Vulnerability of Automatic Identity Recognition to Audio-Visual Deepfakes

Pavel Korshunov, Haolin Chen, Philip N. Garner, Sébastien Marcel

TL;DR

Researchers from the Idiap Research Institute have introduced SWAN-DF, a high-fidelity audio-visual deepfake dataset designed to test if synthetic media can actually fool biometric systems. Their findings are a wake-up call: by tuning existing deepfake models to specific identities, attackers can bypass state-of-the-art face and speaker recognition systems over 90% of the time.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

While the internet is flooded with deepfake videos, most existing research databases focus on a single modality—either just video or just audio. Furthermore, many of these "fakes" are easily detectable by humans or machines because they lack high resolution, proper lip-sync, or realistic skin tones.

The authors identify a critical gap: we don't actually know how well these deepfakes can impersonate a specific target. A video might look "fake" to a detection algorithm because of compression artifacts, but does it look enough like the target to fool a face recognition system? This paper shifts the focus from "is it fake?" to "is it a successful impersonation?"

Methods

The researchers combined several state-of-the-art (SOTA) generative techniques to create realistic, synchronized audio-visual fakes:

  • Video Generation: They used DeepFaceLab, employing two main architectures (DF and LIAE) at resolutions up to 320x320. Crucially, they didn't just use "out-of-the-box" models; they tuned the models for 50,000 iterations (taking up to 20 hours on a Tesla P40 GPU) for specific pairs of identities.
  • Blending: The paper emphasizes that the "secret sauce" of a good deepfake is the blending process—using masking, color correction, and warping to seamlessly integrate a synthetic face into a real video frame.
  • Audio Generation: For the video dataset, they used Voice Conversion (VC) models (like FreeVC and YourTTS) rather than Text-to-Speech (TTS) to ensure the synthetic voice remained perfectly synced with the original speaker's lip movements.
  • Vulnerability Testing: They attacked two SOTA recognition systems: MobileFaceNet for faces and ECAPA-TDNN for speech.

Datasets

The authors introduced two new benchmarks:

  1. SWAN-DF: Based on the SWAN dataset (real HD videos of people speaking). It contains over 150,000 video combinations across 60 pairs of identities.
  2. LibriTTS-DF: An audio-only dataset based on LibriTTS, using the latest TTS methods like TorToiSe and Adaspeech to generate synthetic speech for 39 speakers.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Tuning is Everything: Pre-trained models provide a generic face structure, but fine-tuning on a specific target identity is what makes a deepfake truly dangerous to biometric systems.
  • The Blending Paradox: Detection algorithms often look for artifacts left by GANs. However, the authors argue that the post-processing (blending and blurring) used to make a fake look "real" to a human often masks the very signatures that detectors rely on.
  • Environment Matters: Synthetic speech generated from clean, studio-recorded data (LibriTTS) was much more effective at fooling recognition systems than speech generated from noisy, office-environment data (SWAN).
  • The "Impostor Attack" Metric: The paper uses IAPMR (Impostor Attack Presentation Match Rate) to measure success. If a system has a 95% IAPMR, it means the deepfake successfully impersonated the target 95% of the time.

Key Results

The results demonstrate a significant vulnerability in current biometric security:

  • Face Recognition: The MobileFaceNet system was highly vulnerable, with IAPMR reaching 97.36% for the best-tuned 256px models. Essentially, the system almost always "saw" the target identity rather than the fake.
  • Speaker Recognition: While zero-shot (untuned) voice conversion was less effective, tuning the FreeVC model for 109,000 iterations pushed the success rate to 94.21%.
  • TTS Superiority: In the audio-only LibriTTS-DF dataset, the TorToiSe TTS model (a diffusion-based approach) proved to be the most threatening, achieving an IAPMR of 86.61% without even being specifically tuned for the speaker recognition system.

Limitations and Future Work

The primary limitation noted is the difficulty of using Text-to-Speech (TTS) for video deepfakes. While TTS produces high-quality audio, synchronizing it with video (lip-syncing) remains a major challenge that often introduces visible artifacts.

The authors suggest that future research should focus on multimodal detection—systems that look for inconsistencies between the audio and visual channels simultaneously, rather than treating them as separate problems. They have released the datasets to the research community to help accelerate the development of these more robust detection methods.

Summary updated

Abstract

The task of deepfakes detection is far from being solved by speech or vision researchers. Several publicly available databases of fake synthetic video and speech were built to aid the development of detection methods. However, existing databases typically focus on visual or voice modalities and provide no proof that their deepfakes can in fact impersonate any real person. In this paper, we present the first realistic audio-visual database of deepfakes SWAN-DF, where lips and speech are well synchronized and video have high visual and audio qualities. We took the publicly available SWAN dataset of real videos with different identities to create audio-visual deepfakes using several models from DeepFaceLab and blending techniques for face swapping and HiFiVC, DiffVC, YourTTS, and FreeVC models for voice conversion. From the publicly available speech dataset LibriTTS, we also created a separate database of only audio deepfakes LibriTTS-DF using several latest text to speech methods: YourTTS, Adaspeech, and TorToiSe. We demonstrate the vulnerability of a state of the art speaker recognition system, such as ECAPA-TDNN-based model from SpeechBrain, to the synthetic voices. Similarly, we tested face recognition system based on the MobileFaceNet architecture to several variants of our visual deepfakes. The vulnerability assessment show that by tuning the existing pretrained deepfake models to specific identities, one can successfully spoof the face and speaker recognition systems in more than 90% of the time and achieve a very realistic looking and sounding fake video of a given person.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{korshunov2023vulnerability,
  author = {Pavel Korshunov and Haolin Chen and Philip N. Garner and Sébastien Marcel},
  title = {{Vulnerability of Automatic Identity Recognition to Audio-Visual Deepfakes}},
  booktitle = {IJCB},
  year = {2023},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=56JTybErDA},
}

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