Typosquatting 3.0: Characterizing Squatting in Blockchain Naming Systems

Muhammad Muzammil, Zhengyu Wu, Lalith Harisha, Brian Kondracki, Nick Nikiforakis

Abstract

A Blockchain Name System (BNS) simplifies the process of sending cryptocurrencies by replacing complex cryptographic recipient addresses with human-readable names. However, these names are susceptible to typosquatting attacks, where attackers register typographically similar names to intercept funds. This study presents the first large-scale analysis of intra-BNS typosquatting, examining 4.9M names and 200M transactions across Ethereum, Polygon, and Cardano. We find that typosquatters are increasingly active, targeting popular users and influencers, while wallet providers offer almost no protection against these irreversible financial losses.

Introduction: The Human Element in Decentralized Finance

Blockchain Naming Systems (BNS)—such as the Ethereum Name Service (ENS), Unstoppable Domains (UD), and ADAHandles (ADAH)—were designed to make cryptocurrency more user-friendly. By replacing long, hexadecimal wallet addresses with human-readable names like alice.eth, BNS reduces the friction of transacting on-chain.

However, this convenience introduces a critical security gap: intra-BNS typosquatting. In traditional DNS, a typo might lead a user to a phishing site where an attacker must still trick them into providing data. In the context of BNS, the name is the destination. If a user mistypes a recipient's name, the blockchain protocol faithfully executes the transfer to the squatter's wallet. Because blockchain transactions are irreversible, there is no "undo" button for these errors.

The Anatomy of a BNS Attack

Attackers exploit human error by "surrounding" popular targets with multiple typo variations. This strategy ensures that various common mistakes—such as doubling a letter or swapping adjacent characters—all lead to an attacker-controlled address.

Figure 1: Illustration of a BNS typosquatting attack where a user accidentally sends funds to a typo-variant address instead of the intended recipient.

As illustrated in Figure 1, if Alice intends to send funds to vitalik.eth but accidentally types viitalik.eth, the funds are permanently diverted. The researchers found that high-profile targets like Vitalik Buterin have dozens of registered typo variations resolving to numerous unique attacker wallets.

Methodology and Data Harvesting

To quantify this ecosystem, the researchers developed a multi-stage pipeline to bypass the "namehash" obfuscation used by BNS protocols, allowing them to see plaintext names. They analyzed the largest BNS dataset to date, including:

  • 4.9 Million BNS names across ENS, UD, and ADAH.
  • 200 Million transactions to track fund flow.
  • Social Media Corpus: 14,910 Twitter/X profiles were analyzed to see how social media popularity correlates with being targeted.

To identify victims, they used a "common sender" metric: identifying wallets that had sent funds to both a legitimate name and its typo-variant. This provides a conservative lower bound for successful attacks, as it misses victims who made a typo on their very first transaction.

Key Findings: Prevalence and Financial Impact

The study reveals that typosquatting is not a marginal threat but a systemic one:

  • High Targeting Rates: Up to 37% of the most popular ENS domains have at least one registered typosquatter.
  • Social Media Signals: Attackers monitor platforms like Twitter/X for influencers. 38% of popular names found on social media profiles were targeted by at least one squatter.
  • Significant Losses: The average successful scam transaction resulted in a loss of $1,790. In some cases, victims repeatedly sent funds to the same typo address because it was saved in their transaction history.

Growth and Market Correlation

The rise of typosquatting is closely linked to the broader cryptocurrency market. As the value of assets on these chains increases, so does the incentive for malicious registration.

Figure 6: The growth of BNS registrations and typosquatting density over time, correlated with cryptocurrency prices (ETH, MATIC, ADA).

Figure 6 shows the explosive growth of BNS registrations and the density of squatting starting in 2021. This trend highlights that typosquatting is an evolving "3.0" threat that scales alongside the adoption of decentralized naming services.

The Defensive Gap

A major concern highlighted by the research is the complete lack of defenses. In the traditional web, 31% of top brands proactively register typos of their domains to protect users. In the BNS space, this number drops to just 0.1%.

Furthermore, the study tested 10 popular wallets (including MetaMask and Coinbase) and found that none provided warnings for "cold typos" (sending to a squatter for the first time). Most wallets simply resolve the name and proceed with the transaction, leaving the user vulnerable to simple keyboard errors.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Typosquatting 3.0 represents a significant hurdle for the safe adoption of Web3. The researchers call for immediate integration of defenses within cryptocurrency wallets. Proposed countermeasures include local fuzzy-matching—where a wallet warns a user if a name looks suspiciously similar to a previously used address—and the implementation of community-maintained blocklists to flag known squatter addresses before a transaction is signed.

Summary updated

Abstract

A Blockchain Name System (BNS) simplifies the process of sending cryptocurrencies by replacing complex cryptographic recipient addresses with human-readable names, making the transactions more convenient. Unfortunately, these names can be susceptible to typosquatting attacks, where attackers can take advantage of user typos by registering typographically similar BNS names. Unsuspecting users may accidentally mistype or misinterpret the intended name, resulting in an irreversible transfer of funds to an attacker's address instead of the intended recipient. In this work, we present the first large-scale, intra-BNS typosquatting study. To understand the prevalence of typosquatting within BNSs, we study three different services (Ethereum Name Service, Unstoppable Domains, and ADAHandles) spanning three blockchains (Ethereum, Polygon, and Cardano), collecting a total of 4.9M BNS names and 200M transactions-the largest dataset for BNSs to date. We describe the challenges involved in conducting name-squatting studies on these alternative naming systems, and then perform an in-depth quantitative analysis of our dataset. We find that typosquatters are indeed active on BNSs, registering more malicious domains with each passing year. Our analysis reveals that users have sent thousands of transactions to squatters and that squatters target both globally popular BNS domain names as well as the domains owned by popular Twitter/X users. Lastly, we document the complete lack of defenses against typosquatting in custodial and non-custodial wallets and propose straightforward countermeasures that can protect users without relying on third-party services.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{muzammil2024typosquatting,
  author = {Muhammad Muzammil and Zhengyu Wu and Lalith Harisha and Brian Kondracki and Nick Nikiforakis},
  title = {{Typosquatting 3.0: Characterizing Squatting in Blockchain Naming Systems}},
  booktitle = {eCrime},
  year = {2024},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=XKT2dzPrGe},
}

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