The Personalized A-Theory of Time and Perspective

Vincent Conitzer

Abstract

A-theorists and B-theorists debate whether the "Now" is metaphysically distinguished from other time slices. Analogously, one may ask whether the "I" is metaphysically distinguished from other perspectives. Few philosophers would answer the second question in the affirmative. An exception is Caspar Hare, who has devoted two papers and a book to arguing for such a positive answer. In this paper, I argue that those who answer the first question in the affirmative—A-theorists—should also answer the second question in the affirmative. This is because key arguments in favor of the A-theory are more effective as arguments in favor of the resulting combined position, and key arguments against the A-theory are ineffective against the combined position.

Introduction

In the philosophy of time, the debate between A-theorists and B-theorists centers on the status of the present. A-theorists (including presentists) argue that the "Now" is a real, objective, and metaphysically distinguished property of the universe. B-theorists, conversely, view the universe as a static four-dimensional block where "now" is merely a subjective indexical, no more metaphysically significant than the word "here."

While A-theorists grant the "Now" a special status, they almost universally remain "egalitarians" regarding the self. They believe the present moment is special for everyone, but they do not believe any specific "I" or perspective is metaphysically privileged. Vincent Conitzer argues that this middle ground—the $\beta$A-theory—is inherently unstable. Instead, he proposes that the only consistent path for the A-theorist is to adopt the "Personalized A-theory" ($\alpha$A-theory), which posits that both the time (Now) and the perspective (I) are metaphysically distinguished.

The Metaphysical Framework

To clarify the landscape, Conitzer introduces a new terminological framework:

  • $\alpha$-theory: The view that there is a metaphysically distinguished "I" or Self.
  • $\beta$-theory: The view that no perspective is metaphysically distinguished.
  • $\alpha$A-theory: The "Personalized A-theory," where a single (living) person-stage is distinguished as the "I-Now."

Most traditional A-theories (such as the Moving Spotlight or Growing Block models) are $\beta$A-theories. They attempt to maintain a global, objective "Now" that applies to all observers simultaneously. Conitzer argues that by shifting to an $\alpha$A-theory, we can resolve the most damaging scientific and logical objections that have long plagued the A-theory.

Presence and the VR Analogy

The primary intuition driving the A-theory is the "liveness" or presence simpliciter of experience. When we say "the present is special," we are referring to the fact that our current experiences feel fundamentally different from remembered pasts or anticipated futures.

Conitzer argues that this liveness is inherently tied to a specific perspective. A "global Now" that stretches across the entire universe is a massive, perhaps unnecessary, metaphysical assumption. In contrast, a "local Now" tied to a specific observer is far more parsimonious.

To illustrate the "further fact" of a distinguished perspective, Conitzer uses a Virtual Reality (VR) analogy. In a simulated world, the computer code determines the physics and the relative positions of all agents (the B-theory facts). However, for the simulation to be experienced, there must be additional logic determining which agent’s perspective is currently being rendered on the VR headset. The $\alpha$A-theory suggests that reality contains a similar metaphysical "pointer" that picks out the current "I-Now."

Resolving Scientific Objections

Special Relativity

Special Relativity is often considered the "A-theory killer" because it denies the existence of absolute simultaneity. If there is no universal "Now," the standard A-theory's claim that the present is a global property of the universe collapses.

However, the $\alpha$A-theory is immune to this critique. Because the "Now" is localized to the distinguished observer, there is no need for a global frame of reference. The metaphysical "Now" exists only at the point of the distinguished perspective, making the theory entirely compatible with Einsteinian physics.

The Rate of Passage

Critics often mock the A-theory by asking, "At what rate does time pass?" The standard answer—"one second per second"—is a tautology that explains nothing. Conitzer suggests that in a personalized theory, we can define a non-tautological rate of passage based on mental operations or computational "clock speed." This allows us to treat the subjective experience of time "flying" or "dragging" (for instance, during intense focus or under anesthesia) as a metaphysical reality rather than a mere psychological illusion.

Resilience to Philosophical Puzzles

The $\alpha$A-theory also provides robust answers to classic philosophical dilemmas:

  • Thank Goodness That’s Over!: Arthur Prior’s famous argument for the A-theory—that we feel relief when a painful event is in the past—is strengthened when the "past" is defined relative to the distinguished "I."
  • Time Travel: The theory provides a metaphysical basis for "personal time." A time traveler can legitimately look forward to a "future" event even if that event exists in the "external" past of the B-theory block.
  • Direction of Time: The direction of time's flow can be anchored to the local entropy gradient of the distinguished observer, rather than requiring a universal arrow of time.

Conclusion

While the $\alpha$A-theory may initially seem "metaphysically preposterous" or even solipsistic, Conitzer argues it is the most logically consistent version of the A-theory. It does not deny the existence of other people; it simply denies that their perspectives are metaphysically "lit up" in the same way the "I-Now" is. By localizing the present, the A-theorist can finally reconcile their metaphysical intuitions with the constraints of modern physics. The ultimate challenge remains whether the $\alpha$A-theory can eventually unseat the B-theory (the Block Universe) as the most plausible description of our reality.

Summary updated

Abstract

A-theorists and B-theorists debate whether the "Now" is metaphysically distinguished from other time slices. Analogously, one may ask whether the "I" is metaphysically distinguished from other perspectives. Few philosophers would answer the second question in the affirmative. An exception is Caspar Hare, who has devoted two papers and a book to arguing for such a positive answer. In this paper, I argue that those who answer the first question in the affirmative -A-theorists -should also answer the second question in the affirmative. This is because key arguments in favor of the A-theory are more effective as arguments in favor of the resulting combined position, and key arguments against the A-theory are ineffective against the combined position.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{conitzer2020personalized,
  author = {Vincent Conitzer},
  title = {{The Personalized A-Theory of Time and Perspective}},
  booktitle = {Dialectica},
  year = {2020},
  doi = {10.48106/dial.v74.i1.02},
}
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