Federal Institutions and Strategic Policy Responses to COVID-19 Pandemic

Olga Shvetsova, Julie VanDusky‐Allen, Andrei Zhirnov, Abdul Basit Adeel, Michael Catalano, Olivia Catalano, Frank Giannelli, Ezgi Muftuoglu, Dina Rosenberg, Mehmet Halit Sezgin, Tianyi ZhaoFrontiers in Political Science 2021 · DOI

Abstract

This essay examines the policy response of the federal and regional governments in federations to the COVID-19 crisis. We theorize that the COVID-19 policy response in federations is an outcome of strategic interaction among the federal and regional incumbents in the shadow of their varying accountability for health and the repercussions from the disruptive consequences of public health measures. Using the data from the COVID-19 Public Health Protective Policy Index Project, we study how the variables suggested by our theory correlate with the overall stringency of public health measures in federations as well as the contribution of the federal government to the making of these policies. Our results suggest that the public health measures taken in federations are at least as stringent as those in non-federations, and there is a cluster of federations on which a bulk of crisis policy making is carried by subnational governments. We find that the contribution of the federal government is, on average, higher in parliamentary systems; it appears to decline with the proximity of the next election in presidential republics, and to increase with the fragmentation of the legislative party system in parliamentary systems. Our analysis also suggests that when the federal government carries a significant share of responsibility for healthcare provision, it also tends to play a higher role in taking non-medical steps in response to the pandemic.

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic presented a unique challenge to governance, particularly in federations where the division of power between central and subnational governments is often complex. In unitary states, the central government typically bears the primary responsibility for crisis response. However, in federations like the United States, Germany, or Brazil, the "clarity of responsibility" is often blurred. This paper investigates whether federalism hinders or facilitates crisis response by examining how institutional designs create incentives for politicians to either take the lead or defer to other levels of government.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

The authors propose a strategic-interaction model where incumbents balance two primary electoral risks: health electoral costs (voter dissatisfaction due to mortality rates) and disruption electoral costs (voter dissatisfaction due to economic and social lockdowns). The "rules of the game"—defined by executive type, legislative fragmentation, and healthcare "decision space"—influence which level of government implements costly policies.

The study utilizes data from the COVID-19 Public Health Protective Policy Index (PPI) Project, covering 73 countries (including 19 federations) and over 1,660 subnational units. The PPI measures the stringency of 15 policy categories on a scale from 0 to 1, distinguishing between federal and subnational mandates.

Analysis of Policy Stringency

A key finding is that federations were generally more stringent in their pandemic response than unitary states. The Average Total PPI for federations was 0.69, compared to 0.56 for unitary states. This suggests that the multi-level nature of federations does not necessarily lead to policy paralysis.

Average total PPI vs. decentralization (Regional Authority Index)

As shown in Figure 1, there is a notable cluster of federations (represented by triangles) achieving high stringency scores across varying levels of regional authority, often exceeding the stringency of non-federations.

Strategic Interactions and the Substitution Effect

The data reveals a "substitution effect" within federations. When one level of government fails to act, the other often steps in. This results in a "bi-modal" distribution of policy action: either the federal government takes the lead, or subnational governments do.

Distribution of PPI scores across federations and non-federations

Figure 2 illustrates these distributions. In federations, the "Avg Regional PPI" shows a distinct bimodal pattern compared to the more concentrated distribution in non-federations, highlighting the varied subnational responses and the tendency for regional governments to fill policy vacuums.

Institutional Drivers of Federal Leadership

The degree of federal contribution to pandemic policy is shaped by specific institutional factors:

  • Executive Type: In presidential systems, federal incumbents become more averse to disruptive policies as elections approach (correlation of 0.54), often shifting the burden to regional governors.
  • Legislative Fragmentation: In parliamentary systems, higher party fragmentation (more parties in a coalition) correlates with a higher federal share of the policy response (correlation of 0.32), as the "blame" for economic disruption is more diffused across the coalition.
  • Healthcare Responsibility: Federations where the central government has high pre-existing healthcare accountability (e.g., Argentina, Malaysia) saw significantly higher federal leadership compared to those with low federal healthcare roles (e.g., USA, Switzerland).

Conclusion

While the study's sample size of 19 federations makes the results suggestive, the findings highlight that federal institutions significantly shape crisis response through strategic electoral calculations. Federations often achieve higher stringency through a combination of federal and regional actions, driven by pre-existing "duty of care" mandates and the political risks associated with both health outcomes and economic disruption. Future research should examine whether these strategic interactions persisted through subsequent waves of the pandemic.

Summary updated

Abstract

This essay examines the policy response of the federal and regional governments in federations to the COVID-19 crisis. We theorize that the COVID-19 policy response in federations is an outcome of strategic interaction among the federal and regional incumbents in the shadow of their varying accountability for health and the repercussions from the disruptive consequences of public health measures. Using the data from the COVID-19 Public Health Protective Policy Index Project, we study how the variables suggested by our theory correlate with the overall stringency of public health measures in federations as well as the contribution of the federal government to the making of these policies. Our results suggest that the public health measures taken in federations are at least as stringent as those in non-federations, and there is a cluster of federations on which a bulk of crisis policy making is carried by subnational governments. We find that the contribution of the federal government is, on average, higher in parliamentary systems; it appears to decline with the proximity of the next election in presidential republics, and to increase with the fragmentation of the legislative party system in parliamentary systems. Our analysis also suggests that when the federal government carries a significant share of responsibility for healthcare provision, it also tends to play a higher role in taking non-medical steps in response to the pandemic.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{shvetsova2021federal,
  author = {Olga Shvetsova and Julie VanDusky‐Allen and Andrei Zhirnov and Abdul Basit Adeel and Michael Catalano and Olivia Catalano and Frank Giannelli and Ezgi Muftuoglu and Dina Rosenberg and Mehmet Halit Sezgin and Tianyi Zhao},
  title = {{Federal Institutions and Strategic Policy Responses to COVID-19 Pandemic}},
  booktitle = {Frontiers in Political Science},
  year = {2021},
  doi = {10.3389/fpos.2021.631363},
}
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