Scrooge Attack: Undervolting ARM Processors for Profit: Practical experience report

Christian Göttel, Konstantinos Parasyris, Osman S. Unsal, Pascal Felber, Marcelo Pasin, Valerio Schiavoni

TL;DR

This paper introduces the "Scrooge Attack," a novel scenario where cloud providers could undervolt ARM processors to save energy and increase profits, potentially without users noticing. The authors demonstrate how this attack can be executed and propose client-side detection methods, showing that undervolting can yield significant energy savings (up to 37%) but also introduces reliability risks.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The increasing adoption of ARM processors in cloud infrastructure presents an opportunity for cloud providers to significantly reduce energy costs due to ARM's inherent energy efficiency. However, this efficiency gain could be further exploited by malicious providers who aggressively undervolt CPUs to minimize electricity bills. This undervolting, while saving energy, can lead to application malfunctions and instability when voltage drops below critical thresholds. The challenge is that such undervolting might be difficult for users to detect, especially if the provider can mask it. This paper addresses the question of how a cloud provider could stealthily undervolt ARM instances and how cloud users might detect such an attack.

Methods

The authors propose and analyze the "Scrooge Attack," where a cloud provider manipulates CPU voltage on ARM instances. To mimic cloud environments and study this attack, they use Raspberry Pi boards (3B, 3B+, and 4B) as representative ARM hardware. Their methodology involves:

  • Undervolting: Experimentally reducing the CPU voltage on Raspberry Pi models.
  • Guardband Analysis: Characterizing the safe, critical, and failure regions of processor operation by systematically varying voltage and temperature. This involves booting the system with undervolted configurations and testing for stability.
  • Detection Method: Developing a client-side detection strategy that relies on stressing the processor with a CPU-bound benchmark (multiplication) to induce heat and potentially trigger faults in undervolted systems. The goal is to cause system unavailability, which would then be covered by Service Level Agreements (SLAs).
  • Energy Efficiency Measurement: Using benchmarks like STRESS-NG to quantify the energy savings achieved through undervolting under different cooling conditions.

Datasets

The paper does not introduce new datasets. Instead, it uses:

  • Realistic and Synthetic Workloads: Including CPU-bound and memory-bound benchmarks, as well as the STRESS-NG benchmark suite for evaluating energy efficiency.
  • Raspberry Pi Hardware: Three models (3B, 3B+, 4B) are used as the experimental platform, mimicking ARM-based cloud instances.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Profit-Driven Undervolting is Feasible: Cloud providers can indeed undervolt ARM processors to achieve substantial energy savings, potentially without immediately impacting observable performance.
  • Stealth is Achievable (to a degree): A malicious provider can mask undervolting by carefully selecting voltage offsets and potentially intercepting voltage readings. The attack can remain stealthy up to a -50mV offset for certain workloads.
  • Temperature is the Key Enabler for Detection: The authors highlight that increasing processor temperature is crucial for triggering faults in undervolted systems. This is because higher temperatures exacerbate the effects of voltage instability.
  • Client-Side Detection Relies on Inducing Failure: Users can detect undervolting by running demanding workloads that generate heat, aiming to push the system into a critical or failure state, thereby violating SLAs.
  • Trade-off Between Profit and Reliability: While undervolting offers significant energy savings, it inherently increases the risk of system instability and failures, creating a direct trade-off for the cloud provider.

Key Results

  • Energy Savings: Undervolting can lead to energy savings ranging from 5% to 37% for specific workloads, with the highest gains observed on the Raspberry Pi 3B.
  • Stealth Threshold: The Scrooge Attack can remain unnoticeable by the proposed detection method for undervolt offsets up to -50mV.
  • Failure Probability: At 60°C, the detection method has a high probability (up to 90% on the 3B) of provoking a failure in a system operating in the critical region. More aggressive undervolting (-100mV) can provoke failures at lower temperatures (40°C).
  • Types of Failures: The most common failures observed in undervolted systems include paging requests, system freezes during boot, and NULL pointer dereferences.
  • Cooling Impact: Active cooling generally leads to larger energy gains from undervolting compared to passive cooling, though some specific stressors showed better efficiency with passive cooling on older models.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Hardware Specificity: The experiments were conducted on Raspberry Pi models, and the findings might not directly translate to all ARM server-grade processors due to variations in firmware, voltage regulation mechanisms, and thermal management.
  • Detection Non-Determinism: The proposed detection method is not perfectly deterministic; cloud instances can fail either soon or late, making it challenging for users to precisely time the attack for simultaneous instance failures.
  • Provider Mitigation: Cloud providers could potentially mitigate detection by implementing more sophisticated cooling systems or by carefully tuning undervolting to stay just outside the critical region for most workloads.
  • Future Work: The authors suggest expanding the study to a more diverse set of ARM hardware, making the detection method more deterministic by injecting faults more selectively, and investigating the impact of undervolting on security-sensitive operations. They also note the need for hardware features that improve reliability under critical conditions, such as error-correcting codes.

Summary updated

Abstract

Latest ARM processors are approaching the computational power of x86 architectures while consuming much less energy. Consequently, supply follows demand with Amazon EC2, Equinix Metal and Microsoft Azure offering ARM-based instances, while Oracle Cloud Infrastructure is about to add such support. We expect this trend to continue, with an increasing number of cloud providers offering ARM-based cloud instances. ARM processors are more energy-efficient leading to substantial electricity savings for cloud providers. However, a malicious cloud provider could intentionally reduce the CPU voltage to further lower its costs. Running applications malfunction when the undervolting goes below critical thresholds. By avoiding critical voltage regions, a cloud provider can run undervolted instances in a stealthy manner. This practical experience report describes a novel attack scenario: an attack launched by the cloud provider against its users to aggressively reduce the processor voltage for saving energy to the last penny. We call it the Scrooge Attack and show how it could be executed using ARM-based computing instances. We mimic ARM-based cloud instances by deploying our own ARM-based devices using different generations of Raspberry Pi. Using realistic and synthetic workloads, we demonstrate to which degree of aggressiveness the attack is relevant. The attack is unnoticeable by our detection method up to an offset of −50 mV. We show that the attack may even remain completely stealthy for certain workloads. Finally, we propose a set of client-based detection methods that can identify undervolted instances. We support experimental reproducibility and provide instructions to reproduce our results.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{gottel2021scrooge,
  author = {Christian Göttel and Konstantinos Parasyris and Osman S. Unsal and Pascal Felber and Marcelo Pasin and Valerio Schiavoni},
  title = {{Scrooge Attack: Undervolting ARM Processors for Profit: Practical experience report}},
  booktitle = {SRDS},
  year = {2021},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=GMfjQnlk9P},
}

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