Stackelberg Game for Distributed Time Scheduling in RF-Powered Backscatter Cognitive Radio Networks

Wenbo Wang, Dinh Thai Hoang, Dusit Niyato, Ping Wang, Dong In Kim

TL;DR

This paper introduces a hybrid transmission strategy for "green" cognitive radio networks, where secondary devices can either harvest energy from primary signals to transmit later or use ambient backscatter to communicate immediately. By modeling the interaction between the network gateway and devices as a Stackelberg game, the authors develop a distributed scheduling algorithm that significantly boosts throughput beyond what either transmission mode could achieve on its own.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

In RF-powered Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs), secondary users (STs) "borrow" spectrum from primary users (PTs). Traditionally, these STs follow a "harvest-then-transmit" approach: they collect energy when the PT is active and transmit their own data when the channel is idle.

However, this creates a catch-22: if the PT is too active, the ST has plenty of energy but no time to transmit; if the PT is rarely active, the ST has plenty of time but no energy. To break this dependency, the authors integrate ambient backscattering, which allows STs to transmit data by reflecting the PT's signal while the PT is active. The core challenge is determining how to optimally split a device's limited time between harvesting, backscattering, and active transmission in a distributed environment where devices compete for resources and can cause interference.

Methods

The authors formulate the resource allocation problem as a single-leader-multi-follower Stackelberg game:

  • The Leader (Secondary Gateway): Sets the "rules of engagement," including sensing duration, detection thresholds, and a monetary interference price. This price acts as a control mechanism to compensate the primary network for interference caused by imperfect sensing.
  • The Followers (Secondary Transmitters): Compete for time slots using a Time-Division Multiple Access (TDMA) protocol. They aim to maximize their own payoff by choosing between harvesting and backscattering when the channel is busy.

To solve this, the authors prove that the follower sub-game is an exact potential game, which simplifies finding a Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE). They propose a two-tier distributed algorithm:

  1. Directional Ascent Method: Used by the Gateway to optimize the leader's strategy.
  2. Asynchronous Proximal-Response Method: Used by the transmitters to iteratively reach a stable equilibrium without needing a central controller to manage every micro-decision.

Datasets

The paper relies on numerical simulations rather than a specific real-world dataset. The authors use Monte Carlo simulations to model a network of 5 to 25 secondary transmitters randomly placed within 30 meters of a gateway. They employ a standard log-normal shadowing path loss model (path loss factor $l = 3.5$) and specific hardware parameters (e.g., 10W primary transmit power, -40dBm noise floor) to validate their theoretical findings.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The Synergy Effect: The most striking insight is that the hybrid scheme is "greater than the sum of its parts." The total throughput of the hybrid system is higher than the combined throughput of two separate systems—one using only harvesting and one using only backscattering.
  • Pricing as a Control Knob: By introducing a monetary price for interference, the gateway can effectively "nudge" devices toward backscattering (which causes negligible interference) when the risk of colliding with the primary user is high.
  • Equilibrium Stability: The authors mathematically prove that their distributed algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a unique Stackelberg Equilibrium, ensuring the network remains stable even as devices act in their own self-interest.
  • Sensitivity to Sensing: The STs' performance is highly sensitive to the detection threshold ($\epsilon$). Small errors in sensing the primary user's state lead to sharp increases in false alarms or missed detections, which the hybrid model mitigates better than fixed-mode models.

Key Results

  • Superior Throughput: Numerical results show that the proposed hybrid scheme consistently outperforms fixed-mode schemes across all network scales.
  • Negotiation Advantage: STs in the hybrid scheme have more "leverage" against the gateway's pricing. Because they can switch to backscattering if the interference price for active transmission gets too high, the gateway is forced to keep prices more competitive.
  • Robustness to Channel Activity: While the "harvest-then-transmit" mode fails when the channel is mostly busy, the hybrid scheme thrives because it can pivot to backscattering, maintaining a steady data rate regardless of the primary user's behavior.

Limitations and Future Work

  • TDMA Constraints: The current model assumes a TDMA structure where only one ST operates at a time. While this avoids collisions, it may not scale efficiently to massive IoT deployments where thousands of devices might need simultaneous access.
  • Perfect Knowledge: The model assumes the probabilities of the channel being "Idle" or "Busy" are known a-priori. In highly dynamic environments, these probabilities would need to be estimated in real-time.
  • Hardware Complexity: Implementing a device that can seamlessly switch between energy harvesting, backscattering, and active transmission requires more complex RF front-end circuitry than a single-mode device.

Future research could explore extending this game-theoretic framework to Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA) or multi-channel scenarios to further increase network capacity.

Summary updated

Abstract

In this paper, we study the transmission strategy adaptation problem in an RF-powered cognitive radio network, in which hybrid secondary users are able to switch between the harvest-then-transmit mode and the ambient backscatter mode for their communication with the secondary gateway. In the network, a monetary incentive is introduced for managing the interference caused by the secondary transmission with imperfect channel sensing. The sensing-pricing-transmitting process of the secondary gateway and the transmitters is modeled as a single-leader-multi-follower Stackelberg game. Furthermore, the follower sub-game among the secondary transmitters is modeled as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem with shared constraints. Based on our theoretical discoveries regarding the properties of equilibria in the follower sub-game and the Stackelberg game, we propose a distributed, iterative strategy searching scheme that guarantees the convergence to the Stackelberg equilibrium. The numerical simulations show that the proposed hybrid transmission scheme always outperforms the schemes with fixed transmission modes. Furthermore, the simulations reveal that the adopted hybrid scheme is able to achieve a higher throughput than the sum of the throughput obtained from the schemes with fixed transmission modes.
BibTeX
@article{wang2018stackelberg,
  author = {Wenbo Wang and Dinh Thai Hoang and Dusit Niyato and Ping Wang and Dong In Kim},
  title = {{Stackelberg Game for Distributed Time Scheduling in RF-Powered Backscatter Cognitive Radio Networks}},
  journal = {IEEE Trans. Wireless Communications},
  year = {2018},
  doi = {10.1109/twc.2018.2847658},
}

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