Stackelberg Game for Distributed Time Scheduling in RF-Powered Backscatter Cognitive Radio Networks

Wenbo Wang, Dinh Thai Hoang, Dusit Niyato, Ping Wang, Dong In Kim

Abstract

In this paper, we study the transmission strategy adaptation problem in an RF-powered cognitive radio network, in which hybrid secondary users are able to switch between the harvest-then-transmit mode and the ambient backscatter mode for their communication with the secondary gateway. In the network, a monetary incentive is introduced for managing the interference caused by the secondary transmission with imperfect channel sensing. The sensing-pricing-transmitting process of the secondary gateway and the transmitters is modeled as a single-leader-multi-follower Stackelberg game. Furthermore, the follower sub-game among the secondary transmitters is modeled as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem with shared constraints. Based on our theoretical discoveries regarding the properties of equilibria in the follower sub-game and the Stackelberg game, we propose a distributed, iterative strategy searching scheme that guarantees the convergence to the Stackelberg equilibrium. The numerical simulations show that the proposed hybrid transmission scheme always outperforms the schemes with fixed transmission modes. Furthermore, the simulations reveal that the adopted hybrid scheme is able to achieve a higher throughput than the sum of the throughput obtained from the schemes with fixed transmission modes.

Introduction

In RF-powered Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs), secondary users (STs) "borrow" spectrum from primary users (PTs). Traditionally, these STs follow a "harvest-then-transmit" approach: they collect energy when the PT is active and transmit their own data when the channel is idle.

However, this creates a catch-22: if the PT is too active, the ST has plenty of energy but no time to transmit; if the PT is rarely active, the ST has plenty of time but no energy. To break this dependency, the authors integrate ambient backscattering, which allows STs to transmit data by reflecting the PT's signal while the PT is active. The core challenge is determining how to optimally split a device's limited time between harvesting, backscattering, and active transmission in a distributed environment where devices compete for resources and can cause interference.

System Model and Methods

The authors formulate the resource allocation problem as a single-leader-multi-follower Stackelberg game involving a Secondary Gateway (SG) and multiple Secondary Transmitters (STs).

System model and frame structure for the hybrid transmission scheme. (a) Network architecture with Primary Transmitter (PT), Secondary Transmitters (ST), and Secondary Gateway (SG). (b) Time frame structure for Idle and Busy states.

As illustrated in Figure 1, the system operates in discrete time frames. Each frame begins with a sensing phase ($\tau^s$). Depending on whether the primary channel is sensed as "Idle" or "Busy," the STs adapt their behavior:

  • The Leader (Secondary Gateway): Sets the "rules of engagement," including sensing duration, detection thresholds, and a monetary interference price. This price acts as a control mechanism to compensate the primary network for interference caused by imperfect sensing.
  • The Followers (Secondary Transmitters): Compete for time slots using a Time-Division Multiple Access (TDMA) protocol. They aim to maximize their own payoff by choosing between active transmission (in the Idle state) or a combination of harvesting and backscattering (in the Busy state).

To solve this, the authors prove that the follower sub-game is an exact potential game, which simplifies finding a Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE). They propose a two-tier distributed algorithm: a Directional Ascent Method for the Gateway to optimize the leader's strategy, and an Asynchronous Proximal-Response Method for the transmitters to iteratively reach a stable equilibrium.

Key Insights and Results

The paper relies on numerical simulations to validate the theoretical findings, modeling a network of 5 to 25 secondary transmitters with standard log-normal shadowing path loss.

  • The Synergy Effect: The most striking insight is that the hybrid scheme is "greater than the sum of its parts." The total throughput of the hybrid system is higher than the combined throughput of two separate systems—one using only harvesting and one using only backscattering.
  • Pricing as a Control Knob: By introducing a monetary price for interference, the gateway can effectively "nudge" devices toward backscattering (which causes negligible interference) when the risk of colliding with the primary user is high.
  • Equilibrium Stability: The authors mathematically prove that their distributed algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a unique Stackelberg Equilibrium, ensuring the network remains stable even as devices act in their own self-interest.
  • Robustness to Channel Activity: While the "harvest-then-transmit" mode fails when the channel is mostly busy, the hybrid scheme thrives because it can pivot to backscattering, maintaining a steady data rate regardless of the primary user's behavior.

Conclusion and Future Work

This research demonstrates that a hybrid transmission strategy, managed through a Stackelberg game framework, significantly boosts throughput and reliability in RF-powered CRNs. While the current model assumes a TDMA structure and a-priori knowledge of channel statistics, future work could explore extending this to Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA) or multi-channel scenarios to further increase network capacity. Additionally, addressing the hardware complexity of devices that switch between harvesting and backscattering remains a key area for practical implementation.

Summary updated

Abstract

In this paper, we study the transmission strategy adaptation problem in an RF-powered cognitive radio network, in which hybrid secondary users are able to switch between the harvest-then-transmit mode and the ambient backscatter mode for their communication with the secondary gateway. In the network, a monetary incentive is introduced for managing the interference caused by the secondary transmission with imperfect channel sensing. The sensing-pricing-transmitting process of the secondary gateway and the transmitters is modeled as a single-leader-multi-follower Stackelberg game. Furthermore, the follower sub-game among the secondary transmitters is modeled as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem with shared constraints. Based on our theoretical discoveries regarding the properties of equilibria in the follower sub-game and the Stackelberg game, we propose a distributed, iterative strategy searching scheme that guarantees the convergence to the Stackelberg equilibrium. The numerical simulations show that the proposed hybrid transmission scheme always outperforms the schemes with fixed transmission modes. Furthermore, the simulations reveal that the adopted hybrid scheme is able to achieve a higher throughput than the sum of the throughput obtained from the schemes with fixed transmission modes.
BibTeX
@article{wang2018stackelberg,
  author = {Wenbo Wang and Dinh Thai Hoang and Dusit Niyato and Ping Wang and Dong In Kim},
  title = {{Stackelberg Game for Distributed Time Scheduling in RF-Powered Backscatter Cognitive Radio Networks}},
  journal = {IEEE Trans. Wireless Communications},
  year = {2018},
  doi = {10.1109/twc.2018.2847658},
}
Figure