MAP: MAsk-Pruning for Source-Free Model Intellectual Property Protection

Boyang Peng, Sanqing Qu, Yong Wu, Tianpei Zou, Lianghua He, Alois Knoll, Guang Chen, Changjun Jiang

Abstract

Deep learning models represent significant intellectual property (IP), yet their inherent generalization capabilities often allow unauthorized users to repurpose them for new domains. This paper introduces MAP (MAsk-Pruning), a framework designed to protect model IP by surgically pruning parameters responsible for generalization to unauthorized domains. MAP operates effectively in source-free and data-free settings, maintaining high accuracy for authorized users while significantly degrading performance on unauthorized targets.

Introduction

The primary challenge in model IP protection is illegal knowledge transfer. A model trained for a specific authorized domain often generalizes to similar unauthorized domains, allowing third parties to exploit the model's capabilities without permission.

Conceptual illustration of model IP protection: (a) shows how broad generalization allows unauthorized access; (b) demonstrates how MAP constrains the generalization area to prevent such usage.

Existing protection methods typically require access to both original source data and unauthorized target data—a condition rarely met in practice due to privacy or data availability issues. MAP addresses this by providing protection across three increasingly difficult scenarios: Source-Available (SA-MAP), Source-Free (SF-MAP), and Data-Free (DF-MAP).

Methodology: The MAP Framework

MAP is built on the Inverse Transfer Parameter Hypothesis, which posits that a dense neural network contains a sub-network capable of maintaining high performance on an authorized domain while failing on unauthorized ones.

Surgical Mask-Pruning

Rather than retraining the entire model, MAP learns a target-specific binary mask while freezing original weights. This binary mask acts as a surgical filter, zeroing out parameters that facilitate transfer to unauthorized domains. This approach is more stable than continuous weight adjustment, which often leads to "catastrophic forgetting" of the primary task.

The MAP framework architecture, detailing the generation modules and the mask-pruning process for creating a safe network.

Handling Data Scarcity

To operate without original source data, MAP employs two specialized modules:

  • Source Generator (SF-MAP): Synthesizes "pseudo-source" samples to help the model retain its original performance during the pruning process.
  • Diversity Generator (DF-MAP): In the absence of any data, this module generates a wide variety of synthetic "neighborhood domains." These domains act as proxies for potential unauthorized targets, allowing the framework to shrink the model's generalization boundary effectively.

Evaluation and Results

The framework was evaluated on standard benchmarks including Digits (MNIST, USPS, SVHN), Object Recognition (CIFAR10, STL10), and the large-scale VisDA-2017 dataset across various architectures (VGG, ResNet, Swin-Transformer).

Key Findings

  • Superior Protection: MAP consistently outperformed baselines like NTL and CUTI. In source-free settings, MAP maintained a source accuracy drop of only 8.8%, whereas competing methods saw drops exceeding 68%.
  • Effective Blinding: While preserving source accuracy, MAP successfully reduced target domain performance to near-random levels (e.g., from ~60% to ~10% in certain tasks).
  • Efficiency: Pruning redundant parameters occasionally resulted in slight performance gains on the authorized domain.
  • ST-D Metric: The authors proposed the Source & Target Drop (ST-D) metric to quantify the trade-off between authorized performance and unauthorized protection, with lower values indicating superior IP protection.

Conclusion

MAP represents a significant advancement in model IP protection by enabling "blinding" in practical, data-constrained environments. While the quality of synthetic data generation remains a challenge for the data-free variant, MAP's surgical pruning offers a robust path for controlling the deployment and usage of high-value deep learning assets. Future research will explore extending this framework to complex tasks like semantic segmentation and natural language processing.

Summary updated

Abstract

Deep learning has achieved remarkable progress in various applications, heightening the importance of safeguarding the intellectual property (IP) of well-trained models. It entails not only authorizing usage but also ensuring the deployment of models in authorized data domains, i.e., making models exclusive to certain target domains. Previous methods necessitate concurrent access to source training data and target unauthorized data when performing IP protection, making them risky and inefficient for decentralized private data. In this paper, we target a practical setting where only a well-trained source model is available and investigate how we can realize IP protection. To achieve this, we propose a novel MAsk Pruning (MAP) framework. MAP stems from an intuitive hypothesis, i.e., there are target-related parameters in a well-trained model, locating and pruning them is the key to IP protection. Technically, MAP freezes the source model and learns a target-specific binary mask to prevent unauthorized data usage while minimizing performance degradation on authorized data. Moreover, we introduce a new metric aimed at achieving a better balance between source and target performance degradation. To verify the effectiveness and versatility, we have evaluated MAP in a variety of scenarios, including vanilla source-available, practical source-free, and challenging data-free. Extensive experiments indicate that MAP yields new state-of-the-art performance. Code will be available at https://github.com/ispc-lab/MAP.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{peng2024map,
  author = {Boyang Peng and Sanqing Qu and Yong Wu and Tianpei Zou and Lianghua He and Alois Knoll and Guang Chen and Changjun Jiang},
  title = {{MAP: MAsk-Pruning for Source-Free Model Intellectual Property Protection}},
  booktitle = {IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition},
  year = {2024},
}
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