Scrooge Attack: Undervolting ARM Processors for Profit

Christian Göttel, Konstantinos Parasyris, Osman S. Unsal, Pascal Felber, Marcelo Pasin, Valerio Schiavoni

Abstract

Latest ARM processors are approaching the computational power of x86 architectures while consuming much less energy. Consequently, cloud providers like Amazon, Microsoft, and Oracle are increasingly offering ARM-based instances. While ARM processors are more energy-efficient, a malicious cloud provider could intentionally reduce the CPU voltage to further lower its costs. This practical experience report describes a novel attack scenario: the Scrooge Attack, launched by a cloud provider against its users to aggressively reduce processor voltage for energy savings. We mimic ARM-based cloud instances using Raspberry Pi devices and demonstrate the degree to which this attack is relevant. The attack is unnoticeable by our detection method up to an offset of -50mV. Finally, we propose a set of client-based detection methods that can identify undervolted instances by pushing them to their thermal limits.

Introduction

ARM processors, such as the AWS Graviton series, have gained significant traction in cloud data centers due to their high performance-per-watt. However, the total control cloud providers exert over hardware and firmware introduces a new vulnerability: intentional undervolting. By operating CPUs below nominal voltage specifications, providers can significantly reduce dynamic power consumption and cooling costs. This "Scrooge Attack" directly benefits the provider's bottom line but compromises the reliability of the user's workloads by eroding the processor's safety guardbands.

The Scrooge Attack Mechanism

In a Scrooge Attack, the provider manipulates firmware configurations to undervolt the CPU. To maintain stealth, the provider must prevent the user from detecting the lowered voltage through standard operating system tools.

Workflow of the Scrooge Attack, including spoofing voltage readings to maintain stealth.

As illustrated in the attack workflow, the provider can intercept OS-level requests for voltage readings. By returning nominal values instead of actual undervolted readings, the provider ensures the attack remains invisible to standard monitoring tools. This necessitates a detection strategy that does not rely on software-reported sensors.

Detection via Thermal Guardband Analysis

We propose a detection method that leverages the physical relationship between temperature and circuit stability. As temperature increases, the voltage required for stable operation also increases. By intentionally overheating the CPU, a user can force an undervolted processor to exit its safe operating region.

Voltage vs. temperature safe regions for Raspberry Pi 4B, illustrating how undervolting reduces the thermal safety margin.

Our detection tool uses a highly intensive CPU-bound multiplication benchmark to maximize heat dissipation. If the hardware is undervolted, the combination of high temperature and low voltage triggers timing violations, leading to kernel panics. While disruptive, a hard crash provides definitive proof of hardware instability, allowing users to hold providers accountable for Service Level Agreement (SLA) violations.

Experimental Evaluation

We evaluated the Scrooge Attack using Raspberry Pi 3B, 3B+, and 4B models, employing stress-ng for workload simulation and physical power monitors for ground-truth data.

  • Profitability: Undervolting yielded energy savings between 5% and 13% on average, reaching up to 37% for specific workloads like hrtimers under passive cooling.
  • Stealth Threshold: The attack remains undetectable by thermal stress up to a voltage offset of -50 mV.
  • Detection Success: At more aggressive offsets (e.g., -100 mV), the detection script reliably provoked system failures at 40°C. At milder levels, failures were induced by pushing temperatures to 60°C, with success rates between 40% and 90% depending on the hardware model.
  • Latency: The time required to induce a crash via thermal stress ranged from 145 to 250 seconds of sustained load.

Conclusion

The Scrooge Attack demonstrates that cloud providers have a financial incentive to covertly undervolt ARM hardware. While providers can manipulate software-reported telemetry, they cannot hide the physical instability caused by reduced voltage guardbands. Our thermal-based detection method offers a way for users to verify hardware integrity. Future research will extend these findings to enterprise-grade ARM servers and explore more deterministic fault-injection techniques.

Summary updated

Abstract

Latest ARM processors are approaching the computational power of x86 architectures while consuming much less energy. Consequently, supply follows demand with Amazon EC2, Equinix Metal and Microsoft Azure offering ARM-based instances, while Oracle Cloud Infrastructure is about to add such support. We expect this trend to continue, with an increasing number of cloud providers offering ARM-based cloud instances. ARM processors are more energy-efficient leading to substantial electricity savings for cloud providers. However, a malicious cloud provider could intentionally reduce the CPU voltage to further lower its costs. Running applications malfunction when the undervolting goes below critical thresholds. By avoiding critical voltage regions, a cloud provider can run undervolted instances in a stealthy manner. This practical experience report describes a novel attack scenario: an attack launched by the cloud provider against its users to aggressively reduce the processor voltage for saving energy to the last penny. We call it the Scrooge Attack and show how it could be executed using ARM-based computing instances. We mimic ARM-based cloud instances by deploying our own ARM-based devices using different generations of Raspberry Pi. Using realistic and synthetic workloads, we demonstrate to which degree of aggressiveness the attack is relevant. The attack is unnoticeable by our detection method up to an offset of -50mV. We show that the attack may even remain completely stealthy for certain workloads. Finally, we propose a set of client-based detection methods that can identify undervolted instances. We support experimental reproducibility and provide instructions to reproduce our results.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{gottel2021scrooge,
  author = {Christian Göttel and Konstantinos Parasyris and Osman S. Unsal and Pascal Felber and Marcelo Pasin and Valerio Schiavoni},
  title = {{Scrooge Attack: Undervolting ARM Processors for Profit}},
  booktitle = {SRDS},
  year = {2021},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=GMfjQnlk9P},
}
Figure