Abstract
Low-energy Bluetooth devices have become ubiquitous and widely used for different applications. Among these, Bluetooth trackers are becoming popular as they allow users to track the location of their physical objects. To do so, Bluetooth trackers are often built-in within other commercial products connected to a larger crowdsourced tracking system. Such a system, however, can pose a threat to the security and privacy of the users, for instance, by revealing the location of a user's valuable object. In this paper, we introduce a set of security properties and investigate the state of commercial crowdsourced tracking systems, which present common design flaws that make them insecure. Leveraging the results of our investigation, we propose a new design for a secure crowdsourced tracking system (SECrow), which allows devices to leverage the benefits of the crowdsourced model without sacrificing security and privacy. Our preliminary evaluation shows that SECrow is a practical, secure, and effective crowdsourced tracking solution.
The Problem: Crowdsourcing Without Security
Bluetooth Low-Energy (BLE) trackers are popular tools for locating lost items like keys or wallets. Because these devices lack native GPS or internet connectivity, they rely on a crowdsourced location tracking system. When a user loses an item, any participating smartphone that passes near the tracker detects its BLE beacon and silently uploads the coordinates to a central server.
As shown in Figure 1, this model involves three main entities: the Tracking Device (TD), the Communication Device (CD), and the Tracking Service (TS). While effective, this distributed architecture introduces significant security risks. If the protocol is not properly secured, attackers can hijack trackers, spoof locations to mislead owners, or gain unauthorized access to a user's real-time location history.
Methods and Security Framework
The researchers established a framework of eight Necessary Security Conditions (NSCs) to evaluate the robustness of these systems. These conditions cover privileged ownership (ensuring only the owner can manage the device), physical ownership (requiring physical interaction for registration), and reliable location services (preventing spoofing of devices or coordinates).
To test these conditions, the authors reverse-engineered the Android applications of five major tracking ecosystems: TrackR, CUBE, Chipolo, Pebblebee, and Tile. By dynamically instrumenting these apps, they were able to intercept API calls and attempt unauthorized actions, such as registering devices they did not physically possess or injecting false location data.
Key Results: Widespread Vulnerabilities
The analysis revealed that the current commercial landscape is highly insecure. Most manufacturers rely on easily discoverable identifiers, like Bluetooth MAC addresses, to establish ownership, allowing attackers to "claim" devices they have never touched.
As summarized in Figure 6, four out of the five systems failed to enforce physical ownership. Tile was the only manufacturer to successfully require a physical button press for registration. However, none of the tested systems provided a reliable location service or protected against location spoofing. In many cases, a simple script could convince the vendor's server that a tracker was thousands of miles away from its actual location.
SECrow: A Secure Alternative
To address these systemic flaws, the authors designed SECrow. This protocol leverages several key technologies to ensure security:
- Hardware-backed Keys: Trackers use e-fuses to store immutable private keys, preventing identity cloning.
- Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs): Smartphones use TEEs (like ARM TrustZone) to sign GPS coordinates. This ensures that even if a phone's operating system is compromised, the location data sent to the server remains authentic and unspoofable.
- End-to-End Encryption: Location data is encrypted so that the Tracking Service acts only as a blind router, unable to see the actual coordinates of the users' valuables.
Evaluation of the SECrow prototype showed it is highly practical. While it introduces a slight latency in location updates (~8.6 seconds compared to near-instant insecure updates), this overhead is negligible given that most tracking apps only poll for updates every few minutes. SECrow proves that it is possible to build a crowdsourced tracking system that is both effective and privacy-preserving.
Summary updated