White-Box Implementation of the Identity-Based Signature Scheme in the IEEE P1363 Standard for Public Key Cryptography

Yudi Zhang, Debiao He, Xinyi Huang, Ding Wang, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Jing Wang

Introduction

This research presents the first white-box implementation of the Identity-Based Signature (IBS) scheme as defined in the IEEE P1363 standard. By decomposing private keys into a series of obfuscated lookup tables, the authors enable secure digital signature generation in untrusted environments—such as mobile applications or Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems—without exposing raw secret keys to memory-dumping or execution-tracing attacks.

The Challenge of Untrusted Environments

In traditional "black-box" cryptography, security assumes an attacker only observes the inputs and outputs of an algorithm. However, modern software often operates in "white-box" environments where an adversary has full control over the execution platform. In these scenarios, attackers can inspect device memory and trace CPU instructions to extract hardcoded secret keys.

While white-box solutions exist for symmetric ciphers like AES, public-key infrastructure—specifically IBS—has lacked a robust equivalent. IBS is advantageous because it allows a user's identity (e.g., an email address) to serve as their public key, simplifying key management. The primary challenge lies in protecting the user's private key when the signing process occurs on an insecure device.

Methodology: Key Decomposition and Obfuscation

The authors adapt the IEEE P1363 IBS standard by introducing a novel WhiteBoxKeyGen phase. Instead of providing a single private key ($K_{ID}$), a trusted Key Generation Center (KGC) performs the following:

  1. Key Decomposition: The KGC splits the private key into multiple distinct components.
  2. Lookup Table Generation: It creates four sets of lookup tables ($u_i, X_i, Y_i, v_i$) containing pre-computed values where the private key is masked by random numbers.
  3. Obfuscated Signing: The user’s device performs lookups and basic group operations across these tables to sign messages. Because the private key is "shredded" across these tables, it is never present in its raw form in the device's RAM during execution.

The security of this approach relies on the Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem and the $q$-Strong Diffie-Hellman Problem ($q$-SDHP), ensuring that even with full access to the tables, an attacker cannot reconstruct the original secret key.

Experimental Results

The implementation was evaluated using the MIRACL Cryptographic SDK and Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curves to provide security equivalent to AES-128. Benchmarks were conducted on an Intel Xeon E3-1230 v5 processor to measure the computational overhead introduced by the white-box transformations.

Comparison of computation costs (in milliseconds) for various cryptographic operations.

As shown in Figure 4, the primary overhead occurs during the one-time White Box KeyGen phase (approx. 4360ms). However, the operational phases remain highly efficient. The white-box signing process takes approximately 11ms for standard message sizes, compared to 8ms for the black-box version. Verification remains standard, taking approximately 32ms (white-box) versus 24ms (black-box).

Comparison of signing overhead trends between white-box and black-box implementations as message size increases.

Figure 5 illustrates that the signing overhead remains consistent across various message sizes, scaling predictably even as payloads reach 1MB. This demonstrates that the scheme is lightweight enough for practical deployment on mobile and IoT devices.

Key Insights and Limitations

  • Bridging the Gap: This work moves white-box research beyond symmetric encryption, providing a path for identity-based public-key standards.
  • KGC-Assisted Obfuscation: By offloading the complexity of table generation to a trusted KGC, the user's signing process remains performant.
  • Security Focus: The implementation achieves "weak" white-box security, specifically targeting the prevention of key extraction.

Limitations: The current study focuses on key extraction rather than "code lifting," where an attacker copies the entire obfuscated implementation. Additionally, while PC benchmarks are promising, future work is required to evaluate the specific battery and memory impact on actual mobile hardware (Android/iOS).

Summary updated

Abstract

Unlike black-box cryptography, an adversary in a white-box security model has full access to the implementation of the cryptographic algorithm. Thus, white-box implementation of cryptographic algorithms is more practical. Nevertheless, in recent years, there is no white-box implementation for public key cryptography. In this paper, we propose the first white-box implementation of the identity-based signature scheme in the IEEE P1363 standard. Our main idea is to hide the private key to multiple lookup tables, so that the private key cannot be leaked during the algorithm executed in the untrusted environment. We prove its security in both black-box and white-box models. We also evaluate the performance of our white-box implementations, in order to demonstrate utility for real-world applications.
BibTeX
@article{zhang2020white,
  author = {Yudi Zhang and Debiao He and Xinyi Huang and Ding Wang and Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo and Jing Wang},
  title = {{White-Box Implementation of the Identity-Based Signature Scheme in the IEEE P1363 Standard for Public Key Cryptography}},
  journal = {IEICE Trans. Information and Systems},
  year = {2020},
  doi = {10.1587/transinf.2019inp0004},
}
Figure