Vulnerability of speaker verification systems against voice conversion spoofing attacks: The case of telephone speech

Tomi Kinnunen, Zhizheng Wu, Kong-Aik Lee, Filip Sedlak, Engsiong Chng, Haizhou Li

Abstract

Voice conversion - the methodology of automatically converting one's utterances to sound as if spoken by another speaker - presents a threat for applications relying on speaker verification. We study vulnerability of text-independent speaker verification systems against voice conversion attacks using telephone speech. We implemented a voice conversion systems with two types of features and nonparallel frame alignment methods and five speaker verification systems ranging from simple Gaussian mixture models (GMMs) to state-of-the-art joint factor analysis (JFA) recognizer. Experiments on a subset of NIST 2006 SRE corpus indicate that the JFA method is most resilient against conversion attacks. But even it experiences more than 5-fold increase in the false acceptance rate from 3.24 % to 17.33 %.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{kinnunen2012vulnerability,
  author = {Tomi Kinnunen and Zhizheng Wu and Kong-Aik Lee and Filip Sedlak and Engsiong Chng and Haizhou Li},
  title = {{Vulnerability of speaker verification systems against voice conversion spoofing attacks: The case of telephone speech}},
  booktitle = {IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing},
  year = {2012},
  doi = {10.1109/icassp.2012.6288895},
}

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