The Merchant: Avoiding Payment Channel Depletion through Incentives

Yuup van Engelshoven, Stefanie Roos

Abstract

Payment channels networks (PCNs) drastically increase the throughput and hence scalability of blockchains by performing transactions off-chain. In an off-chain payment, parties deposit coins in a channel and then perform transactions without invoking the global consensus mechanism of the blockchain. However, the transaction value is limited by the capacity of the channel, i.e., the amount of funds available on a channel. These funds decrease when a transaction is sent and increase when a transaction is received on the channel. Recent research indicates that there is an imbalance between sending and receiving transactions, which leads to channel depletion in the sense that one of these operations becomes impossible over time due to the lack of available funds. We incentivize the balanced use of payment channels through fees. Whereas the current fee model depends solely on the transaction value, our fee policies encourage transactions that have a positive effect on the balance in a channel and discourage those that have a negative effect. This paper first defines necessary properties of fee strategies. Then, it introduces two novel fees strategies that provably satisfy all necessary properties. Our extensive simulation study reveals that these incentives increase the effectiveness of payments by 8% to 19%.

Introduction

Blockchains are inherently limited by their consensus mechanisms, leading to slow transaction speeds. Payment Channel Networks (PCNs) like Bitcoin’s Lightning Network mitigate this by conducting transactions "off-chain." In a PCN, two parties lock funds in a channel, allowing for rapid, low-cost transfers. However, a critical issue is depletion: if traffic flows primarily in one direction, a channel eventually runs out of funds on one side, becoming a "one-way street." To restore balance today, users must perform expensive and slow on-chain rebalancing. "The Merchant," a system developed at Delft University of Technology, addresses this by using economic incentives to maintain liquidity purely through off-chain mechanisms.

Methodology

The Merchant introduces a fee framework based on three formal properties designed to ensure network health and stability:

  1. Balance-Incentive: Fees increase as a transaction moves a channel further from its ideal "reference point" (typically a 50/50 split).
  2. Continuity: Small changes in transaction value result in small changes in fees.
  3. Subadditivity: It is never cheaper to split one large payment into many tiny ones, preventing network spam.

The researchers proposed two versions of the fee function:

  • Variant 1: Charges a small fee even for payments that help balance the channel.
  • Variant 2: Charges zero fees for payments that improve channel balance, effectively offering a free rebalancing service to nodes.

To implement this in a decentralized manner, the system integrates with SpeedyMurmurs, a routing protocol that allows nodes to make local fee decisions rather than relying on a central authority to calculate path costs.

Results and Discussion

The system was evaluated using simulations on a real-world snapshot of the Lightning Network (March 2020) and a synthetic Barabási-Albert graph. The study simulated 100,000 transactions with varied value distributions.

Success ratio averaged over 100,000 transactions for different fee functions on a Barabási-Albert (BA) graph.

As illustrated in Figure 1, The Merchant's fee strategies consistently outperform existing models.

  • Higher Success Rates: The Merchant increased the transaction success ratio by up to 19% compared to standard Lightning fees in scenarios with normally distributed balances.
  • Longevity: Even after 100,000 transactions, The Merchant maintained a success ratio at least 10% higher than the baseline.
  • Variant 2 Superiority: The "zero fee for helpful moves" strategy (Variant 2) consistently yielded the best results, demonstrating that eliminating fees for rebalancing transactions creates a win-win scenario for both senders and routing nodes.

Conclusion

The Merchant demonstrates that dynamic fees can act as a powerful control signal to coordinate capital across a decentralized network without central oversight. By incentivizing transactions that improve channel balance, the system significantly delays the need for on-chain maintenance and improves the overall reliability of PCNs. Future work will focus on enhancing privacy and addressing scenarios with fundamentally one-sided economic activity.

Summary updated

Abstract

Payment channels networks drastically increase the throughput and hence scalability of blockchains by performing transactions \emph{off-chain}. In an off-chain payment, parties deposit coins in a channel and then perform transactions without invoking the global consensus mechanism of the blockchain. However, the transaction value is limited by the capacity of the channel, i.e., the amount of funds available on a channel. These funds decrease when a transaction is sent and increase when a transaction is received on the channel. Recent research indicates that there is an imbalance between sending and receiving transactions, which leads to channel depletion in the sense that one of these operations becomes impossible over time due to the lack of available funds. We incentivize the balanced use of payment channels through fees. Whereas the current fee model depends solely on the transaction value, our fee policies encourage transactions that have a positive effect on the balance in a channel and discourage those that have a negative effect. This paper first defines necessary properties of fee strategies. Then, it introduces two novel fees strategies that provably satisfy all necessary properties. Our extensive simulation study reveals that these incentives increase the effectiveness of payments by $8\%$ to $19\%$.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{engelshoven2021merchant,
  author = {Yuup van Engelshoven and Stefanie Roos},
  title = {{The Merchant: Avoiding Payment Channel Depletion through Incentives}},
  booktitle = {DAPPS},
  year = {2021},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=SlBJ6nHuii},
}
Figure