MEV Makes Everyone Happy under Greedy Sequencing Rule

Yuhao Li, Mengqian Zhang, Jichen Li, Elynn Y. Chen, Xi Chen, Xiaotie Deng

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of the Greedy Sequencing Rule (GSR) on transaction ordering and Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) in decentralized finance. By analyzing Constant Function Market Makers (CFMMs), the authors demonstrate a surprising alignment of incentives: in a zero-fee environment, a miner's pursuit of profit maximization under GSR leads to a socially optimal outcome where all user transactions are executed at prices better than or equal to their individual execution prices. However, the study also reveals a significant computational barrier: the introduction of trading fees transforms the miner's optimization problem into an NP-hard challenge, suggesting that practical exploitation is computationally prohibitive.

Introduction

In decentralized finance (DeFi), the power of miners and block builders to order transactions has led to the rise of predatory MEV tactics, most notably "sandwich attacks." These attacks exploit user slippage by placing trades before and after a user's transaction, extracting value at the user's expense. To mitigate this, the Greedy Sequencing Rule (GSR) was proposed. The GSR mandates that transactions be ordered such that token prices oscillate around a starting benchmark, theoretically eliminating the structural possibility of sandwich attacks. This paper explores the consequences of miners attempting to maximize profit while strictly adhering to this rule.

The Arbitrage-Free Interval

A core concept in the authors' analysis is the Arbitrage-Free Interval. This represents a specific range of reserves (and thus prices) within a CFMM where no risk-free profit can be extracted by a miner.

Visualization of the Arbitrage-Free Interval and transaction impacts on reserves.

As shown in Figure 1(a), the interval $[L_x, R_x]$ defines the boundaries for the reserves of asset $X$. If the market state falls outside this interval, an arbitrage opportunity exists. Figure 1(b) illustrates how different transactions ($TX_1$ and $TX_2$) interact with these boundaries. The GSR essentially forces the miner to keep the system state within or moving toward these equilibrium points, limiting their ability to manipulate prices for predatory gain.

The Zero-Fee "Win-Win" Scenario

The paper's most striking finding occurs in the context of zero trading fees ($f=0$). The authors developed Algorithm 1, a polynomial-time algorithm that identifies the miner's optimal strategy under GSR.

Under this regime, the miner's "selfish" profit maximization aligns perfectly with user interests. To maximize their own MEV, the miner is incentivized to act as a liquidity provider, offsetting the price impact of user trades. This results in two major benefits for the network:

  1. Guaranteed Execution: Every user transaction in the pool is executed.
  2. Price Surplus: Every user receives an execution price that is as good as, or better than, the price they would have received if their transaction were the only one in the block.

Computational Complexity with Trading Fees

While the zero-fee case presents a mathematical harmony, real-world decentralized exchanges (DEXs) typically charge fees. The authors prove that when trading fees are greater than zero ($f > 0$), the problem of finding the optimal miner strategy becomes NP-hard.

By reducing the problem from the classic Partition Problem, the authors demonstrate that miners cannot easily compute the most profitable sequence of trades. This complexity serves as a secondary defense mechanism; even if a miner wishes to extract maximum value, the computational cost of finding the optimal strategy may outweigh the potential gains, especially within the tight time constraints of block production.

Conclusion and Future Directions

The Greedy Sequencing Rule offers a promising path toward fairer transaction ordering. While the "everyone is happy" result is theoretically tied to zero-fee environments, it highlights a potential for incentive alignment in protocol design. Future research may focus on approximation algorithms for the NP-hard fee-based scenario and exploring how strategic users might split their trades to further leverage the GSR's structural properties. Ultimately, the GSR demonstrates that formal sequencing rules can transform MEV from a predatory force into a mechanism for market efficiency.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@inproceedings{li2023mev,
  author = {Yuhao Li and Mengqian Zhang and Jichen Li and Elynn Y. Chen and Xi Chen and Xiaotie Deng},
  title = {{MEV Makes Everyone Happy under Greedy Sequencing Rule}},
  booktitle = {DeFi@CCS},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.1145/3605768.3623543},
}
Figure