Abstract
Community-based question answering (CQA) services are facing key challenges to motivate domain experts to provide timely answers. Recently, CQA services are exploring new incentive models to engage experts and celebrities by allowing them to set a price on their answers. In this paper, we perform a data-driven analysis on two emerging payment-based CQA systems: Fenda (China) and Whale (US). By analyzing a large dataset of 220K questions (worth 1 million USD collectively), we examine how monetary incentives affect different players in the system. We find that, while monetary incentive enables quick answers from experts, it also drives certain users to aggressively game the system for profits. In addition, in this supplier-driven marketplace, users need to proactively adjust their price to make profits. Famous people are unwilling to lower their price, which in turn hurts their income and engagement over time. Finally, we discuss the key implications to future CQA design.
Introduction
Traditional Community Question Answering (CQA) services like Quora and StackOverflow rely on voluntary contributions. As these platforms grow, it becomes increasingly difficult to capture the attention of true domain experts, leading to slow response times or unanswered questions. This paper investigates a new "supplier-driven" marketplace model where experts set their own prices for answers, aiming to understand if monetary incentives are a sustainable solution for expert engagement or if they fundamentally alter the social dynamics of knowledge sharing.
The Paid Q&A Ecosystem
The study focuses heavily on Fenda's unique incentive structure. Unlike traditional models, Fenda introduces a three-party revenue stream involving the asker, the answerer, and the listeners.
In this model, the asker pays a fee to an expert for an answer. However, the asker can also earn a cut every time a third party (a "listener") pays a small fee (e.g., $0.15) to access that answer. This creates an "Asker-as-Entrepreneur" dynamic where asking a high-quality, viral question can actually result in a profit for the asker. The study found that 40% of Fenda questions successfully covered the asker's initial cost through these listener fees.
Methodology and Datasets
The researchers conducted a large-scale empirical study using data collected between 2016 and 2017 from two primary platforms:
- Fenda (China): 88,540 users and 212,082 question-answer pairs. This represents a mature, high-volume market.
- Whale (US): 1,419 users and 9,199 answers, serving as a cross-cultural comparison point.
Collectively, the dataset covers over $1 million USD in transactions. The team utilized custom crawlers for mobile APIs, user profiling (categorizing "experts" vs. "normal users"), and unsupervised clustering to analyze pricing strategies over time.
Revenue Concentration and the Pareto Principle
A key finding of the study is the extreme concentration of wealth within these platforms. The system is highly top-heavy: on Fenda, the top 5% of answerers captured approximately 90% of total profits.
As shown in the income distribution, a tiny sliver of the population (0.5% of users) contributes a massive portion of the value—roughly 25% of all answers and nearly 50% of the platform's revenue. This "Expert Pareto Principle" suggests that while the platform is open to all, the economic benefits are heavily skewed toward established celebrities and high-profile professionals.
Key Insights and Behavioral Patterns
- Speed vs. Price: Monetary incentives successfully reduced latency. Average response times ranged from 10 to 23 hours, significantly faster than voluntary models like StackOverflow (58 hours). However, there was no significant correlation between price and speed; high prices reflected fame rather than faster service.
- Pricing Rigidity: Users who proactively lowered their prices over time saw increased engagement. Conversely, high-profile celebrities often maintained high prices regardless of demand, leading to a "death spiral" of declining questions.
- System Abuse: The profit motive birthed new forms of manipulation. "Bounty Hunters" spam low-priced experts hoping for viral listener fees, while "Collusive Users" fake popularity by asking/answering questions at artificial prices to manipulate recommendation algorithms.
Conclusion
While monetary incentives effectively attract experts and improve response times, they introduce significant challenges regarding revenue inequality and platform integrity. Future CQA designs may need to explore hybrid models—combining expert-driven pricing with crowdsourced bounties—and implement more robust automated systems to detect financial collusion and spam.
Summary updated