Centralization vs Decentralization in Hiring and Admissions

Benjamin Fish, Diptangshu Sen, Juba Ziani

Introduction

In high-stakes selection processes—ranging from university admissions to corporate hiring—organizations must decide how much authority to centralize. A centralized system, often utilizing a committee or an automated AI screening tool, offers efficiency and standardization. Conversely, a decentralized system empowers individual "principals" (such as department heads or team leads) to make their own selections, allowing for a more nuanced evaluation of "fit."

This paper explores the mathematical trade-offs inherent in this choice. While delegating selection to a centralized agent saves time and resources, it often sacrifices the specific needs of the individual decision-maker. Furthermore, the shift toward centralization has profound implications for fairness, particularly for candidate groups characterized by "noisy" or less traditional data.

The Principal-Agent Model of Selection

The researchers employ a stylized Principal-Agent model rooted in statistical decision theory to compare these two regimes. In this framework, applicants are defined by two latent variables:

  1. Ability ($s$): A standardized measure of technical skill or academic potential.
  2. Fit ($f$): A context-specific measure of how well a candidate meshes with a particular team or environment.

A Principal (the person who will ultimately work with the candidate) derives utility from both ability and fit, weighted by a parameter $\alpha$. However, evaluating fit is costly ($c_{rev}$), requiring interviews and deep portfolio reviews. An Agent (a centralized office or AI tool) is typically "blind" to fit and selects candidates based solely on signals of ability ($\tilde{s}$).

The Principal faces a strategic choice: perform the expensive review themselves to optimize for both variables, or delegate the task to the Agent, accepting a candidate who may be highly skilled but a poor organizational fit.

The Utility Trade-off: The "U-Shaped" Curve

One of the paper's primary theoretical contributions is the characterization of the Principal’s utility curve. Interestingly, when a Principal chooses to conduct their own hiring (non-delegated), their utility is non-monotonic relative to the importance they place on fit ($\alpha$).

When a Principal cares equally about fit and ability, utility often dips. This occurs because it is statistically more difficult to find candidates who excel in both dimensions simultaneously; the "search space" for an ideal candidate becomes more restrictive. In contrast, in a delegated model, utility simply declines as the Principal’s preference for fit increases, because the Agent completely ignores the fit dimension, leading to a growing mismatch between the Agent's selection and the Principal's needs.

The authors also identify a "viability threshold." If the cost of review ($c_{rev}$) is too high relative to the diversity of the applicant pool, the Principal is mathematically better off delegating the decision—or even opting not to hire at all—rather than attempting to find the "perfect" fit through manual review.

Fairness and the "Noisy" Group Problem

The most striking findings emerge from the analysis of fairness across demographic groups. The paper distinguishes between two types of disadvantage:

  • Bias: A systematic shift in the mean signal (e.g., lower average test scores due to socioeconomic factors).
  • Noise: A higher variance in signals (e.g., candidates from non-traditional backgrounds whose transcripts or resumes are harder for the Principal to interpret).

The model reveals that a rational, utility-maximizing Principal who performs their own hiring may "fix" bias by simply adjusting their selection threshold. However, they cannot easily fix noise. If a group’s signals are too uncertain, a Principal may choose to completely exclude that group to minimize the risk of a "bad fit" hire that would not justify the high cost of review.

In this context, delegation acts as a surprising "fairness safety net." Because a centralized Agent or AI is "blind" to the Principal's specific fit requirements and costs, it will continue to select from the noisy group based on ability signals. While this may lead to lower-quality hires from that group (potentially reinforcing negative stereotypes), it prevents the total exclusion that might occur under a decentralized, strategic human decision-maker.

Conclusion

The tension between centralization and decentralization is not merely a matter of administrative efficiency; it is a fundamental trade-off between precision and equity. While decentralized hiring allows for the optimization of "fit," it imposes high costs and creates incentives for the exclusion of "noisy" candidate pools. Centralization via AI or committees provides a standardized baseline that can protect representation, but often at the cost of the individual Principal's utility. As automated systems become more prevalent, understanding these hidden costs is essential for designing selection processes that are both efficient and just.

Summary updated

Abstract

There is a range of ways to organize hiring and admissions in higher education, as in many domains, ranging from very centralized processes where a single person makes final decisions to very decentralized processes where many people make decisions about who to admit or hire. Decentralized processes can enable individual and collective empowerment, but this may come at the cost of efficiency. With the advent of automated decision making, this question of centralization has a big impact on hiring and admissions, given that automated systems often are easier to implement, or even require, more centralized decision making. In this paper, we develop a strategic model to explore the impact of the degree of centralization on both the candidates and the hirers, with a focus on university admissions. The model reflects a trade-off between a centralized committee where preferences may not capture individual hirers' preferences, and a decentralized process where individual hirers face extra costs to interview candidates themselves. We characterize when individual hirers prefer the decentralized process over the centralized process as a function of the degree to which the centralized process and hirers' preferences are aligned. We also show that decentralization can have devastating consequences for fairness, leading to major disparities in the likelihood of getting hired across candidates. Our results demonstrate the trade-offs that occur under the question of centralization vs decentralization, and point to how an answer to this question can impose significant harm to people in these systems.
BibTeX
@misc{fish2025centralization,
  author = {Benjamin Fish and Diptangshu Sen and Juba Ziani},
  title = {{Centralization vs Decentralization in Hiring and Admissions}},
  year = {2025},
  eprint = {2502.07792},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.07792},
}
Figure