The Contest Game for Crowdsourcing Reviews

Marios Mavronicolas, Paul G. Spirakis

Abstract

We consider a contest game modelling a contest where reviews for a proposal are crowdsourced from n players. Player i has a skill \(s_{i}\), strategically chooses a quality \(q \in \{ 1, 2, \ldots , Q \}\) for her review and pays an effort \(\textsf{f}_{q} \ge 0\), strictly increasing with q. Under voluntary participation, a player may opt to not write a review, paying zero effort; mandatory participation does not provide this option. For her effort, she is awarded a payment per her payment function, which is either player-invariant, like, e.g., the popular proportional allocation, or player-specific; it is oblivious when it does not depend on the numbers of players choosing a different quality. The utility to player i is the difference between her payment and her cost, calculated by a skill-effort function \(\mathsf{\Lambda } (s_{i}, \textsf{f}_{q})\). Skills may vary for arbitrary players; anonymous players means \(s_{i} = 1\) for all players i. In a pure Nash equilibrium, no player could unilaterally increase her utility by switching to a different quality. We show the following results about the existence and the computation of a pure Nash equilibrium:
BibTeX
@inproceedings{mavronicolas2023contest,
  author = {Marios Mavronicolas and Paul G. Spirakis},
  title = {{The Contest Game for Crowdsourcing Reviews}},
  booktitle = {Theoretical},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.1016/j.tcs.2025.115516},
}

Loading related content...

Figure