Uncertainty-Aware Jamming Mitigation With Active RIS: A Robust Stackelberg Game Approach

Xiao Tang, Zhen Ma, Limeng Dong, Yuyi Wang, Qinghe Du, Dusit Niyato, Zhu Han

TL;DR

This paper proposes a robust anti-jamming strategy for wireless communications using an Active Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface (ARIS). By modeling the interaction between a legitimate user and an adaptive jammer as a Stackelberg game with channel uncertainties, the authors develop an iterative algorithm that significantly improves communication security against sophisticated jamming attacks.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Wireless communication systems are constantly under threat from malicious jamming attacks. These attacks are becoming increasingly sophisticated, with jammers adapting their strategies to exploit legitimate transmissions. This poses a significant challenge to maintaining secure and reliable communication. Furthermore, the inherent uncertainties in wireless channel estimations, especially when dealing with an adversarial jammer, make designing robust anti-jamming solutions even more difficult. Traditional methods often struggle with these adaptive threats and channel uncertainties. This paper tackles this problem by proposing a novel approach that leverages an Active Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface (ARIS) to actively mitigate jamming, while explicitly accounting for channel uncertainties and the strategic, adaptive nature of the jammer.

Methods

The core of the paper's methodology lies in a robust Stackelberg game formulation. Here's a breakdown:

  • Stackelberg Game: This models a hierarchical interaction where the legitimate user (leader) makes a decision first, and the jammer (follower) observes this decision and then makes its own optimal counter-decision. This captures the sequential nature of jamming and defense.
  • Active RIS (ARIS): Unlike passive RIS, ARIS can amplify signals, offering enhanced capabilities for signal manipulation and jamming mitigation.
  • Channel Uncertainty: The paper explicitly models the uncertainty in the jammer's channel from the legitimate user's perspective. This is done using a bounded error model, where the legitimate user assumes the worst-case channel realization within a known error bound.
  • Backward Induction: This game theory technique is used to solve the Stackelberg game. First, the jammer's optimal strategy (best response) is derived, assuming perfect channel knowledge. Then, this optimal jamming strategy is incorporated into the legitimate user's optimization problem to determine its robust defense strategy.
  • Block Successive Upper Bound Minimization (BSUM): To solve the complex, non-convex optimization problem for the legitimate user, a BSUM framework is employed. This decomposes the problem into smaller, manageable subproblems (power allocation, transceiving beamforming, and active reflection) that are iteratively optimized until convergence.
  • Successive Convex Approximation (SCA): Within the BSUM framework, SCA is used to handle non-convex parts of the subproblems, transforming them into convex approximations that can be solved efficiently.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The evaluation is based on simulated scenarios with defined parameters for path loss, fading, noise, and power constraints.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • ARIS as a Game Changer: The ARIS, with its ability to amplify and reflect signals, provides a powerful tool for actively shaping the wireless environment to the legitimate user's advantage, significantly enhancing anti-jamming capabilities.
  • Robustness is Key: Explicitly accounting for channel uncertainties is crucial for designing effective anti-jamming strategies. A strategy designed for perfect channel knowledge can be vulnerable when uncertainties are present, leading to suboptimal performance.
  • Strategic Interaction Matters: Modeling the jammer as an adaptive follower in a Stackelberg game accurately captures the dynamic and adversarial nature of jamming, leading to more effective defense strategies.
  • The Price of Robustness: The proposed robust scheme achieves superior performance under uncertainty but incurs a slight utility loss compared to a hypothetical scenario with perfect information. This highlights the trade-off between security and performance when dealing with uncertainty.
  • Jammer's Dilemma: Counter-intuitively, the proposed robust scheme can sometimes lead to a higher utility for the jammer when compared to a non-robust scheme, especially at higher jamming power prices. This is because a mismatched legitimate strategy (due to uncertainty) can provoke a more aggressive jamming attack, which then incurs a severe cost penalty for the jammer.

Key Results

  • The proposed robust ARIS-assisted anti-jamming scheme significantly outperforms baseline schemes (without uncertainty, non-robust scheme, and without ARIS) in terms of legitimate user utility.
  • The performance gains are evident across various scenarios, including different jamming power prices, ARIS sizes, and jammer locations.
  • The ARIS plays a critical role, with its utility and effectiveness increasing with the number of reflecting elements.
  • The robust design effectively mitigates jamming even under challenging conditions, such as when the jammer is in an advantageous position.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Computational Complexity: While the BSUM framework and SCA techniques are used to tackle the non-convexity, the overall optimization problem can still be computationally intensive, especially with a large number of ARIS elements.
  • Perfect Jammer Knowledge: The current model assumes the jammer has perfect knowledge of the legitimate user's strategy and channels. Future work could explore scenarios where the jammer also faces uncertainties.
  • Scalability: The paper focuses on a single-user scenario. Extending the framework to multi-user environments with more complex interactions would be a valuable future direction.
  • Real-world Implementation: The work is based on simulations. Investigating the practical implementation challenges and performance in real-world wireless environments would be beneficial.

Summary updated

Abstract

Malicious jamming presents a pervasive threat to the secure communications, where the challenge becomes increasingly severe due to the growing capability of the jammer allowing the adaptation to legitimate transmissions. This paper investigates the jamming mitigation by leveraging an active reconfigurable intelligent surface (ARIS), where the channel uncertainties are particularly addressed for robust anti-jamming design. Towards this issue, we adopt the Stackelberg game formulation to model the strategic interaction between the legitimate side and the adversary, acting as the leader and follower, respectively. We prove the existence of the game equilibrium and adopt the backward induction method for equilibrium analysis. We first derive the optimal jamming policy as the follower’s best response, which is then incorporated into the legitimate-side optimization for robust anti-jamming design. We address the uncertainty issue and reformulate the legitimate-side problem by exploiting the error bounds to combat the worst-case jamming attacks. The problem is decomposed within a block successive upper bound minimization (BSUM) framework to tackle the power allocation, transceiving beamforming, and active reflection, respectively, which are iterated towards the robust jamming mitigation scheme. Simulation results are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in protecting the legitimate transmissions under uncertainties, and the superior performance in terms of jamming mitigation as compared with the baselines.
BibTeX
@article{tang2026uncertainty,
  author = {Xiao Tang and Zhen Ma and Limeng Dong and Yuyi Wang and Qinghe Du and Dusit Niyato and Zhu Han},
  title = {{Uncertainty-Aware Jamming Mitigation With Active RIS: A Robust Stackelberg Game Approach}},
  journal = {IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1109/tifs.2026.3671078},
}
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