts within a mathematical model of the electricity market, considering generation capacity, transmission constraints, and consumer utility. They then derive the conditions for both socially optimal generation and investment, and compare them to profit-maximizing behavior under the proposed scheme.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The paper focuses on theoretical modeling and analytical examples, rather than empirical data analysis or training on specific datasets.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Aligning Profit with Welfare: The core insight is that by carefully designing taxes and subsidies, producer profit maximization can be made to align with social welfare maximization. This is a crucial step towards achieving sustainability goals in energy markets.
  • The Power of Pigouvian Taxes: The paper demonstrates how a Pigouvian tax can effectively internalize pollution costs, leading to more accurate pricing and a natural preference for cleaner energy sources in market clearing.
  • Subsidy as a Lever for Investment: The proposed subsidy mechanism, tied to consumer surplus, offers a novel way to encourage investment in renewable capacity. It decouples producer profits from market price fluctuations, making renewable investments more attractive.
  • Robustness to Information Asymmetry: The proposed scheme is designed to rely on aggregate values (like total generation and pollution), making it robust to information asymmetry that often plagues regulators. This means the ISO doesn't need perfect knowledge of every producer's cost functions.
  • Incentive Compatibility: The scheme is designed to be incentive compatible, meaning producers are motivated to accurately declare their costs and parameters, as strategic behavior is discouraged.

Key Results

The paper presents a theoretical framework and then illustrates its application through an analytical example and numerical experiments.

  • Analytical Example: In a simplified one-bus system, the proposed tax-subsidy scheme leads to a higher social welfare compared to competitive market clearing. The optimal investment in generation capacity is shown to be greater than what would occur under strategic investment.
  • Numerical Experiments (IEEE 24-bus system):
    • The optimal spot market price and social welfare are higher than in the competitive model.
  • The proposed tax scheme leads to different tax burdens for producers based on their technology mix and associated externalities.
  • The optimal investment model results in higher social welfare (4.36% increase) and total generation investment compared to the strategic investment model.
  • Producer profits are shown to increase with the proposed subsidy, particularly in the optimal investment scenario.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Budget Balance: The paper acknowledges that the scheme is "Not Budget Balanced in General." If the total subsidies exceed the total taxes collected in an interval, the ISO might face funding issues. The authors suggest this could be resolved by adjusting fixed fees for market participants.
  • Data Requirements: While the scheme is designed to be robust to information asymmetry, it still relies on accurate data for pollution externalities and generation costs. The paper notes that ISOs must measure pollution levels.
  • Simplifications: The analytical example and numerical experiments involve simplifications, such as linear cost and utility functions, and specific assumptions about externality coefficients.
  • Future Work: The paper suggests that further research could explore more complex market structures, different types of renewable energy sources, and the dynamic evolution of these schemes over time. The authors also mention the need to set subsidy levels to a reasonable number to ensure individual rationality.

Summary updated

Abstract

The impact of energy production significantly affects system sustainability, which has enabled a shift towards renewable energy sources. Thus, producer behavior is crucial in electricity markets to achieve sustainability goals. In this paper, we address two key challenges comprising electricity markets and generation investment. Firstly, electricity markets typically are operated with competitive market clearing and merit-order dispatch, which neglects negative externalities from pollution. A Pigouvian tax is proposed in order to investigate the impacts of these externalities on electricity prices and resolve this issue. Secondly, renewable energy sources entail low operational costs, which result in lower system prices and reduced profits for producers. Furthermore, producers face high investment costs when moving into renewable energy resources, which leads to strategic investment decisions. In order to mitigate this strategic behavior, subsidies are proposed equal to producers' contribution to consumer surplus. These subsidies incentivize producers to decrease prices and increase consumer surplus, so, producers would be motivated to invest in socially optimal generation capacity. Finally, we demonstrate that implementing the proposed tax and subsidy does not increase the regulator's information burden.
BibTeX
@misc{gharigh2024tax,
  author = {Mohammad Reza Karimi Gharigh and Lamia Varawala and Mohammad Reza Hesamzadeh and György Dán},
  title = {{A Tax-Subsidy Scheme for Efficient Investment in Renewable Generation Capacity}},
  year = {2024},
  eprint = {2407.02161},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.02161},
}
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