In the early days of Bitcoin, the security of the network was simple: miners were paid a fixed "block subsidy" of newly minted coins. This subsidy acted as a predictable, stabilizing force. However, as these rewards halve every four years, blockchains must eventually transition to a fee-only incentive model, where security is funded entirely by transaction fees.
This transition is not just an accounting change; it is a fundamental shift in the game theory of consensus. Research by Florian Tschorsch and Björn Scheuermann 0001 in Bitcoin and Beyond: A Technical Survey on Decentralized Digital Currencies highlights a growing concern: can transaction fees alone provide enough motivation to keep the network secure?
The Undercutting Problem
The primary threat in a fee-dominated world is undercutting. In a traditional system, a rational miner always wants to extend the longest chain to claim the next block subsidy. But when rewards come from fees, the value of a block depends on its specific contents.
Imagine a miner sees a previous block that contains $10,000 in fees. Instead of mining on top of that block, a strategic miner might "undercut" it by mining a competing block at the same height. Crucially, the attacker intentionally leaves some of those high-fee transactions out of their own block. As Nguyen Cong Luong and colleagues explain in A Survey on Applications of Game Theory in Blockchain, this acts as a bribe to the next miner. By leaving fees on the table, the attacker incentivizes the rest of the network to build on their fork rather than the original chain, effectively "stealing" the history of the ledger.
Volatility as a Security Threat
The danger isn't just the amount of fees, but their variance. Fixed subsidies are constant, but fees are volatile. Xiongfei Zhao and Yain-Whar Si argue in Dynamic Transaction Storage Strategies for a Sustainable Blockchain that this volatility is the "primary driver" of malicious behavior.
When one block is worth significantly more than the average, it becomes a target. This creates a "Prisoner's Dilemma" for miners: if they follow the protocol, they get a standard reward; if they fork, they might capture a "whale" transaction. Gerui Zhang and others have found that even scaling throughput can backfire; if high-value transactions are distributed inconsistently, scaling can actually increase reward volatility, triggering more frequent forks.
Smoothing the Reward Curve
To combat this, researchers are proposing mechanisms to "flatten" the reward curve. The intuition is simple: if every block pays roughly the same, the incentive to fork disappears.
- Dynamic Transaction Storage (DTS): Xiongfei Zhao and Gerui Zhang proposed An Efficient Dynamic Transaction Storage Mechanism for Sustainable High Throughput Bitcoin, which dynamically adjusts block space based on fee levels. By holding back some high-fee transactions for future blocks, the protocol ensures a steady stream of income for miners, removing the "bribe" that fuels undercutting.
- Undercutting Avoidance Rules: Tiantian Gong and Aniket Kate demonstrate in Undercutting Bitcoin Is Not Profitable that real-world constraints, like block size limits, actually make undercutting harder than theoretical models suggest. They propose a selection rule where miners voluntarily avoid leaving high-fee transactions in the pool, creating a stable Nash Equilibrium.
- Bayesian Mechanism Design: Moving beyond simple rules, David Simchi‐Levi and Zishuo Zhao suggest in Bayesian Mechanism Design for Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation that we can design fee structures that are collusion-proof and generate predictable revenue, even as the number of users grows.
The MEV Complication
The rise of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)—where miners profit from reordering or censoring transactions—adds a new layer of complexity. Mengya Zhang and Xingyu Lyu found that "private transactions" (sent directly to miners) are often dominated by MEV bots.
As Aviv Tamar and Ittay Eyal note in MAD-DAG: Protecting Blockchain Consensus from MEV, these high-value opportunities create massive variance in block rewards. If a single block contains a multi-million dollar arbitrage opportunity, the incentive to fork the chain becomes almost irresistible. This suggests that the "fee regime" problem is not just about transaction fees, but about any variable revenue source that makes one block more attractive than another.
The consensus among researchers like Alex Zhang and Michael Tang is that for blockchains to survive the sunset of block subsidies, they must evolve from simple "first-price" auctions to sophisticated economic mechanisms that prioritize incentive compatibility and reward stability over simple throughput.