Cryptanalysis of simple three-party key exchange protocol (S-3PAKE)

Raphael Chung-Wei Phan, Wei-Chuen Yau, Bok-Min Goi

Abstract

Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols allow parties to share secret keys in an authentic manner based on an easily memorizable password. Recently, Lu and Cao proposed a three-party password-authenticated key exchange protocol, so called S-3PAKE, based on ideas of the Abdalla and Pointcheval two-party SPAKE extended to three parties. S-3PAKE can be seen to have a structure alternative to that of another three-party PAKE protocol (3PAKE) by Abdalla and Pointcheval. Furthermore, a simple improvement to S-3PAKE was proposed very recently by Chung and Ku to resist the kind of attacks that applied to earlier versions of 3PAKE. In this paper, we show that S-3PAKE falls to unknown key-share attacks by any other client, and undetectable online dictionary attacks by any adversary. The latter attack equally applies to the recently improved S-3PAKE. Indeed, the provable security approach should be taken when designing PAKEs; and furthermore our results highlight that extra cautions still be exercised when defining models and constructing proofs in this direction.
BibTeX
@article{phan2008cryptanalysis,
  author = {Raphael Chung-Wei Phan and Wei-Chuen Yau and Bok-Min Goi},
  title = {{Cryptanalysis of simple three-party key exchange protocol (S-3PAKE)}},
  journal = {Information Sciences},
  year = {2008},
  doi = {10.1016/j.ins.2008.02.008},
}

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