La gestion des résultats des entreprises innovantes

Guillaume DumasToulouse 2014

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Abstract

This research explores earnings management (EM) strategies within innovative firms, specifically analyzing the role of R&D accounting. The thesis, defended at Université Toulouse 1 Capitole, demonstrates that innovative companies frequently manage earnings upward during R&D phases to mitigate information asymmetry and secure external funding. By examining R&D capitalization under IAS 38 and real activity adjustments, the study reveals that managers often prioritize hitting profit benchmarks over purely informative financial reporting.

Introduction

Innovation represents a "black box" for external stakeholders. Due to the high risk and confidentiality associated with R&D, significant information asymmetry exists between company insiders and investors. This gap complicates the acquisition of external capital. To signal financial health, managers may engage in Earnings Management (EM)—using accounting discretion or real transaction timing to influence financial reports. This paper investigates whether innovative firms specifically manipulate R&D accounting to meet targets and if these actions facilitate funding.

Methodology

The author employs a multi-pronged econometric approach across three studies:

  • Discretionary Accruals: Utilizing Jones (1991) and Kothari et al. (2005) models to identify manipulation in accounting entries.
  • R&D Capitalization Analysis: Testing if capitalization under IAS 38 is driven by future economic benefits (informative) or profit targets (opportunistic).
  • Processual Management: Applying the Zhao et al. (2012) framework to see if managers combine real R&D cuts with accounting capitalization to reach specific benchmarks.

The dataset comprises French firms listed on Euronext and Alternext (2005–2011), with R&D data manually collected from annual reports and patent data from the INPI.

Key Findings

The Input-Output Paradox

Earnings management is most prevalent during the R&D input phase (spending). When uncertainty is highest and patents have not yet been secured, the pressure to "window dress" results is greatest. Once patents are published, they serve as a credible signal of quality, reducing the need for accounting manipulation.

Strategic Signaling for Funding

The research identifies a positive correlation between aggressive earnings management and the acquisition of new external debt or equity in the following year. Quantitative analysis shows that innovative firms manage earnings upward significantly, with discretionary accruals representing between 14.4% and 19.2% of total assets.

Opportunistic Capitalization

Managers utilize R&D capitalization most opportunistically when they are close to missing a target, such as avoiding a net loss. In these "just above zero" scenarios, capitalization is negatively correlated with pre-managed earnings. Conversely, when far from targets, capitalization tends to be more informative of actual future value.

Processual Management Strategies

To meet zero-earnings targets, managers often use capitalization as a complement to R&D spending cuts. However, to maintain earnings levels from previous years, they typically choose one method over the other. For analyst forecasts, a complex "expectations management" game is played: increasing R&D mid-year to lower expectations, then capitalizing those costs at year-end to beat the lowered target.

Conclusion

The findings underscore that while accounting standards like IAS 38 aim for transparency, the inherent discretion in R&D accounting allows for significant opportunistic behavior. For investors, understanding these "processual" management techniques is crucial for accurately assessing the true financial health and future potential of innovative enterprises.

Summary updated

Abstract

Cette thèse s’intéresse à la gestion des résultats dans le cadre des entreprises innovantes. Elle est constituée de trois articles. Dans le premier, il s’agit d’examiner si les résultats des entreprises innovantes sont gérés et si le stade de développement des innovations influence cette gestion des résultats. Il apparaît que les résultats des entreprises innovantes sont gérés à la hausse. Cette gestion ne semble intervenir qu’au cours de l’activité d’innovation (c’est-à-dire lorsque les entreprises investissent en R&D) ; l’achèvement des innovations n’incitant pas les dirigeants à gérer les résultats. Partant de ce constat, nous nous demandons dans le deuxième article si (i) la comptabilisation des dépenses de R&D est utilisée comme une modalité de GR ou (ii) si l’activation de ces dépenses est une information comptable fiable. Nos résultats montrent que les dépenses de R&D sont activées pour gérer les résultats et plus précisément pour atteindre des résultats cibles. L’activation des dépenses de R&D est une information comptable fiable uniquement lorsque les dirigeants ne sont pas incités à atteindre des résultats cibles. Enfin, dans le troisième article, nous observons si les dirigeants des entreprises innovantes utilisent l’ajustement des dépenses de R&D en plus de leur activation pour atteindre les résultats cibles. Il apparaît que ces deux modalités de GR sont utilisées conjointement pour atteindre le bénéfice et les prévisions de résultat des analystes. En revanche, pour éviter une diminution du résultat, les dépenses de R&D sont soit ajustées soit activées.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{dumas2014la,
  author = {Guillaume Dumas},
  title = {{La gestion des résultats des entreprises innovantes}},
  booktitle = {Toulouse},
  year = {2014},
}
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