A Pricing Mechanism to Jointly Mitigate Market Power and Environmental Externalities in Electricity Markets

Lamia Varawala, Mohammad Reza Hesamzadeh, György Dán, Derek W. Bunn, Juan Rosellón

Abstract

The electricity industry has been one of the first to face technological changes motivated by sustainability concerns. Whilst efficiency aspects of market design have tended to focus upon market power concerns, the new policy challenges emphasise sustainability. We argue that market designs need to develop remedies for market conduct integrated with regard to environmental externalities. Accordingly, we develop an incentive-based market clearing mechanism using a power network representation with a distinctive feature of incomplete information regarding generation costs. The shortcomings of price caps to mitigate market power, in this context, are overcome with the proposed mechanism.

Introduction

Modern electricity markets face a complex "two-headed monster": the persistent challenge of market power exercised by dominant producers and the urgent need to internalize environmental externalities. While traditional market designs focus on minimizing fuel and maintenance costs, they often ignore the social costs of pollution, such as carbon emissions and particulates. Furthermore, large power companies can manipulate prices by withholding capacity or inflating bids, leading to inefficient market outcomes.

This paper, published in Energy Economics, proposes a unified "penalty and reward" pricing mechanism. This mechanism forces producers to internalize pollution costs while simultaneously stripping away their ability to manipulate market prices. Crucially, the mechanism is designed to function under conditions of information asymmetry, where the Independent System Operator (ISO) does not know the true operating costs of the generators.

The Dual Challenge: Market Power and Externalities

In an ideal competitive market, the ISO would clear the market by selecting the cheapest and cleanest generators first. However, two primary distortions prevent this:

  1. Market Power: In many regions, a few large firms dominate the market. These firms can "game" the system by bidding above their marginal costs to drive up prices, pocketing excess rents at the expense of consumers.
  2. Externalities: Traditional dispatch ignores the "hidden" costs of emissions. While carbon taxes exist, they are often not integrated into the moment-to-moment dispatch logic of the power grid.
Social welfare loss in an oligopolistic market.

As shown in the figure above, when producers exercise market power in an oligopolistic setting, they shift the market away from the socially optimal generation level ($q_1^*$) toward a lower level ($q_1^\#$). This results in a significant "social welfare loss," represented by the striped region, where the marginal utility to consumers exceeds the marginal total cost of production.

The Proposed Incentive-Based Mechanism

The authors develop a novel Incentive-Based Market Clearing Mechanism that redefines social welfare to include consumer utility minus both generation costs and environmental damage. The core of the mechanism is an incentive function ($\phi^i$) that calculates a specific payment or penalty for each producer.

This function is mathematically derived to ensure that a producer’s profit-maximizing strategy is to bid their true costs and pollution levels. By integrating the difference between the socially optimal state and the gamed (oligopolistic) state, the mechanism rewards producers for the marginal utility they provide and taxes them for the marginal damage their pollution causes. The model also incorporates the physical realities of the grid, such as transmission limits and line losses, using a power transfer distribution factor (PTDF) representation.

The Failure of Traditional Price Caps

Regulatory authorities often rely on price caps to curb market power. However, the authors demonstrate that these are blunt instruments. If a price cap is set too high, market power persists. If set too low, it can lead to "involuntary load shedding," where the ISO cannot procure enough power to meet demand because prices are suppressed below actual production costs.

Social welfare loss persisting under a price cap.

As illustrated, even with a price cap in place, a striped region of social welfare loss remains. The price cap fails to align the oligopolistic generation level with the socially optimal level, highlighting the need for the more sophisticated incentive structure proposed in this research.

Results and Key Insights

Using a numerical simulation of a two-node system, the authors compared four distinct scenarios to measure total social welfare:

  • Socially Optimal: Achieves the maximum welfare of 425 units.
  • Competitive (No Pollution Tax): Results in 390 units of welfare, as cheap but "dirty" power is over-utilized.
  • Oligopoly (Market Power): Welfare drops significantly to 286 units due to inefficiently low production and high prices.
  • Proposed Mechanism: Successfully reaches the 425-unit optimal welfare target.

The proposed mechanism effectively shifts the market clearing price to reflect the true social cost of electricity, eliminating the welfare losses seen in traditional models. It proves "information-proof," meaning the ISO does not need to verify a company's costs; the incentive structure itself makes truth-telling the most profitable strategy for the producer.

Conclusion and Future Directions

This research provides a robust framework for aligning private profit with social welfare in complex electricity markets. While the mechanism shows great promise, the authors acknowledge certain limitations. The system may require the ISO to pay net subsidies to producers, which would need to be recovered through fixed participation fees. Additionally, while the math holds for small systems, scaling the optimization to real-world grids with thousands of nodes remains a computational challenge for future study. Finally, the accuracy of the mechanism depends on the ISO's ability to define precise "damage functions" for various pollutants.

Summary updated

Abstract

The electricity industry has been one of the first to face technological changes motivated by sustainability concerns. Whilst efficiency aspects of market design have tended to focus upon market power concerns, the new policy challenges emphasise sustainability. We argue that market designs need to develop remedies for market conduct integrated with regard to environmental externalities. Accordingly, we develop an incentive-based market clearing mechanism using a power network representation with a distinctive feature of incomplete information regarding generation costs. The shortcomings of price caps to mitigate market power, in this context, are overcome with the proposed mechanism.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{varawala2023pricing,
  author = {Lamia Varawala and Mohammad Reza Hesamzadeh and György Dán and Derek W. Bunn and Juan Rosellón},
  title = {{A Pricing Mechanism to Jointly Mitigate Market Power and Environmental Externalities in Electricity Markets}},
  booktitle = {Energy},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.1016/j.eneco.2023.106646},
}
Figure