TL;DR
This paper reveals that many websites continue to track users through sophisticated, cookie-less methods like browser fingerprinting and ID synchronization, even when users explicitly reject cookies. The research highlights a significant disconnect between user expectations of privacy under GDPR and the actual tracking practices employed by websites, particularly less popular ones.
What Problem Does This Paper Address?
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) aimed to give users more control over their data, often through cookie consent banners. However, as third-party cookies become less reliable, trackers are evolving to use more persistent and stealthy methods. This paper investigates whether websites respect user consent choices, especially when users opt out of cookies, by examining how they employ "post-cookie" tracking techniques like first-party ID leaking, ID synchronization, and browser fingerprinting. The core problem is the potential for websites to bypass GDPR consent mechanisms by using these alternative tracking methods, undermining user privacy.
Methods
The researchers developed a sophisticated crawling methodology using Puppeteer to automate browser interactions. They instrumented a Chrome browser with the Consent-O-matic extension to detect and automatically handle cookie consent forms, allowing them to simulate three user actions: "Accept All," "Reject All," and "No Action." They then collected extensive data, including HTTP requests/responses, cookies, and JavaScript execution profiles. For detecting browser fingerprinting, they focused on analyzing JavaScript function calls indicative of fingerprinting libraries, rather than just native browser methods, to reduce false positives. For ID synchronization and leaking, they performed offline analysis of network traffic, examining URLs, request bodies, and headers for unique identifiers being passed between domains.
Datasets
The study crawled approximately 850,000 websites from the Tranco list. From this, they identified 27,953 websites with cookie consent management platforms (CMPs). The collected data for these sites, across the three consent actions, amounted to 108 GB. The paper does not introduce a new benchmark dataset but rather uses a large-scale crawl of real-world websites to analyze existing tracking practices.
Key Insights and Ideas
- Consent is Largely Ignored: The most striking finding is that a significant portion of tracking activities, particularly first-party ID leaking, occurs before users even have a chance to make a choice or after they explicitly reject all cookies.
- "Reject All" Can Intensify Tracking: Counterintuitively, rejecting all cookies sometimes leads to more third-party tracking activities, especially ID synchronization, suggesting that opting out might trigger fallback tracking mechanisms.
- Browser Fingerprinting is Persistent: Websites largely disregard user consent for browser fingerprinting, performing it regardless of the user's choice. This technique is particularly concerning as it's stateless and harder for users to control.
- Popularity Matters (for Disregard): Less popular websites are more aggressive in disregarding user consent choices and engaging in first-party ID leaking and third-party ID synchronization. This suggests a correlation between a website's market position and its adherence to privacy principles.
- Geographic Discrepancies: Websites in certain European countries (e.g., France, Denmark) show better adherence to user choices regarding first-party ID leaking compared to others, indicating varying levels of GDPR enforcement or implementation.
Key Results
- First-Party ID Leaking: Over 75% of first-party ID leaking activities happened either before users made a choice or when they rejected all cookies. Specifically, 14,238 websites leaked IDs before consent, and 15,334 did so when users rejected all cookies.
- Third-Party ID Synchronization: Websites with embedded third-parties engaged in an average of 3.51 synchronizations before user consent, and this number increased to 3.91 when users rejected all cookies.
- Browser Fingerprinting: 279 websites performed fingerprinting before user consent, and 285 did so when users rejected all cookies. A significant 73.5% of fingerprinting websites did so regardless of the user's consent action.
- Popularity Impact: Less popular websites showed a trend of being more aggressive in disregarding user choices. For instance, popular sites (top 50K) leaked first-party IDs before user choice 67% of the time, while less popular sites (400K-450K) did so 77% of the time.
Limitations and Future Work
The authors acknowledge that their fingerprinting detection might miss minified or obfuscated scripts. They also note that while their methodology can identify potential GDPR violations, a definitive legal judgment would require a case-by-case analysis, as websites might have other legal bases for data collection beyond explicit consent.
Future work could explore:
- How third-parties should connect into CMP prompts.
- Whether certain third-parties intentionally act only on "reject all" options and why.
- The comparative effectiveness of different CMPs in ensuring GDPR compliance.
- The attribution of privacy violations: is it the website, the CMP, or the third-party's fault?
- Investigating the dynamics of tracking and how they evolve over time.
Summary updated