TL;DR
This paper reveals how Facebook (Meta) uses its "invisible" FB Pixel and a one-time tag called FBCLID to track users across the web, even de-anonymizing past browsing activity and potentially tracking users indefinitely. The research highlights the significant adoption of these tracking mechanisms, particularly on sensitive websites, and their implications for user privacy.
What Problem Does This Paper Address?
The paper tackles the growing challenge of online user tracking, especially in the wake of third-party cookie restrictions. While Facebook's FB Pixel has been known to track user activity on websites, its ability to link this activity to specific users, particularly before they even have a Facebook account, and to track them persistently over time, has not been fully understood. The authors investigate how Facebook leverages the FB Pixel, in conjunction with the ephemeral FBCLID tag, to overcome limitations and build comprehensive user profiles, raising significant privacy concerns.
Methods
The researchers employed a multi-pronged approach:
- Crawling and Analysis: They crawled a large number of websites (up to 1M, with a focus on the top 10K and a sample of 6K) to identify the presence of FB Pixel and analyze network traffic and cookies.
- Empirical Analysis of FBCLID: They conducted experiments to understand how FBCLID values are generated and assigned, and how they are transmitted to Facebook.
- Longitudinal Study: They used the Wayback Machine to investigate the historical adoption of FB Pixel, tracing its presence back to 2013.
- Third-Party Sharing Analysis: They examined how websites share FB-related IDs (FBCLID and
_fbp) with third-party entities. - Cookie Expiration Analysis: They investigated the lifespan of FB Pixel cookies (
_fbp) by observing how their expiration dates are updated on websites.
Datasets
The study utilized several datasets:
- Tranco List: A ranking of the top 1M websites, used to select websites for crawling.
- Cyren's URL Category Check Gate: Used to categorize websites.
- Curlie's Internet Directory: Used to identify websites in sensitive GDPR categories.
- Wayback Machine: Used for historical analysis of FB Pixel adoption.
No new benchmarks were introduced; instead, the study analyzed existing web infrastructure and tracking mechanisms.
Key Insights and Ideas
- FBCLID as a De-anonymizer: The ephemeral FBCLID, when combined with the
_fbpcookie, acts as a powerful de-anonymization tool, allowing Facebook to link past anonymous browsing activity to a specific Facebook user. - Persistent Tracking Beyond 90 Days: Contrary to the typical 90-day lifespan of cookies, a significant majority of websites update the expiration date of the
_fbpcookie, enabling persistent tracking indefinitely. - Sensitive Categories are Highly Targeted: Websites in sensitive categories like health, politics, and sexual orientation show a high adoption rate of FB Pixel, indicating extensive tracking in these areas.
- Third-Party Sharing is Widespread: Many websites share FBCLID and
_fbpIDs with numerous third-party entities, extending the reach of tracking beyond Facebook itself. - Historical Data Accumulation: Facebook has been building user profiles through FB Pixel since at least 2013, meaning a user's browsing history could be matched to their account from a decade ago.
Key Results
- FB Pixel Adoption: Approximately 23% of the top 10K websites and 16.5% of sampled websites between 10K-1M rank use FB Pixel.
- FBCLID Usage: 93% of FB Pixel-enabled websites report both
_fbpand_fbc(containing FBCLID) values, enabling matching. - Persistent Tracking: 87.3% of analyzed websites update the
_fbpcookie expiration date, allowing for tracking beyond the initial 90 days. - Third-Party Sharing: A median website passes FBCLIDs to 4.9-6.2 third parties, with some passing them to over 30. Google is the primary recipient, with over 61% of websites reporting FBCLIDs to its services.
- Sensitive Categories: Websites in health, politics, and sexual orientation categories are particularly eager to adopt FB Pixel.
Limitations and Future Work
- Limited Knowledge of Usage: The authors acknowledge they do not know how, when, or why the collected data is used by Facebook or third parties after collection.
- Countermeasures Effectiveness: While ad-blockers and privacy-focused browsers exist, the paper notes that companies are finding ways to circumvent them, and the effectiveness of current countermeasures needs further investigation.
- Future Work: The authors suggest further research into the effectiveness of existing countermeasures and the development of new ones to preserve user privacy in the post-third-party cookie era. They also highlight the need to quantify how effective privacy-preserving efforts are and what other methods can be proposed by the security and privacy community.
Summary updated