National Factor Endowment, Sector-specific Intensity, Technological Dependency and Organizational Structure:A Property-right Approach

Yang LiuJournal of the Association for Information Systems 2015

Abstract

This paper utilizes a property-rights approach to analyze how national factor endowments, sector-specific intensity of headquarter services, and the degree of technological dependency influence the organizational decisions of final-good producers. We highlight that the technological dependency of a producer on its supplier is a critical factor driving firm heterogeneity and organizational diversity within sectors. Our findings suggest that cost advantages from factor endowments primarily dictate the structure of firms with high technological dependency, while headquarter service intensity is the dominant factor for firms with low dependency.

Introduction: The "Make vs. Buy" Dilemma in Global Trade

In the modern era of globalized "intra-product" specialization, a fundamental question persists: why do some firms choose vertical integration (owning the supply chain) while others in the same sector opt for outsourcing? Traditional trade theories often view industries as homogeneous, yet empirical evidence reveals significant diversity in firm strategies.

This research addresses this gap by introducing technological dependency into the classic property-rights framework. It explores how a firm's reliance on a supplier's specific technical expertise interacts with national cost advantages and industry characteristics to determine the most profitable organizational structure.

Methodology: A Property-Rights Framework

The study employs a theoretical economic model building upon the property-rights approach to the firm (Grossman and Hart, 1986). Key elements include:

  • Mathematical Modeling: A two-country model (Home and Foreign) where consumers have C.E.S. (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) utility.
  • Incomplete Contracts: The model assumes firms cannot contract for every future scenario, necessitating ex-post bargaining over production surpluses.
  • Nash Bargaining: Profit division is determined by each party's "outside option." Under integration, the producer retains components after firing a supplier; under outsourcing, they do not.
  • Technological Dependency ($\rho_i$): The core innovation is a firm-specific parameter representing the elasticity of substitution between headquarter services and intermediate components. Lower elasticity indicates higher technological dependency.

Key Insights: Dependency as a Driver of Diversity

Technological dependency serves as the "hidden variable" explaining why firms in the same sector adopt different structures. It creates varying "hold-up" problems that integration or outsourcing are designed to mitigate.

The non-linear relationship between technological dependency (represented by $\rho_i$) and organizational choice across different theoretical cases.

As shown in Figure 2, the relationship between dependency and the incentive to integrate is often non-linear. National factor endowments (e.g., cheaper foreign labor) do not affect all firms equally; their impact is most pronounced for firms with high technological dependency. Conversely, in headquarter-intensive sectors, the specific intensity of those services matters most when technological dependency is low.

Results: Optimal Organizational Strategies

The paper categorizes optimal strategies based on industry type, cost advantages, and dependency levels. These results are summarized in the following table:

Summary of optimal organizational structures based on cost advantage, headquarter service intensity, and technological dependency.
  1. Headquarter-Intensive Sectors: Integration is preferred when foreign cost advantages are significant. If advantages are insignificant, high-dependency firms tend to outsource, while low-dependency firms integrate.
  2. Component-Intensive Sectors: With significant foreign cost advantages, high-dependency firms choose integration, whereas low-dependency firms outsource. If cost advantages are insignificant, outsourcing is generally the preferred route regardless of dependency.
  3. Moderate Intensity Sectors: These sectors exhibit complex shifts. For instance, with significant foreign cost advantages, firms may cycle between integration and outsourcing as their degree of dependency moves from high to low.

Conclusion and Future Directions

This research demonstrates that technological dependency is a vital determinant of global organizational structure. While providing a robust theoretical foundation, the model is currently limited to a two-country, two-agent framework. Future research should aim to validate these mathematical predictions against empirical firm-level trade data and explore how these dynamics evolve over a product's lifecycle as technology standardizes.

Summary updated

Abstract

This document using property-right approach analyzes the effect of national factor endowment, sector-specific intensity of head-quarter services and the degree of technological dependency on the decision of organizational structures of final-good producers.We highlight that the technological dependency of the final-good producer on the supplier is a significant factor resulting to the heterogeneity of firms within sectors so as their organizational structures. The conclusion is that cost advantage resulting from national factor endowment has significant effect on the decision of organizational structure of the final-good producer with high degree of technological dependency. The sector-specific intensity of head-quarter service has significant effect on the decision of organizational structure of the final-good producer with low degree of technological dependency.
BibTeX
@article{liu2015national,
  author = {Yang Liu},
  title = {{National Factor Endowment, Sector-specific Intensity, Technological Dependency and Organizational Structure:A Property-right Approach}},
  journal = {Journal of the Association for Information Systems},
  year = {2015},
}
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