Abstract: Why do different countries experience varying levels of budget deficits? Common pool resource theorists argue that budget deficits tend to be low if the executive, who considers total tax burdens, suppresses the narrow incentives of individual legislators, who only consider partial tax burdens. Policy inertia theorists argue that a decrease in the number of veto players is associated with a low level of budget deficit. In this article, we combine the two approaches and offer a conditional common pool resource theory that predicts budget deficits to decrease as the executive strength vis-à-vis the legislature increases under parliamentarism because of the lack of legislative veto power. Under presidentialism, however, this effect is not likely to be significant because of the presence of legislative veto power. We support the argument through an analysis of cross-national data on budget deficits of 49 countries from 1995 to 2011.
Introduction
Why do some countries consistently run high budget deficits while others maintain fiscal balance? Political scientists have long debated two main drivers of fiscal health. The Common Pool Resource (CPR) problem suggests that individual legislators favor "pork barrel" spending for local constituents while shifting the tax burden to the nation, a problem a strong executive is meant to solve. Conversely, Policy Inertia (PI) theory argues that a high number of "veto players" makes it difficult for governments to adjust budgets during economic shocks.
This paper introduces a "conditional common pool resource theory," arguing that neither theory is complete without considering the institutional context of the government system. The authors propose that executive strength only effectively reduces deficits when the legislature lacks independent veto power.
Theoretical Framework: The Conditional Logic
The core of the argument is that executive strength is not a universal solution for deficits. Its effectiveness depends on the institutional relationship between the executive and the legislature.
In parliamentary systems, the executive and legislature are mutually dependent. A Prime Minister can use party discipline or the threat of dissolution to force legislators to prioritize national fiscal health. In these systems, increased executive strength (measured by seat share) directly correlates with lower deficits. In contrast, presidential systems grant the legislature independent veto power. Even with a large majority, individual legislators remain less disciplined because their survival is independent of the executive, rendering executive seat share largely irrelevant to deficit control.
Methodology and Data
The study utilizes a dataset of 49 countries from 1995 to 2011 (652 observations), drawing from the World Bank Databank and the Database of Political Institutions. The authors employ a fixed-effects regression model featuring an interaction term between Executive Strength (ruling party seat share) and System Type (parliamentary vs. presidential).
This approach demonstrates that the impact of executive strength is conditional on the institutional framework. The model controls for economic variables like GDP per capita and major global financial crises, such as the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, using cluster-robust standard errors to ensure validity.
Key Findings
The empirical analysis strongly supports the conditional theory. Key results include:
- Quantitative Impact: In parliamentary systems, a one-unit increase in the ruling party's seat share is associated with a decrease in the budget deficit of approximately 0.08 percentage points.
- The Presidential Gap: In presidential systems, executive strength had little to no significant effect on deficit reduction.
- Real-World Contrast: A striking example from 2006 illustrates this: Thailand (parliamentary) and the Philippines (presidential) both had ruling parties with over 75% seat shares. However, Thailand maintained a 1.91% surplus while the Philippines ran a 1.25% deficit.
- Explanatory Power: The interaction model (Model 3) showed a significantly higher explanatory power (R²) than models testing CPR or PI theories in isolation, suggesting that the conditional approach more accurately captures the complexities of fiscal politics.
Conclusion and Future Directions
This research demonstrates that institutional design fundamentally shapes fiscal outcomes. While the current study provides robust evidence from 1995–2011, future work could extend this analysis to the post-COVID era to see if these dynamics persist under extreme global stress. Additionally, more granular research into specific budgetary rules—such as the powers of Finance Ministers or specific amendment rules—could further refine our understanding of how institutional nuances influence national debt. For policymakers, the findings suggest that strategies to improve fiscal discipline must be tailored to the specific executive-legislative relationship of the country.
Summary updated