Affirmative Action in Education: Evidence From Engineering College Admissions in India

Marianne Bertrand, Rema Hanna, Sendhil Mullainathan

Abstract

Many countries mandate affirmative action in university admissions for traditionally disadvantaged groups. Little is known about either the efficacy or costs of these programs. This paper examines affirmative action in engineering colleges in India for "lower-caste" groups. We find that it successfully targets the financially disadvantaged: the marginal upper-caste applicant comes from a more advantaged background than the marginal lower-caste applicant who displaces him. Despite much lower entrance exam scores, the marginal lower-caste entrant does benefit: we find a strong, positive economic return to admission. These findings contradict common arguments against affirmative action: that it is only relevant for richer lower-caste members, or that those who are admitted are too unprepared to benefit from the education. However, these benefits come at a cost. Our point estimates suggest that the marginal upper-caste entrant enjoys nearly twice the earnings level gain as the marginal lower-caste entrant. This finding illustrates the program's redistributive nature: it benefits the poor, but costs resources in absolute terms. One reason for this lower level gain is that a smaller fraction of lower-caste admits end up employed in engineering or advanced technical jobs. Finally, we find no evidence that the marginal upper-caste applicant who is rejected due to the policy ends up with more negative attitudes towards lower castes or towards affirmative action programs. On the other hand, there is some weak evidence that the marginal lower-caste admits become stronger supporters of affirmative action programs.

Introduction

Affirmative action remains one of the most debated social policies globally, yet empirical evidence regarding its actual costs and benefits is often scarce. Critics typically raise two primary concerns: the "Creamy Layer" argument, which suggests that these programs only benefit the relatively wealthy members of disadvantaged groups, and the "Mismatch" hypothesis, which posits that students admitted with lower test scores are ill-equipped for rigorous curricula, leading to poor labor-market outcomes.

This study investigates these claims within the context of India’s caste-based "reservation" system. In the state studied, over 50% of seats in state-run engineering colleges are reserved for Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Other Backward Castes (OBC). By analyzing this high-stakes environment, the authors provide a rigorous assessment of the policy's impact on both the beneficiaries and those displaced.

Methodology and Data

To isolate the causal effect of admission, the researchers employed a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design, treated as an Instrumental Variables (IV) approach. In the Indian state under study, admission is a deterministic function of a standardized entrance exam score and caste category. This allowed for a comparison between applicants just above and just below the admission cutoffs for each specific caste.

The study's strength lies in its comprehensive data collection. The authors utilized the 1996 Entrance Exam Census, covering all individuals who took the exam. Crucially, they conducted a primary follow-up survey between 2004 and 2006, tracking approximately 700 households nearly a decade after the exam. This longitudinal approach allowed them to observe the "counterfactual"—the outcomes for rejected applicants—and compare them to those who were admitted. Benchmarking against the National Sample Survey (NSS) ensured the applicant pool was representative of the broader urban population.

Key Findings

Effective Targeting

The evidence refutes the "creamy layer" argument. The policy successfully targets socio-economically disadvantaged individuals. Displaced upper-caste students came from households with an average monthly income of Rs 14,088, whereas the lower-caste students who took their places came from significantly poorer backgrounds, with an average parental income of Rs 8,340.

Refuting the Mismatch Hypothesis

Despite entering with much lower test scores, lower-caste students realized substantial economic returns from their education. Admission increased their monthly income by Rs 3,700 to Rs 6,200, representing a massive 40% to 70% increase. This suggests that the education provided was highly effective for these students, fundamentally altering their economic trajectories rather than being "wasted" due to lack of preparation.

The Efficiency-Equity Trade-off

While the policy is a powerful tool for redistribution, it comes with a measurable efficiency cost. The marginal upper-caste student would have gained nearly twice as much in absolute earnings as the marginal lower-caste entrant. Specifically, for every 1 Rupee "lost" by an upper-caste applicant, the lower-caste displacer gained only between 0.4 and 0.6 Rupees. This gap is partly explained by job quality: lower-caste admits were less likely to secure "advanced technical" roles involving computer use or English proficiency.

Social Impacts

Interestingly, the study found no evidence that the policy breeds resentment among rejected upper-caste applicants. Their attitudes toward lower castes and affirmative action remained similar to those who were admitted. Conversely, there was some evidence that lower-caste beneficiaries became stronger supporters of such programs.

Conclusion

The study demonstrates that affirmative action in Indian engineering colleges is a potent redistributive mechanism that successfully reaches the poor and provides them with life-changing economic gains. However, these gains are achieved at the cost of overall economic efficiency, as the students displaced by the policy would have likely generated higher absolute returns from the same education.

The findings are limited to the engineering sector in a single state and reflect outcomes a decade post-exam. Future research should explore whether these dynamics hold in other fields like medicine or the humanities, and whether alternative redistributive tools could achieve similar equity goals with lower efficiency costs.

Summary updated

Abstract

Many countries mandate affirmative action in university admissions for traditionally disadvantaged groups. Little is known about either the efficacy or costs of these programs. This paper examines affirmative action in engineering colleges in India for "lower-caste" groups. We find that it successfully targets the financially disadvantaged: the marginal upper-caste applicant comes from a more advantaged background than the marginal lower-caste applicant who displaces him. Despite much lower entrance exam scores, the marginal lower-caste entrant does benefit: we find a strong, positive economic return to admission. These findings contradict common arguments against affirmative action: that it is only relevant for richer lower-caste members, or that those who are admitted are too unprepared to benefit from the education. However, these benefits come at a cost. Our point estimates suggest that the marginal upper-caste entrant enjoys nearly twice the earnings level gain as the marginal lower-caste entrant. This finding illustrates the program's redistributive nature: it benefits the poor, but costs resources in absolute terms. One reason for this lower level gain is that a smaller fraction of lower-caste admits end up employed in engineering or advanced technical jobs. Finally, we find no evidence that the marginal upper-caste applicant who is rejected due to the policy ends up with more negative attitudes towards lower castes or towards affirmative action programs. On the other hand, there is some weak evidence that the marginal lower-caste admits become stronger supporters of affirmative action programs.
BibTeX
@article{bertrand2009affirmative,
  author = {Marianne Bertrand and Rema Hanna and Sendhil Mullainathan},
  title = {{Affirmative Action in Education: Evidence From Engineering College Admissions in India}},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  year = {2009},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.11.003},
}
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