Participation of an Energy Storage Aggregator in Electricity Markets

Jesus E. Contreras-Ocaña, Miguel A. Ortega-Vazquez, Baosen Zhang

Abstract: An important function of aggregators is to enable the participation of small energy storage units in electricity markets. This paper studies two generally overlooked aspects related to aggregators of energy storage: i) the relationship between the aggregator and its constituent storage units and ii) the aggregator's effect on system welfare. Regarding i), we show that short-term outcomes can be Pareto-inefficient: all players could be better-off. In practice, however, aggregators and storage units are likely to engage in long rather than short-term relationships. Using Nash Bargaining Theory, we show that aggregators and storage units are likely to cooperate in the long-term. A rigorous understanding of the aggregator-storage unit relationship is fundamental to model the aggregator's participation in the market. Regarding ii), we first show that a profit-seeking energy storage aggregator is always beneficial to the system when compared to a system without storage, regardless of size or market power the aggregator may have. However, due to market power, a monopolist aggregator may act in a socially suboptimal manner. We propose a pricing scheme designed to mitigate market power abuse by the aggregator. This pricing scheme has several important characteristics: its formulation requires no private information, it incentivizes a rational aggregator to behave in a socially optimal manner, and allows for regulation of the aggregator's profit.

Introduction

As residential energy storage systems, such as home batteries, become more prevalent, they offer significant potential to provide valuable services to the power grid. However, individual units are typically too small to meet the minimum capacity requirements of wholesale electricity markets. Aggregators solve this by acting as intermediaries, pooling small-scale resources to participate in these markets.

Hierarchical structure of the electricity market with an aggregator and multiple storage units.

This paper addresses two major gaps in current research: the internal profit-sharing dynamics between aggregators and storage units (SUs), and the impact of an aggregator's market power on overall system welfare.

Internal Dynamics: Aggregator and Storage Units

A primary challenge for aggregators is establishing a stable relationship with constituent SUs. In short-term, "single-shot" interactions modeled as a Stackelberg game, one party may exploit the other, leading to Pareto-inefficient outcomes where both parties could potentially achieve higher profits.

However, because these entities typically interact daily, they are likely to engage in long-term relationships. Applying Nash Bargaining Theory, the authors demonstrate that aggregators and SUs are incentivized to reach a cooperative agreement. This cooperation maximizes the joint "profit pie" before splitting it, leading to a stable, Pareto-optimal equilibrium that benefits both the aggregator and the individual storage units.

Market Power and System Welfare

Large-scale aggregators are "price-anticipatory" rather than "price-takers," meaning they recognize that their charging and discharging actions can influence market prices. The paper proves a fundamental principle: a profit-seeking aggregator—even one with a total monopoly—will always result in a lower total system cost than a system with no storage at all.

Comparison of system cost and aggregator profit across different levels of energy arbitrage.

Despite this general benefit, market power can lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. As illustrated in Figure 1, a monopolist aggregator may engage in "capacity withholding." By shifting less energy than is socially optimal (point B vs. point C), the aggregator can maintain wider price spreads to maximize its private profit. While point B is still better for the system than point A (no storage), it fails to reach the social optimum at point C.

The Market Power Mitigating Price (MPMP)

To address the withholding problem, the authors propose a novel "Market Power Mitigating Price" (MPMP). This pricing formula is designed so that an aggregator’s private profit-maximization objective becomes mathematically identical to the system operator's cost-minimization objective.

The MPMP is particularly advantageous because it is "information-light." It does not require the System Operator to know the internal costs or technical limits of the storage units; it only requires knowledge of generation cost functions, which operators already possess. Furthermore, the scheme allows for the regulation of aggregator profits through a constant ($C_{b,t}$), enabling policy-driven profit management without sacrificing operational efficiency.

Conclusion

This research provides a robust game-theoretic framework for understanding how energy storage aggregators interact with both small-scale units and wholesale markets. While aggregators are inherently beneficial to the grid, their market power requires careful management. The proposed MPMP offers a practical, information-efficient regulatory tool to align private profit motives with the goal of minimizing total system costs.

Summary updated

Abstract

An important function of aggregators is to enable the participation of small energy storage units in electricity markets. This paper studies two generally overlooked aspects related to aggregators of energy storage: i) the relationship between the aggregator and its constituent storage units and ii) the aggregator's effect on system welfare. Regarding i), we show that short-term outcomes can be Pareto-inefficient: all players could be better-off. In practice, however, aggregators and storage units are likely to engage in long rather than short-term relationships. Using Nash Bargaining Theory, we show that aggregators and storage units are likely to cooperate in the long-term. A rigorous understanding of the aggregator-storage unit relationship is fundamental to model the aggregator's participation in the market. Regarding ii), we first show that a profit-seeking energy storage aggregator is always beneficial to the system when compared to a system without storage, regardless of size or market power the aggregator may have. However, due to market power, a monopolist aggregator may act in a socially suboptimal manner. We propose a pricing scheme designed to mitigate market power abuse by the aggregator. This pricing scheme has several important characteristics: its formulation requires no private information, it incentivizes a rational aggregator to behave in a socially optimal manner, and allows for regulation of the aggregator's profit.
BibTeX
@article{contrerasocana2019participation,
  author = {Jesus E. Contreras-Ocaña and Miguel A. Ortega-Vazquez and Baosen Zhang},
  title = {{Participation of an Energy Storage Aggregator in Electricity Markets}},
  journal = {IEEE Trans. Smart Grid},
  year = {2019},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=BXKdcIdnzz2},
}
Figure