Introduction
This document presents the front matter and table of contents for a landmark 1963 symposium issue of the journal International Organization, titled "International Force—A Symposium." Edited by Lincoln P. Bloomfield, the issue features contributions from some of the most influential political scientists and strategists of the 20th century, including Hans Morgenthau, Thomas Schelling, and Brian Urquhart.
The Problem of International Military Capability
In the early 1960s, the United Nations was grappling with the aftermath of its first major, complex armed interventions, most notably the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). The central problem addressed by this collection is the lack of a coherent framework for an international military capability.
The authors tackle a fundamental tension: the feasibility of a "world policeman" within a system defined by sovereign states. The symposium explores the gap between the idealistic vision of the UN Charter—which envisioned a standing force—and the reality of logistical failures, conflicting national loyalties, and the paralyzing effects of the Cold War's bipolar power structure.
Methodological Approaches
As a symposium of scholarly essays, the methods employed are qualitative and interdisciplinary:
- Historical Case Analysis: Examining "Lessons from the Past" through early UN Peace Forces (Nicholas, Urquhart).
- Institutional Analysis: Evaluating the administrative and command-and-control relationship between UN Headquarters and field operations (Bloomfield).
- Logistical Modeling: A technical look at the supply chain and transport requirements for a multinational force (Bowman and Fanning).
- Political Philosophy & Realism: Applying "Realist" theory to determine if the political conditions for a global police force actually exist (Morgenthau).
- Strategic Game Theory: Using strategic modeling to understand how an international force affects the stability of the "balance of terror" (Schelling).
Key Insights and Theoretical Frameworks
The symposium provides several critical insights into the nature of international peacekeeping:
- The Logistics of Peace: Success is as much a matter of "beans and bullets" as diplomacy. Standardizing equipment across dozens of nations is a primary hurdle.
- The Loyalty Conflict: Questioning whether soldiers can suppress national identity for a global mandate.
- The "Lilliput" Problem: Stanley Hoffmann suggests an international force might be "pinned down" by the very states it is meant to regulate.
- Strategic Instability: Thomas Schelling argues that a powerful international force might increase global tension if its intervention triggers a pre-emptive response from a superpower.
- Political Preconditions: Hans Morgenthau posits that a police force is the result of a political community, not its creator.
Results and Institutional Impact
The collective "result" of the symposium was a sobering reality check for 1960s internationalists. While a permanent UN force was technically possible, it was deemed politically "premature" due to the lack of a unified global executive authority. This work helped define the "middle way" for the UN—moving away from a "standing army" toward the ad-hoc, consent-based peacekeeping model used today.
Limitations and Historical Context
The analysis is heavily colored by the US-Soviet rivalry, limiting its direct applicability to modern asymmetric conflicts. Furthermore, the perspectives are predominantly Western.
The Board of Editors and contributors are almost exclusively from Western institutions (MIT, Harvard, Oxford), omitting the perspectives of the "Global South" nations that would eventually become the primary providers of UN troops. Future research directions suggested by the authors include "Headquarters-Field Relations" and the psychological training of international civil servants.
Summary updated