Investment Timing and Social Welfare under Feed-in Tariff Contract

Luciana Barbosa, Artur Rodrigues, Alberto Sardinha2020 · DOI

Abstract

This paper presents a novel model to analyze the effects on the investment timing and social welfare of three feed-in tariffs (FIT) within an oligopolistic market structure. The FIT contracts are the fixed price, the fixed premium, and the minimum price guarantee. The model allows the identification of the optimal time to deploy a renewable energy project and the value of the tariff that maximizes the social welfare for each FIT design. These optimal tariffs generate the same investment timing and the same social welfare.

Introduction

The transition to renewable energy is often hindered by high capital intensity and market uncertainty. Governments frequently employ Feed-in Tariffs (FITs) to mitigate these risks and incentivize private investment. However, traditional policy analysis often overlooks two critical factors: the market power of firms in an oligopoly and the strategic value of delaying investment, known as the "option to wait." This research addresses these gaps by modeling a duopoly where a renewable energy producer enters a market dominated by a conventional producer, utilizing Real Options Analysis to determine the optimal "trigger point" for investment.

Methodology

The study employs a game-theoretic approach combined with financial mathematics to evaluate three distinct FIT designs:

  1. Fixed Price: A guaranteed price for every unit of energy produced.
  2. Fixed Premium: A constant subsidy paid on top of the fluctuating market price.
  3. Minimum Price Guarantee: A price floor that protects the producer when market prices fall below a certain threshold.

The market is modeled as a Stackelberg Leadership Game, where the renewable producer acts as the leader due to regulatory priority in grid access. Demand uncertainty is captured using Geometric Brownian Motion, allowing for the calculation of the value of the option to wait. Social welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus, firm profits, and environmental benefits (avoided GHG emissions), minus the public cost of the subsidy.

Key Findings

The Equivalence Principle

A central finding of this research is the "Equivalence Principle." When a policymaker sets the tariff level to maximize social welfare, all three FIT designs—fixed price, fixed premium, and price floor—converge on the same outcome. Specifically, they result in the identical investment timing (trigger point) and the same total social welfare. This suggests that the choice between these mechanisms may depend more on administrative ease or political feasibility than on fundamental economic efficiency.

The Duration Trap and Market Volatility

The research highlights a "duration trap" specific to Fixed Price schemes. While longer contracts generally accelerate investment in premium or floor schemes, a longer Fixed Price contract can actually delay investment if the rate is set too low. In such cases, firms fear being locked into an unprofitable rate for the duration of the contract. Furthermore, the study confirms that increased market volatility raises the investment trigger, emphasizing that policy stability is as crucial as the subsidy amount itself.

Environmental Sensitivity

The effectiveness of a FIT is highly sensitive to the societal value placed on environmental protection ($K_G$). If the perceived cost of environmental damage is low, FITs may lead to over-subsidization, potentially decreasing overall social welfare by encouraging entry into a market where the environmental benefits do not outweigh the public expenditure.

Conclusion

This paper provides a robust framework for policymakers to design renewable energy subsidies. By accounting for market power and investment timing, it demonstrates that while FITs are effective at accelerating the green transition, their success depends on careful calibration to market conditions and environmental goals. The discovery of policy equivalence among optimized FIT designs offers a simplifying insight for energy regulators worldwide.

Summary updated

Abstract

This paper presents a novel model to analyze the effects on the investment timing and social welfare of three feed-in tariffs (FIT) within an oligopolistic market structure. The FIT contracts are the fixed price, the fixed premium, and the minimum price guarantee. The model allows the identification of the optimal time to deploy a renewable energy project and the value of the tariff that maximizes the social welfare for each FIT design. These optimal tariffs generate the same investment timing and the same social welfare.
BibTeX
@misc{barbosa2020investment,
  author = {Luciana Barbosa and Artur Rodrigues and Alberto Sardinha},
  title = {{Investment Timing and Social Welfare under Feed-in Tariff Contract}},
  year = {2020},
  doi = {10.26619/ual-cicee/wp02.2020},
}
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