The Greek Parliament of 2012: Coalition Formations & Power Indices in Context

Constandina Koki, Stefanos LeonardosarXiv 2018 · arXiv

Abstract

This paper applies cooperative game theory to the volatile 2012 Greek elections, using power indices like Shapley-Shubik and Myerson to analyze how political influence was distributed among seven parties. The study demonstrates that a party's actual "power" to form a government or block legislation often diverges wildly from its seat count, highlighting the critical role of institutional rules and inter-party alliances.

Introduction: The Illusion of Seat Counts

In parliamentary democracies, the number of seats a party holds is often equated with its political power. However, in fragmented multi-party systems, this relationship is rarely linear. A small "kingmaker" party might hold more leverage than a much larger rival if it is the only viable partner for a coalition. This research addresses the challenge of quantifying this "hidden" power during a period of extreme political instability in Greece (2012–2014), where the traditional two-party system collapsed into a landscape divided by "pro-austerity" (MoU) and "anti-austerity" (anti-MoU) camps.

Methodology: Modeling the Weighted Majority Game

The authors model the Greek Parliament as a weighted majority game, employing several specialized power indices to capture different facets of political influence:

  • Shapley-Shubik Index (SSI): Measures the expected share of political "spoils" by treating all theoretically possible coalitions as equally likely.
  • Holler Index (Public Good Index): Focuses on minimal winning coalitions, highlighting the importance of smaller parties whose presence is essential for a majority.
  • Myerson Index: Incorporates a communication structure based on actual political platforms, limiting analysis to "feasible" coalitions.
  • Coleman’s Indices: Used to measure the power to initiate versus prevent action, particularly relevant for supermajority requirements.

Data and Context

The study utilizes official results from three pivotal events: the May 2012 election (deadlock), the June 2012 election (fragile coalition), and the December 2014 Presidential vote (government collapse). A qualitative "Connectivity Graph" was constructed from party manifestos to inform the Myerson Index calculations.

Key Insights: Power Beyond Proportionality

Analysis revealed that power is not always monotonic with seat share. For instance, in May 2012, the moderate DIMAR party held only 6.33% of seats but possessed a Myerson Index of 22% because it was the sole "bridge" between opposing camps. Conversely, in June 2012, SYRIZA's Myerson power decreased despite gaining seats, as its rivals (ND and PASOK) became strong enough to form a majority without it.

Furthermore, the 60% supermajority requirement for electing a President in 2014 turned ideologically isolated parties into "veto players." Coleman’s index showed that the power to prevent action was nearly absolute, making government collapse almost inevitable.

Results: May vs. June 2012

The divergence between seat share and actual power is most evident when comparing the two 2012 elections. In May, the leading New Democracy (ND) party benefited significantly from the 50-seat "winner's bonus," holding 36% of seats but commanding 46% of the SSI power.

Figure 1: Comparison of seat share and power indices (SSI and Holler) for the May 2012 election.

By the June 2012 election, the SSI for ND spiked even further as its seat share increased to 43%. Interestingly, SYRIZA and PASOK were ranked equally by the SSI (approximately 12% each) despite a massive 14% difference in their actual seat shares, suggesting they were functionally equivalent in coalition-building potential.

Figure 2: Comparison of seat share and power indices (SSI and Holler) for the June 2012 election.

Conclusion and Future Work

While these models provide deep insights, they treat parties as monolithic blocks and use binary connectivity. Future research could refine these findings by accounting for individual MP defections and the varying intensity of ideological distances between parties. Applying these game-theoretic tools to other fragmented European parliaments remains a promising avenue for validating these approaches.

Summary updated

Abstract

We revisit the May and June 2012 Greek Parliamentary elections and the December 2014 Presidential election that was held by the June-elected Parliament. The three voting instances provide a political field experiment for the application of power indices and their interpretation in context. We model the Greek Parliament as a weighted majority game and assess voting power with the Shapley-Shubik, Holler and when relevant, Coleman's indices. Also, based on the actual events, we establish connections between parties and evaluate the Myerson index. We focus on the influence of institutional rules on the distribution of power among the elected political parties and add an alternative input to the ongoing political debate about the reform of both the Parliamentary and Presidential electoral system in Greece. Additionally, our findings contribute to the understanding of the coalition formation process in the particular context and provide empirical evidence on the performance of non-selective indices in parliamentary multi-party settings which can be used for comparison by similar case-studies in the future.
BibTeX
@misc{koki2018greek,
  author = {Constandina Koki and Stefanos Leonardos},
  title = {{The Greek Parliament of 2012: Coalition Formations \& Power Indices in Context}},
  year = {2018},
  eprint = {1803.03445},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.03445},
}
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