TL;DR
This paper examines the impact of the Ethereum Merge on decentralized finance (DeFi) lending protocols, specifically AAVE and Compound. It reveals that while interventions to prevent mass liquidations were successful, they led to significant market distortions and unfairly compensated lenders, with arbitrageurs profiting handsomely from the hard fork.
What Problem Does This Paper Address?
The Ethereum Merge, a major upgrade transitioning the blockchain from Proof-of-Work (PoW) to Proof-of-Stake (PoS), created a unique challenge for DeFi lending protocols. A planned PoW hard fork meant holders of ETH would receive an equivalent amount of a new PoW token (ETHW). This created an arbitrage opportunity: users could borrow ETH before the merge, receive both ETH and ETHW, and potentially profit. Lending protocols feared this would lead to a surge in ETH borrowing, skyrocketing interest rates, and mass liquidations, threatening their stability. The problem this paper addresses is how these protocols responded to this unprecedented event and what the consequences of their interventions were for the market and its participants.
Methods
The authors employ a data-driven approach, analyzing on-chain data from the Ethereum blockchain. They collected data from AAVE and Compound, the two largest DeFi lending protocols, focusing on ETH borrowing markets. Their methodology involved:
- Data Collection: Running Ethereum and EthereumPoW nodes, querying smart contract event logs, and utilizing blockchain explorers.
- Price Data Analysis: Gathering hourly price data for cryptocurrencies from Yahoo Finance to track ETHW's value relative to ETH.
- Transaction Tracing: Following ETH debt transfers to identify if borrowed funds were moved to cryptocurrency exchanges, indicating potential hard-fork arbitrage.
- Parameter Analysis: Examining the configuration parameters of lending protocols and how they were adjusted in response to the merge.
- Quantitative Analysis: Measuring borrowing rates, utilization, liquidity, debt, and liquidations to assess the impact of the merge and interventions.
Datasets
The study utilizes on-chain data from the Ethereum blockchain, specifically from the AAVE and Compound lending protocols. This includes:
- Transaction data: To track the movement of borrowed ETH and ETHW.
- Event logs: To monitor borrowing and lending activities.
- Historical state data: To reconstruct the state of lending markets.
- Price data: From Yahoo Finance for ETH and ETHW.
The paper does not introduce new benchmark datasets but rather analyzes existing on-chain data in a novel context.
Key Insights and Ideas
- Hard-Fork Arbitrage: The paper quantifies a new form of arbitrage, "hard-fork-arbitrage," where users profited by borrowing ETH before the merge to gain ETHW. This was a significant driver of borrowing activity.
- Intervention Effectiveness: Lending protocols like AAVE and Compound intervened by pausing or capping ETH borrowing. These measures successfully prevented mass liquidations and the accumulation of bad debt.
- Lender Disadvantage: Despite preventing protocol collapse, these interventions disproportionately harmed lenders. They were not adequately compensated for the risk and opportunity cost of providing liquidity, effectively subsidizing arbitrageurs.
- Market Distortion: The interventions led to market distortions, including a drying up of liquidity as lenders withdrew funds, and borrowing rates that were significantly lower than the potential profit from hard-fork arbitrage.
- stETH as Collateral Risk: The significant amount of stETH (staked ETH) used as collateral on AAVE posed a systemic risk. A sharp drop in stETH price could have triggered liquidations, impacting the broader Ethereum consensus layer.
- Market Inefficiency: The existence of hard-fork arbitrage highlights a market inefficiency, where prices did not fully reflect all available information, allowing for predictable profit opportunities.
Key Results
- Borrowing rates on AAVE and Compound experienced extreme volatility, jumping by two orders of magnitude and reaching 100% utilization at times.
- Despite this volatility, no spike in mass liquidations or irretrievable bad debt materialized on either protocol.
- Arbitrageurs transferred tokens worth over $13 million USD to centralized exchanges, effectively extracting value from lenders.
- On AAVE, 20.3% of the stETH market capitalization was deposited as collateral, posing a significant risk to the Ethereum consensus layer.
- For borrowers who managed to take out loans before the caps were implemented, the profit from hard-fork arbitrage significantly outweighed the borrowing costs.
Limitations and Future Work
- Smart Contract Borrowers: The study acknowledges that tracking direct transfers to exchanges for smart contract borrowers was not possible, potentially leading to an underestimation of the total funds transferred.
- External Shocks: The paper notes that while the Merge was a predictable event, future market shocks may be less foreseeable, limiting the ability of DAOs to react effectively.
- Future Work: The authors suggest that future research could explore the broader implications of market inefficiencies in DeFi and the potential for more robust mechanisms to compensate liquidity providers during extraordinary market events. They also highlight the need to consider the impact of external market shocks on DeFi protocols.
Summary updated