Abstract: This paper argues that the relation between temptations and the level of consumption plays a key role in explaining the observed behaviors of the poor. Temptation goods are defined to be the set of goods that generate positive utility for the self that consumes them, but not for any previous self that anticipates that they will be consumed in the future. We show that the assumption of declining temptations, which says that the fraction of the marginal dollar that is spent on temptation goods decreases with overall consumption, has a number of striking implications for the investment, savings, borrowing and risk-taking behavior of the poor, which would not arise if temptations were either non-declining or entirely absent. Moreover the predicted behaviors under the declining temptation assumption can help us explain some of the puzzling facts about the poor that have been emphasized in the recent literature.
Introduction
Economists have long struggled to explain certain persistent behaviors among the global poor. Why would a fruit vendor in India borrow money at a 5% daily interest rate for nearly a decade? Why do farmers often bypass high-return investments, such as fertilizer, even when they are not strictly credit-constrained? Standard economic theory often defaults to the assumption of high "discount rates"—the idea that the poor are inherently less patient. However, this fails to account for the nuance of their financial lives, such as the fact that the same individuals may be remarkably far-sighted when it comes to burial insurance or long-term family obligations.
Banerjee and Mullainathan propose a different mechanism: the "temptation tax." They argue that the poor appear myopic not because of a lack of patience, but because of the specific composition of their consumption and how the urge to spend on "temptation goods" changes with wealth.
Theoretical Framework: The Declining Temptation Case
The authors develop a microeconomic model that distinguishes between two categories of goods:
- Non-temptation goods ($x$): Items that provide utility to both the current self and the future self (e.g., education, housing, or long-term assets).
- Temptation goods ($z$): Items that provide utility only to the "self" consuming them in the moment, but are viewed as a waste by any previous "self" (e.g., cigarettes, sweets, or non-nutritious luxury foods).
At the heart of this model is a Modified Euler Equation. In standard models, individuals save until the marginal utility of consumption today equals the discounted marginal utility of consumption tomorrow. In this framework, however, saving is subject to a "temptation tax." Because an individual knows their future self will likely "waste" a portion of every saved dollar on temptation goods that the current self does not value, the incentive to save is fundamentally diminished.
The authors focus on the Declining Temptation Case (DTC). This assumes that as total consumption rises, the fraction of the marginal dollar spent on temptation goods decreases. For the wealthy, the temptation tax is negligible; for the poor, it is a significant barrier to capital accumulation.
Behavioral Poverty Traps and the "Chaining" Effect
A primary insight of the paper is that poverty traps can emerge purely from behavioral dynamics, even in the absence of external market failures like credit rationing. If an individual is below a specific wealth threshold, the temptation tax is so high that they choose to dissave, effectively trapping themselves in poverty. Conversely, if that same individual were slightly wealthier, the relative cost of temptation would drop enough to make saving worthwhile, leading to long-term wealth accumulation.
This problem is compounded by the "chaining" effect in multi-period life cycles. A person does not just worry about tomorrow's self wasting money; they worry about the self the day after that, and every subsequent self. This chain of anticipated future temptations makes long-term saving feel futile for those at the bottom of the income distribution, as the eventual utility of the saved dollar is expected to be heavily diluted by future impulsive spending.
Key Results and Empirical Synthesis
While theoretical, the paper synthesizes empirical findings from various contexts—including Pakistani moneylender surveys, Kenyan fertilizer studies, and financial diaries of the poor—to validate its predictions:
- Misattribution of Impatience: The model proves that observers using standard economic tools would mistakenly conclude the poor have lower internal patience (a lower $\delta$). In reality, the poor may have the same psychological discount rate as the rich but are simply reacting to the higher temptation tax inherent to their consumption level.
- The Precautionary Savings Paradox: Standard theory suggests people save more when the future is uncertain. This model shows the opposite for the poor: increased uncertainty can reduce savings because the "tax" makes it too expensive to protect against low-income states.
- Credit Demand: The framework explains why the poor often demand "commitment" credit (like microfinance with rigid, public repayment schedules) while fearing "temptation" credit (like credit cards), which provides easy access to small-scale, impulsive spending.
- Investment Scale: The poor may reject high-return investments if the payout is too small. If a profit isn't large enough to lift the individual into a lower-temptation wealth bracket, they anticipate the gain will be consumed by temptation goods, rendering the initial investment effort pointless.
Limitations and Policy Implications
The authors acknowledge that defining a "temptation good" is subjective and context-dependent. They suggest that future empirical research should utilize Engel curves—tracking how spending patterns change with income—to identify these goods more precisely.
Furthermore, they note a "starvation margin." At the absolute bottom of the income scale, the "temptation" to consume calories might actually be a far-sighted necessity, suggesting the temptation curve might be S-shaped rather than strictly concave. From a policy perspective, the paper cautions against simple "sin taxes." If demand for temptation goods is inelastic, such taxes could be regressive and actually increase the temptation tax, further stifling the ability of the poor to save and invest.
Summary updated