When Effort May Fail: Equilibria of Shared Effort with a Threshold

Gleb Polevoy, Stojan Trajanovski, Mathijs de WeerdtSSRN 2022

TL;DR

This paper introduces and analyzes a new class of games called "shared effort games with a threshold," where players contribute to projects and share in the generated value only if their contribution meets a certain threshold relative to others. The authors provide a comprehensive characterization of Nash equilibria and their efficiency for these games, offering insights into how to design and analyze scenarios ranging from academic collaborations to public goods provision.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Many real-world scenarios involve individuals or groups pooling resources and effort towards a common goal, with the benefits being shared among contributors. Examples include co-authoring papers, contributing to open-source projects, or even organizing community events. While existing game theory models often assume linear value generation and equal sharing, this paper addresses a more nuanced reality: often, contributors only receive a share of the value if their effort meets a minimum requirement, and this requirement can be relative to the contributions of others. This "threshold" mechanism is crucial for understanding situations where free-riding is a concern or where a certain level of commitment is necessary for a project to be viable. The authors aim to fill a gap in the literature by formally modeling and analyzing these thresholded shared effort games, focusing on the existence and efficiency of equilibria.

Methods

The paper develops a formal model of shared effort games with a threshold, incorporating player budgets, project functions (linear value generation), and a relative contribution threshold. The core of their analysis revolves around characterizing Nash Equilibria (NE) and their efficiency, measured by the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and Price of Stability (PoS). They employ a constructive approach, providing explicit conditions for the existence of pure NE for two players and then generalizing to n players. For efficiency analysis, they leverage concepts like potential functions and develop analytical bounds for PoA and PoS. To complement the theoretical findings, especially for more than two players, they introduce and utilize a generalized fictitious play simulation method to explore equilibrium existence and efficiency in complex scenarios. They also introduce a new solution concept, "cyclically strong equilibrium," as a refinement of Nash equilibrium.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Thresholds Matter: The introduction of a relative contribution threshold significantly alters the game's dynamics, leading to different equilibrium outcomes and efficiency levels compared to models without thresholds.
  • Budget Ratios are Key: For two players, the ratio of their budgets and the ratio of project coefficients are critical determinants of whether a Nash Equilibrium exists and how efficient it is.
  • Steep Projects Dominate: In many scenarios, players prioritize contributing to "steep" projects (those with higher value coefficients), and the distribution of effort among these projects is crucial for equilibrium.
  • Suppression is a Factor: Players can be "suppressed" if they contribute to a project but don't receive a share of its value. The conditions for equilibria without suppressed players are a key focus.
  • New Solution Concept: The "cyclically strong equilibrium" offers a refined notion of stability by disallowing profitable cyclical deviations of entire budgets, providing a potentially more robust solution concept.
  • Simulations Validate Theory: The simulation results largely align with theoretical predictions, reinforcing the validity of the analytical models and providing a practical tool for exploring complex cases.

Key Results

  • Two-Player Characterization: The paper provides a complete constructive characterization of the existence of pure Nash equilibria for two-player games with a general threshold, along with exact values for the Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability.
  • Thresholds 0 and 1: For $\theta=0$ (no threshold), pure equilibria always exist and are socially optimal (PoA = PoS = 1). For $\theta=1$ (all-or-nothing), existence of equilibria without suppressed players depends on specific conditions related to project and budget structures.
  • Efficiency Bounds: For two players, efficiency (PoS and PoA) is often close to 1 when budgets are similar, but can drop significantly when budgets are far apart, depending on project coefficient ratios. For more players, coordination can substantially improve total utility in scenarios where efficiency is otherwise low.
  • Mixed Nash Equilibrium: The paper proves the existence of mixed Nash equilibria for shared effort games, extending previous results for continuous games.
  • NP-Hardness of Best Response: Finding a best response in these games is shown to be NP-hard, even for simplified cases, highlighting the computational challenges in analyzing these models.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Linear Project Functions: The current model assumes linear project value functions. The authors suggest extending the model to piecewise linear functions to capture discrete steps in project completion.
  • More than Two Players: While theoretical results are provided for n players, the full characterization is most complete for two players. Future work aims to extend this to more players and various non-linear project functions.
  • Cost of Effort: The model does not explicitly include a cost of effort, which could influence equilibrium outcomes and eliminate suppressed players.
  • Relative vs. Absolute Thresholds: The paper focuses on relative thresholds. Exploring absolute thresholds and their implications is a potential future direction.
  • Cyclically Strong Equilibrium: The paper establishes that Nash equilibria are cyclically strong under certain conditions. Further research is needed to determine if these conditions are necessary for this equivalence.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@misc{polevoy2022when,
  author = {Gleb Polevoy and Stojan Trajanovski and Mathijs de Weerdt},
  title = {{When Effort May Fail: Equilibria of Shared Effort with a Threshold}},
  year = {2022},
  howpublished = {SSRN},
}
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