Welfare Guarantees for Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding

Kshipra Bhawalkar, Tim Roughgarden

Abstract

We analyze the price of anarchy (POA) in a simple and practical non-truthful combinatorial auction when players have subadditive valuations for goods. We study the mechanism that sells every good in parallel with separate second-price auctions. We first prove that under a standard “no overbidding” assumption, for every subadditive valuation profile, every pure Nash equilibrium has welfare at least 50% of optimal — i.e., the POA is at most 2. For the incomplete information setting, we prove that the POA with respect to Bayes-Nash equilibria is strictly larger than 2 — an unusual separation from the full-information model — and is at most 2 ln m, where m is the number of goods.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{bhawalkar2011welfare,
  author = {Kshipra Bhawalkar and Tim Roughgarden},
  title = {{Welfare Guarantees for Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding}},
  booktitle = {SODA},
  year = {2011},
  doi = {10.1137/1.9781611973082.55},
}

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