TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel game-theoretic model to quantify the economic impact of "revert protection" in blockchain auctions, a feature that prevents users from paying fees for failed transactions. The authors demonstrate that revert protection, contrary to initial intuition, can significantly increase auction revenue, improve market efficiency, and enhance blockspace efficiency for blockchain builders and sequencers.
What Problem Does This Paper Address?
Blockchains, particularly those with smart contracts, often involve complex transactions that can fail (revert). Normally, users are charged fees even for these failed transactions, with these fees often accruing to block builders or sequencers. The question arises: is it in the interest of these entities to offer "revert protection," a feature that shields users from these fees on failed transactions? This paper tackles this by analyzing the economic implications of revert protection in the context of priority gas auctions and Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), aiming to quantify its benefits and understand its role in blockchain economics.
Methods
The authors develop a unified, game-theoretic model of a priority ordering auction for MEV opportunities. This model is designed to be flexible enough to capture various blockchain settings, including L1 block builders and L2 sequencers with different fee structures and revert penalty rates. They analyze both pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria. The core of their analysis involves deriving closed-form solutions for equilibrium strategies, auction revenue, and blockspace usage under different revert protection scenarios. They then perform comparative statics to understand how changes in parameters like the number of participants, value of the MEV opportunity, base gas fee, and revert penalty rates affect these outcomes.
Datasets
Not discussed in the paper.
Key Insights and Ideas
- Revert Protection is Profitable: The most striking insight is that revert protection, which might seem like a cost to builders/sequencers, can actually lead to higher auction revenue. This is because it encourages more participation and prevents value loss from failed bids.
- Market Efficiency Boost: In decentralized exchange (DEX) arbitrage scenarios, revert protection leads to better market efficiency by ensuring that arbitrage opportunities are more consistently exploited, leading to more accurate pricing.
- Blockspace Efficiency: With revert protection, only the winning transaction occupies blockspace, whereas without it, multiple failed transactions might still consume resources.
- The Role of Revert Penalty Rates: The model distinguishes between penalties on the base gas fee ($r_1$) and priority fees ($r_2$). While $r_1$ significantly impacts participation and revenue, $r_2$ has a negligible effect on overall auction revenue.
- Trade-offs with Implementation Costs: The paper explores scenarios where implementing revert protection incurs costs. It finds that passing these costs to searchers (users) can lead to higher sequencer profits than the sequencer internalizing these costs, especially when costs are low.
Key Results
- Higher Auction Revenue: Revert protection increases expected auction revenue by ensuring more consistent value extraction from MEV opportunities.
- Improved Market Efficiency: In AMM settings, revert protection increases the probability of arbitrage opportunities being exploited, leading to more efficient markets.
- Reduced Blockspace Consumption: Revert protection ensures only one transaction occupies blockspace per MEV opportunity.
- Optimal Revert Penalty: The revenue-maximizing choice for the base gas fee revert penalty ($r_1$) is zero (full revert protection). However, when implementation costs are considered and internalized by the sequencer, a non-zero optimal $r_1$ emerges to maximize profit.
- $r_2$ is Irrelevant for Revenue: The revert penalty rate on priority fees ($r_2$) does not affect the total expected auction revenue.
Limitations and Future Work
The authors acknowledge that their model simplifies certain aspects of real-world blockchain systems. Specifically, they abstract away from the technical challenges and potential denial-of-service (DoS) attack vectors associated with implementing revert protection. Future work could explore these implementation costs and security considerations in more detail. Additionally, while the paper focuses on symmetric equilibria, the existence and characteristics of non-symmetric equilibria could be a fruitful area for further research. The paper also suggests exploring how different auction designs and fee mechanisms interact with revert protection.
Summary updated