Secure Dual-Functional Radar-Communication Transmission: Exploiting Interference for Resilience Against Target Eavesdropping

Nanchi Su, Fan Liu, Zhongxiang Wei, Ya-Feng Liu, Christos Masouros

TL;DR

This paper proposes a novel security framework for Dual-Functional Radar-Communication (DFRC) systems by treating the radar target as a potential eavesdropper. By leveraging Directional Modulation and Constructive/Destructive Interference, the authors jointly optimize radar sensing performance and communication security, effectively "scrambling" data at the target's location while enhancing signal quality for legitimate users.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

As the wireless spectrum becomes increasingly crowded, researchers are turning to Dual-Functional Radar-Communication (DFRC). These systems use the same hardware and waveform to perform two tasks at once: sensing the environment (radar) and sending data to cellular users (communication).

However, DFRC has a built-in security flaw. To get a good radar "read" on a target, the base station must point a high-power beam directly at it. Because that same beam carries communication data, the radar target becomes a "privileged" eavesdropper. If the target is a malicious drone or unauthorized vehicle, it can easily intercept the private data intended for legitimate users. Traditional security methods, like adding "Artificial Noise," often waste power and degrade the performance of both radar and communication.

Methods

The authors propose a joint design of the transmit waveform and the receive beamformer. Their goal is to maximize the radar's Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR) while satisfying power limits and security constraints.

The core innovation lies in how they handle Multi-User Interference (MUI):

  1. Constructive Interference (CI): Instead of trying to cancel out interference between communication users, the system treats MUI as a source of useful power. It pushes the received symbols at legitimate users further into the "correct" regions of their signal constellation (e.g., QPSK), improving reliability.
  2. Destructive Interference (DI): To stop the eavesdropper, the authors apply the opposite logic. They explicitly design the waveform so that the signal arriving at the radar target falls into "destructive regions" of the constellation. This maximizes the Symbol Error Rate (SER) at the target, making the intercepted data unintelligible.
  3. Optimization Solvers: The paper develops two main algorithms to solve these non-convex problems: Successive Quadratically Constrained Quadratic Programming (SQ) and a Fractional Programming (FP) approach.
  4. Robustness: Recognizing that radar targets move, they extend the design to handle target location uncertainty, ensuring security even if the target's exact angle is only known within a rough interval.

Datasets

The paper does not use external real-world datasets. Instead, the authors evaluate their methods using Monte Carlo simulations based on standard wireless channel models:

  • Channel Model: Rician fading channels (common for mmWave/LoS scenarios).
  • Antenna Setup: Uniform Linear Arrays (ULAs) at both the base station and radar receiver.
  • Benchmarks: The proposed "DFRC-CI" and "DFRC-CI-DI" methods are compared against existing techniques like "DFRC-PD" (a beamforming design from prior literature) and standard Semidefinite Relaxation (SDR) upper bounds.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Interference as a Resource: The "aha moment" is realizing that interference doesn't have to be suppressed. By controlling the phase of the interference, it can be used to "fortify" legitimate signals and "poison" the eavesdropper's signal simultaneously.
  • The Target is the Eavesdropper: Unlike classical security models where an eavesdropper hides in the shadows, here the eavesdropper is the very thing the system is trying to track. This creates a unique trade-off: the better you "see" the target with radar, the more data you potentially leak to it.
  • Geometric Security: By defining "destructive zones" in the complex signal plane, the authors move beyond simple power-reduction security to a more sophisticated geometric approach that scrambles the actual information content.

Key Results

  • Superior Radar Performance: The proposed FP-based design achieves a higher radar SINR compared to benchmark DFRC techniques, especially as communication requirements (SNR thresholds) become stricter.
  • Effective Scrambling: When Destructive Interference (DI) constraints are applied, the Symbol Error Rate (SER) at the target approaches 1.0 (near-total failure to decode) as the angular separation between the target and legitimate users increases.
  • Rapid Convergence: The algorithms are computationally efficient, typically converging in fewer than 10 iterations for both precise and uncertain target locations.
  • Trade-offs: The results quantify the "security price"—enforcing DI constraints slightly reduces the radar SINR, but provides a massive jump in physical layer security.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Modulation Constraints: The current work focuses on M-PSK modulation. Extending this to high-order QAM (Quadratic Amplitude Modulation) would be more complex due to the tighter constellation boundaries.
  • CSI Requirements: The model assumes the base station has Channel State Information (CSI) for the users and at least an angular estimate for the target. In highly dynamic environments, obtaining perfect CSI is challenging.
  • Hardware Impairments: Future research could look at how hardware non-linearities (like power amplifier distortion) affect the delicate phase-balancing required for Constructive/Destructive interference.

Summary updated

Abstract

We study security solutions for dual-functional radar communication (DFRC) systems, which detect the radar target and communicate with downlink cellular users in millimeter-wave (mmWave) wireless networks simultaneously. Uniquely for such scenarios, the radar target is regarded as a potential eavesdropper which might surveil the information sent from the base station (BS) to communication users (CUs), that is carried by the radar probing signal. Transmit waveform and receive beamforming are jointly designed to maximize the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the radar under the security and power budget constraints. We apply a Directional Modulation (DM) approach to exploit constructive interference (CI), where the known multiuser interference (MUI) can be exploited as a source of useful signal. Moreover, to further deteriorate the eavesdropping signal at the radar target, we utilize destructive interference (DI) by pushing the received symbols at the target towards the destructive region of the signal constellation. Our numerical results verify the effectiveness of the proposed design showing a secure transmission with enhanced performance against benchmark DFRC techniques.
BibTeX
@article{su2022secure,
  author = {Nanchi Su and Fan Liu and Zhongxiang Wei and Ya-Feng Liu and Christos Masouros},
  title = {{Secure Dual-Functional Radar-Communication Transmission: Exploiting Interference for Resilience Against Target Eavesdropping}},
  journal = {IEEE Trans. Wireless Communications},
  year = {2022},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=QAnUwycGn12},
}

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