Secure Dual-Functional Radar-Communication Transmission: Exploiting Interference for Resilience Against Target Eavesdropping

Nanchi Su, Fan Liu, Zhongxiang Wei, Ya‐Feng Liu, Christos Masouros

Abstract

We study security solutions for dual-functional radar communication (DFRC) systems, which detect the radar target and communicate with downlink cellular users in millimeter-wave (mmWave) wireless networks simultaneously. Uniquely for such scenarios, the radar target is regarded as a potential eavesdropper which might surveil the information sent from the base station (BS) to communication users (CUs), that is carried by the radar probing signal. Transmit waveform and receive beamforming are jointly designed to maximize the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the radar under the security and power budget constraints. We apply a Directional Modulation (DM) approach to exploit constructive interference (CI), where the known multiuser interference (MUI) can be exploited as a source of useful signal. Moreover, to further deteriorate the eavesdropping signal at the radar target, we utilize destructive interference (DI) by pushing the received symbols at the target towards the destructive region of the signal constellation. Our numerical results verify the effectiveness of the proposed design showing a secure transmission with enhanced performance against benchmark DFRC techniques.

Introduction

As the wireless spectrum becomes increasingly crowded, researchers are turning to Dual-Functional Radar-Communication (DFRC). These systems use the same hardware and waveform to perform two tasks simultaneously: sensing the environment (radar) and sending data to cellular users (communication). However, DFRC has a built-in security flaw. To obtain a high-quality radar return, the base station must point a high-power beam directly at the target. Because that same beam carries communication data, the radar target becomes a "privileged" eavesdropper. If the target is a malicious drone or unauthorized vehicle, it can easily intercept private data intended for legitimate users.

Conceptual comparison between (a) a standard DFRC system where the target eavesdrops on the data beam, and (b) the proposed secure DFRC system utilizing a secure beam and accounting for target uncertainty.

Methodology: Turning Interference into a Shield

The core innovation of this research lies in the joint design of the transmit waveform and the receive beamformer to maximize the radar's Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR) while satisfying security constraints. Instead of treating Multi-User Interference (MUI) as a nuisance to be canceled, the authors leverage Directional Modulation (DM) to manipulate interference geometrically.

Constructive and Destructive Interference

  1. Constructive Interference (CI): For legitimate communication users, the system treats MUI as a source of useful power. It pushes the received symbols further into the "correct" decision regions of their signal constellation (e.g., QPSK), effectively increasing the received signal power without increasing transmit power.
  2. Destructive Interference (DI): To thwart the eavesdropper, the authors apply the opposite logic. The waveform is designed so that the signal arriving at the radar target falls into "destructive regions" of the constellation. This maximizes the Symbol Error Rate (SER) at the target, rendering intercepted data unintelligible.
Geometric representation of (a) the constructive region for a legitimate user and (b) the destructive region for the eavesdropping target in the complex signal plane.

Optimization and Robustness

The paper develops two main algorithms to solve these non-convex problems: Successive Quadratically Constrained Quadratic Programming (SQ) and a Fractional Programming (FP) approach. Furthermore, recognizing that radar targets move, the design is extended to handle target location uncertainty, ensuring security even if the target's exact angle is only known within a rough interval.

Key Results and Insights

Numerical evaluations using Monte Carlo simulations on Rician fading channels demonstrate several key findings:

  • Superior Radar Performance: The proposed FP-based design achieves a higher radar SINR compared to benchmark DFRC techniques, particularly as communication requirements become more stringent.
  • Effective Scrambling: When DI constraints are applied, the SER at the target approaches 1.0 (near-total failure to decode) as the angular separation between the target and legitimate users increases.
  • Geometric Security: By defining "destructive zones" in the complex signal plane, the authors move beyond simple power-reduction security to a sophisticated geometric approach that scrambles the actual information content.
  • The Security Price: While enforcing DI constraints slightly reduces the radar SINR, it provides a massive jump in physical layer security, representing a favorable trade-off for sensitive applications.

Conclusion and Future Work

This framework demonstrates that interference can be a powerful resource for securing DFRC systems. By treating the radar target as the eavesdropper and manipulating the signal geometry, the system can track targets and communicate securely simultaneously. Future research will focus on extending these concepts to higher-order QAM modulations, addressing the challenges of imperfect Channel State Information (CSI) in dynamic environments, and accounting for hardware non-linearities in the phase-balancing process.

Summary updated

Abstract

We study security solutions for dual-functional radar communication (DFRC) systems, which detect the radar target and communicate with downlink cellular users in millimeter-wave (mmWave) wireless networks simultaneously. Uniquely for such scenarios, the radar target is regarded as a potential eavesdropper which might surveil the information sent from the base station (BS) to communication users (CUs), that is carried by the radar probing signal. Transmit waveform and receive beamforming are jointly designed to maximize the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the radar under the security and power budget constraints. We apply a Directional Modulation (DM) approach to exploit constructive interference (CI), where the known multiuser interference (MUI) can be exploited as a source of useful signal. Moreover, to further deteriorate the eavesdropping signal at the radar target, we utilize destructive interference (DI) by pushing the received symbols at the target towards the destructive region of the signal constellation. Our numerical results verify the effectiveness of the proposed design showing a secure transmission with enhanced performance against benchmark DFRC techniques.
BibTeX
@article{su2022secure,
  author = {Nanchi Su and Fan Liu and Zhongxiang Wei and Ya‐Feng Liu and Christos Masouros},
  title = {{Secure Dual-Functional Radar-Communication Transmission: Exploiting Interference for Resilience Against Target Eavesdropping}},
  journal = {IEEE Trans. Wireless Communications},
  year = {2022},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=QAnUwycGn12},
}
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