Two-Sided Fairness in Multi-Stakeholder Recommendation and Matching

This direction is split into other directions: multi-stakeholder fairness (fairness of exposure), multi-stakeholder fairness (provider-side fairness). Its last version stays readable and citable here.

Version 1 of 1179 papers263 conceptsfrozen 2026-10-04

In traditional recommendation systems, the "invisible hand" of the algorithm has a single-minded goal: maximize user satisfaction. Whether it’s a star rating, a click, or a purchase, the system treats the items being recommended as passive goods. However, in modern digital marketplaces—like ridesharing, job recruitment, and academic peer review—the "items" are often people or entities with their own preferences, constraints, and livelihoods.

When an algorithm decides which driver gets a passenger or which candidate appears at the top of a recruiter's list, it isn't just a recommendation; it is an allocation of opportunity. Research into two-sided fairness seeks to move beyond one-sided optimization to ensure that both the consumers (users) and the providers (sellers, creators, or workers) are treated equitably.

The One-Sided Blind Spot

Most fairness interventions focus exclusively on the consumer side, ensuring that different user demographics receive similar quality of service. As Sirui Yao and Bert Huang point out in Beyond Parity: Fairness Objectives for Collaborative Filtering, this neglect of the provider side leads to "exposure bias."

In a "winner-take-all" dynamic, a few popular items capture the vast majority of attention, while niche or new creators languish in obscurity. This isn't just a diversity problem; it’s an economic one. In two-sided platforms, neglecting the provider side can lead to "fairness deserts" where certain workers earn significantly less Ashwin Kumar or niche content creators are systematically marginalized Julia Neidhardt.

From Fair Division to Bilateral Matching

How do we mathematically define fairness when two different groups have conflicting needs? Researchers have turned to the field of fair division to find answers.

A cornerstone concept is Envy-Freeness up to One item (EF1)—the idea that no participant should envy another's allocation after removing at most one item from the other's bundle. Justin Payan and Yair Zick applied this to academic peer review in I Will Have Order! Optimizing Orders for Fair Reviewer Assignment. By using "picking sequences" (like a sports draft), they ensure that papers (the recipients) and reviewers (the providers) both reach a state of approximate envy-freeness.

Evi Micha and Nisarg Shah expanded this in Two-Sided Matching Meets Fair Division, introducing "Double EF1" to guarantee fairness for both sides of a many-to-many market simultaneously.

The central challenge of two-sided fairness is the utility-fairness trade-off. If a system is forced to give exposure to an unpopular item to be "fair" to the provider, it might provide a less relevant recommendation to the user.

To solve this, researchers like Haolun Wu and Fernando Diaz 0001 treat fairness as a multi-objective optimization problem. In Multi-FR: A Multi-Objective Optimization Method for Achieving Two-sided Fairness in E-commerce Recommendation, they use specialized solvers to find Pareto optimal solutions—points where you cannot improve fairness for one group without hurting another.

Similarly, Qinyi Chen and Negin Golrezaei propose setting minimum utility thresholds for both items and users, ensuring a "guaranteed percentage" of ideal benefit for every stakeholder Interpolating Item and User Fairness in Multi-Sided Recommendations.

Economic Justice: Nash and Rawls

Beyond simple parity, researchers are importing deep economic principles to define what a "fair" marketplace looks like:

  • Nash Social Welfare (NSW): Instead of maximizing the sum of utilities (which allows one person to have everything), NSW maximizes the product of utilities. This naturally balances efficiency and equity. Pallavi Jain 0001 and Rohit Vaish have extended this to two-sided preferences in Maximizing Nash Social Welfare under Two-Sided Preferences.
  • Rawlsian Max-Min: This approach prioritizes the "least-advantaged" member of the system. Seyed A. Esmaeili uses this in Rawlsian Fairness in Online Bipartite Matching to ensure that the platform, the drivers, and the riders all receive a baseline level of fairness.
  • Lorenz Dominance: Virginie Do and Jamal Atif leverage the Lorenz curve—a tool used to measure income inequality—to develop ranking algorithms that prioritize the "worse-off" individuals while maintaining efficiency Two-sided fairness in rankings via Lorenz dominance.

Breaking the Matthew Effect

Fairness isn't a static, one-time check; it’s a dynamic process. In Towards Long-term Fairness in Recommendation, Yikun Xian models the problem as a Constrained Markov Decision Process (CMDP). By treating recommendation as a long-term game, the system can learn to sacrifice a small amount of immediate click-through rate to give a promising new creator the exposure they need to survive, eventually breaking the "rich-get-richer" cycle.

Ultimately, this research direction recognizes that algorithms are not just neutral filters, but the governing infrastructure of digital society. By balancing the needs of consumers, providers, and platforms, two-sided fairness aims to build marketplaces that are not just efficient, but sustainable and just.

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Latest version (a living page):

@misc{lacuna_two_sided_fairness_in_multi_stakeholder__596eb4f6,
  title = {Two-Sided Fairness in Multi-Stakeholder Recommendation and Matching},
  author = {{Lacuna}},
  howpublished = {Lacuna research direction},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://lacuna.tiptreesystems.com/direction/two-sided-fairness-in-multi-stakeholder-recommendation-and-matching/rdr_596eb4f6766241ce847ea8062cc361b8},
  note = {Latest version of a living research direction; cite a version for a fixed text. Accessed 2026-11-20},
}

This exact version (version 1, frozen text):

@misc{lacuna_two_sided_fairness_in_multi_stakeholder__596eb4f6_v1,
  title = {Two-Sided Fairness in Multi-Stakeholder Recommendation and Matching},
  author = {{Lacuna}},
  howpublished = {Lacuna research direction},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://lacuna.tiptreesystems.com/direction/two-sided-fairness-in-multi-stakeholder-recommendation-and-matching/rdr_596eb4f6766241ce847ea8062cc361b8/v/1},
  note = {Version 1, frozen 2026-10-04. Accessed 2026-11-20},
}