In traditional wireless communication, security and power delivery are often at odds. Securing a transmission usually requires extra energy—either for complex encryption or for generating "artificial noise" (AN) to jam eavesdroppers. However, in the emerging field of Simultaneous Wireless Information and Power Transfer (SWIPT), researchers have realized that the energy signals themselves can serve a dual purpose. Instead of treating energy delivery and security as separate tasks, this research direction explores how energy-carrying beams can be repurposed as jamming signals to mask data from eavesdroppers.
The Synergy of Power and Interference
The core intuition behind this approach is that an energy signal is, by definition, a high-power signal that carries no information for a communication receiver. To a legitimate energy harvester, this signal is a vital resource; to an eavesdropper trying to intercept a nearby data stream, this same signal acts as devastating interference.
As WeiQiang Xu and colleagues explain in Secure Beamforming For MIMO Broadcasting With Wireless Information And Power Transfer, this mechanism transforms traditional interference into a resource. By deliberately injecting artificial noise into the transmission, a base station can satisfy the power requirements of energy-harvesting nodes while simultaneously degrading the channel quality for potential eavesdroppers. This "dual-purpose" signal design ensures that the very energy meant to power the network also acts as its shield.
Eliminating the Power Overhead
In standard Physical Layer Security (PLS), generating artificial noise is expensive because it consumes a portion of the transmit power budget that could otherwise be used for data. The breakthrough in SWIPT systems is the realization that this overhead can be effectively zero.
Ali A. Nasir, Hoang Duong Tuan, and Trung Q. Duong demonstrate in Secure and Energy-Efficient Beamforming for Simultaneous Information and Energy Transfer that energy beams can be repurposed as jamming signals without requiring additional power. Because an eavesdropper is typically unaware of the specific transmission schedule or the structure of the energy beam, the beam acts as a natural jammer. This allows for the simultaneous optimization of secrecy and energy efficiency, even when the transmitter has imperfect knowledge of the environment.
Scaling to Complex Networks
This concept extends beyond simple point-to-point links. In more complex architectures, such as those using Reconfigurable Intelligent Surfaces (RIS), the challenge is managing these dual-purpose signals across different timescales. Ming-Min Zhao and Lajos Hanzo show in Secrecy Rate Maximization of RIS-assisted SWIPT Systems how energy beams directed toward harvesting users can be designed to mask information signals. By splitting the optimization into long-term surface configurations and short-term beamforming, they maintain high secrecy rates with minimal overhead.
The idea even applies to collaborative tasks like Over-the-Air Computation (AirComp). In Secure Over-the-Air Computation using Zero-Forced Artificial Noise, Antonia Wachter-Zeh and Luis Maßny identify a "surplus power" phenomenon: users with strong channels often have extra transmit capacity because they must throttle their output to match the weakest link in the network. This unexploited power can be redirected into "zero-forced" artificial noise—noise that cancels out at the intended receiver but remains chaotic for an eavesdropper.
Covertness through Full-Duplex Noise
Finally, the relationship between power and noise can be inverted to achieve covert communication, where the goal is to hide the very existence of a transmission. In Probabilistic Accumulate-then-Transmit in Wireless-Powered Covert Communications, Yida Wang 0004 and Shihao Yan describe a full-duplex architecture where a receiver emits artificial noise. This noise serves two roles: it provides the energy that a remote sensor needs to function, and it creates a "noise floor" that prevents an adversary from detecting the sensor's subsequent low-power data transmissions.
By treating energy and noise as two sides of the same coin, these researchers have moved wireless security from a tax on system resources to a natural byproduct of power delivery.